The Perry Centennial Celebration: a case study in U.S.-Japanese cultural diplomacy.

• Author: Saeki, Chizuru

Introduction

In studying U.S.-Japanese relations during the 1950s, historians and specialists in international relations have focused on political affairs, military strategies, and global politics in East Asia. (1) During this period, however, American involvement with Japan was not based exclusively on geo-political and military considerations; it also included cultural diplomacy. In undertaking this indirect yet important approach in the conduct of diplomacy, American policy makers relied on both government and private agencies to promote ideas and practices that characterized the American way of life to secure influence overseas. (2) In the case of U.S.-Japanese relations, the centennial celebration of the opening of Japan to American trade, an example of cultural diplomacy, had a significant impact on U.S.-Japanese relations and the development of the Cold War in East Asia.

U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1853-1945

On July 8, 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived off the coast of Uraga with four U.S. warships carrying a letter from President Millard Fillmore to the shogun in Edo (Tokyo) asking for humane treatment of shipwrecked American seamen, permission for American ships to enter Japanese ports for coal and supplies, and trade between the two nations. The shogunate was plunged into a state of crisis as the American ships entered Edo Bay. Caught in a vulnerable position because of the shogun's illness, the shogunal's advisors could not agree on a response to Perry's demands. Fearful that the Americans might use force to secure Japanese compliance, the Tokugawa government (Bakufu) allowed Perry to land in Uraga. Ending nearly two centuries of relative isolation, Bakufu officials, aware of the West's superior technology demonstrated against China in the Opium War (1839-42), knew that Japan could not withstand a military assault by a Western power. (3)

As the shogunate continued to wrestle with Perry's demands, the commodore returned the following spring with eight ships. Bakufu officials agreed to open two ports--Hakodate in Hokkaido and Shimoda at the tip of the Izu Peninsula--to American ships, to treat shipwrecked sailors, and to permit an American consul to reside in Shimoda. In August 1856, the American government directed Townsend Harris, the first U.S. consul to Japan, to negotiate a commercial treaty. Some Bakufu officials, realizing that the Western powers were far more advanced than Japan militarily, economically, and technologically, concluded that Japan could not avoid establishing full diplomatic relations with foreign powers. On July 29, 1858, Japan concluded a commercial treaty with the U.S., providing for the immediate opening of three ports for trade and two others shortly thereafter. The agreement also included provisions for duties on a variety of imports with a maximum five percent tariff on those imports. Edo and Osaka were opened to foreign residents in 1862 and 1863. Lastly, American citizens were granted extraterritorial rights and freedom of worship in Japan. (4)

During the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912), the Meiji government promoted Japan's modernization under Western tutelage. Under the slogan of rich nation and strong army, the Meiji government sought to make Japan strong enough to be treated with respect by the Western powers. After establishing a modern army and navy with Western assistance, Japan pursued imperialist policies in East Asia. Through its victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), and subsequent annexation of Korea (1910), Japan began to imitate the Western powers by establishing colonies and spheres of influence in East Asia. Western recognition of Japan's rising power followed quickly as evidenced by the termination of unequal treaties (1897) and the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902). (5)

Despite Japan's rising power in East Asia, the U.S. did not recognize Japan as an equal power. In 1905, the state legislature of California tried to restrict Asian immigration to the West Coast. One year later, the San Francisco school board announced plans to segregate Asians in its public schools. A gentlemen's agreement between the U.S. and Japan resolved both issues in favor of the United States. Nonetheless, disagreements continued to mount between the two governments. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the U.S. rejected Japan's effort to include a "racial equality clause" in the League of Nations Charter. Then, at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22, the United States, together with Great Britain, pressed Japan to maintain a smaller navy than either Western power. Two years later, the U.S. Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1924, which included a clause that barred Japanese immigrants from entering the United States. In the early 1930s, the United States and the Western powers criticized Japan's takeover of Manchuria in Northern China but could not stop it because of the Great Depression. Japan responded to criticism of its expansionist policies in East Asia (including America's response, the Stimson Doctrine) by withdrawing from the League of Nations in 1933. (6)

