Has Nguyen Phu Trong's Leadership Curbed Economic Reform? Economic Reform Trends in Vietnam

Published date01 July 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/aepr.12301
Date01 July 2020
AuthorShozo Sakata
Has Nguyen Phu Trongs Leadership Curbed
Economic Reform? Economic Reform Trends
in Vietnam
Shozo SAKATA
Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO)
This paper argues how the features of Vietnams political-administrative system and their recent
changes have affected economic reform, particularly reform of state-owned enterprises. After the
12th Party Congress in 2016, the Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trongs administration
has seemed to exaggerate its conservative and totalitarian-looking rule in the political arena. In
contrast, the economic reform policies introduced by Trongs administration seem more trans-
formative and progressive. This paper suggests that this contradiction must indicate changes in
the policies relating to the state management of economic entities and/or a disguised form of
reform to retain state inuence over economic management, both of which tend to end up with
pervasive rent-seeking practices.
Key words: national champion, reform, rent-seeking, state-owned enterprises, Vietnam
JEL codes: P31, P48, D72, D73, O14, O43
Accepted: 11 December 2019
1. Introduction
It is generally agreed that the introduction of the reform orientation called Doi Moi, pro-
posed in the 6th Party Congress in 1986, put Vietnam on the right track for economic
development. However, Vietnam neither initiated many drastic reform policies at one
time nor achieved rapid economic growth immediately after it declared the onset of this
reform. Vietnam has gradually transformed its economy from a planned to a market-
oriented type, undertaking various restructurings, reorganizations, and amendments over
the last 30 years or more. Once facing a severely stagnant economy with a gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita of less than $US 100 at the end of the planning era, Vietnam
became a so-called middle-income country in 2010. Doi Moi has been an ongoing pro-
cess, and at least according to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), Vietnam is still
engaging in continuous reform efforts. Nonetheless, Vietnam has actively advanced eco-
nomic reform, particularly in participating in the global economy since the middle of the
1990s. It has concluded many bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs).
Correspondence: Shozo Sakata, Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Orga-
nization (IDE-JETRO), 3-2-2 Wakaba, Mihama-ku, Chiba-shi, Chiba 261-8545, Japan.
Email: shozo_sakata@ide.go.jp
© 2020 Japan Center for Economic Research 305
doi: 10.1111/aepr.12301 Asian Economic Policy Review (2020) 15, 305322
The remaining challenge for reform relates to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Whereas
many SOEs have been privatized or equitized (the term used by Vietnamese political
leaders), the government still announces its target numbers for equitized and listed SOEs
at the beginning of each year, but is disappointed at the end of each year.
Vietnams political and administrative reforms have occurred at a much slower
pace. One-party rule has been maintained, national elections are still under the screen-
ing and the supervision of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (the aligned organization of
the CPV), and the successive constitutions since Vietnam gained its independence as
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have conferred a special status to the CPV
(or the Labor Party of Vietnam from 1951 to 1976) as the leading political institution
of the state. Furthermore, recent events in the political arena, including a harsh anti-
corruption campaign, the concentration of power in the CPVs Secretary General
Nguyen Phu Trong, and the increasing repression of press freedom, represent the Par-
tys efforts to work against political-administrative reforms, strengthening (or even
reviving) the Leninist-style central state control.
Political scientist Jonathan London (2009, 2017) depicts Vietnam as a country
under market-Leninism.
1
London claims that in Vietnam, a specic combination of
market economic institutions and Leninist power relationsexists, and contrary to
conventional assumptions, market-based growth is not intrinsically incompatible with
Leninism(2017, p. 389). However, this sophisticated terminology does not reveal the
CPVs motivation or rationale for adopting economic reforms, which inevitably lessen
state control over the economy. The open question is whether the CPVs recent exces-
sively authoritarian rules signal its intention to curb economic reform.
In an attempt to answer this question, the present paper provides a discussion of
the progression of economic reforms in Vietnam under the recent political-
administrative changes through a presentation of various views on Vietnams reform.
In Section 2 recent political-administrative statuses and their underlying reform policy
issues under the new leadership since 2016 are introduced, followed by the review of
Vietnams recent economic performance in Section 3. These sections represent the
situation as the progressive reform taking place under the increasingly authoritarian-
looking polity. In Section 4, an analysis of the mechanism that has caused such a situa-
tion is presented. The present paper concludes that the CPVs seemingly intensifying
state control has not devastated much of the reform policy formulation. However, the
CPVs strengthened authoritarian surveillance over society has not curbed much perva-
sive rent-seeking practices either, which disables real reform.
2. Political-Economic Changes after 2016
Vietnams political-administrative systems have been governed by the CPVs Leninist
elites who enjoy monopolistic power to subordinate powerful bureaucracy, control
civil society through repression, and prioritize state economic interests over non-state
interests(London, 2017, p. 417). This section provides an overview of the recent situ-
ation, particularly after 2016, in which the CPV has seemingly intensied its control
Economic Reform Trends in Vietnam Shozo Sakata
306 © 2020 Japan Center for Economic Research

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