U.S.-Japanese relations deteriorated further with the resumption of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. By 1941, Japan tried to circumvent American trade restrictions by occupying Indochina and threatening to assume control of Southeast Asia, especially the Dutch East Indies, in order to satisfy Japan's economic needs. Perceiving this move as a threat to American interests in the Pacific, the U.S. froze Japanese financial assets and placed an embargo on all American oil exports to Japan. In the negotiations that followed, Japanese officials offered to withdraw their troops from Indochina if the U.S. would resume its oil exports to Japan. The U.S. however, insisted that Japan withdraw its troops from China and Manchuria. Rejecting these demands, Japanese leaders decided that they could protect their country's vital interests only through war. (7)

In December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. It proved to be a brilliant tactical victory for Japan but a fatal strategic error in the broader context of the war. Japan sought to knock out the U.S. Pacific Fleet and keep the United States from threatening Japan's access to raw materials in Southeast Asia. In planning the attack, Japanese naval leaders assumed that such a severe blow would cripple the U.S. fleet and prevent the U.S. from entering the war. Accordingly, they failed to follow-up the attack with an invasion of the United States. The attack, however, united American public opinion in favor of entering the war. (8)

The early days of the war witnessed a series of decisive victories for Japan until it experienced its first major defeat at the Battle of Midway (June 1942). (9) Over the next three years, American forces advanced across the Pacific on two fronts: General Douglas MacArthur slogged across New Guinea toward the Philippines while Admiral Chester Nimitz's amphibious forces engaged in an island-hopping campaign across the Pacific. By early 1945, MacArthur had returned to the Philippines and U.S. marines had occupied Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Convinced that a direct attack on Japan's home islands would prove too costly, President Harry S. Truman ordered the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9), thus ending the War in the Pacific. (10)

Occupation of Japan and the Cold War, 1945-1952

As Hiroshima and Nagasaki lay in ruin, Emperor Hirohito asked the Japanese people to "endure the unendurable" and accept surrender. On August 16, 1945, one day after the Japanese surrender, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), entered Japan, marking the beginning of the Allied Occupation of that nation (1945-52). SCAP officials immediately sought to both demilitarize and democratize Japan. They quickly organized an International Military Tribunal of the Far East, ordering the execution of twenty-eight Japanese military leaders, including Prime Minister Tojo Hideki. At the same time, SCAP adopted sweeping political, economic, and social reforms, including demands to dissolve the zaibatsu, promote land reform, and draft a new constitution. (11)

Most Japanese accepted these policies without protest. This peaceful Occupation process owed much to MacArthur's decision to retain the status of the Emperor. Believing that the Japanese would fight to the bitter end, MacArthur knew that Japan was united behind Emperor Hirohito. The fate of the Emperor after the war thus became the most immediate concern for the Japanese and SCAP. MacArthur believed that Hirohito and the institution of the Emperor were essential for maintaining political and social stability during the early period of the Occupation. He therefore decided to retain the Emperor to avoid the collapse of Japanese society. In so doing, MacArthur absolved Hirohito of any responsibility for war crimes. MacArthur also praised Hirohito's courage to announce his nation's surrender to avoid further loss of Japanese life. Since they worshipped the Emperor as a descendent of the Sun Goddess, most Japanese were impressed by MacArthur's handling of this issue. As long as SCAP and MacArthur retained the Emperor, there was little chance of any strong protest against American Occupation forces in Japan. (12)

Early American Occupation policy focused on the demilitarization and social reconstruction of Japan. By 1948, however, U.S. officials revised that policy to include Japan in America's national security policy in Asia. By the late 1940s, Washington officials had embraced a policy of containment, namely, stopping Soviet expansion through economic and military assistance programs (i.e., Marshall Plan, NATO). The U.S. had looked to Nationalist China to serve as an anchor of stability in Asia, but by 1947 that government was quickly losing ground to the Chinese communists. Meanwhile, Japan's Socialist Party had...