Morality within the limits of practical reason: a critique of Kant’s concept of moral virtue

• Published date: 02 January 2020
• Date: 02 January 2020
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-11-2018-0171
• Pages: 205-216
• Author: Edward Uzoma Ezedike
• Subject Matter: Economics,Social economics

Morality within the limits of

practical reason: a critique of

Kant’s concept of moral virtue

Edward Uzoma Ezedike

Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities,

University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria

Abstract

Purpose –The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluateKant’s idea of grounding morality within the

limits of practicalreason. Kant argues that morality must be devoidof emotions if the authors must make the

right decisions. His idea of morality is basically ratiocentric. This paper, therefore, seeks a justification of

Kant’s ratiocentricism,which excludes subjectiveemotional dimensions in moral actions and judgements.

Design/methodology/approach –This paper adopts a criticaland analytic method of research. It is not

empirical research, and hence, does not make use of tables and quantifiable data. The methodology is

exclusivelyqualitative in nature.

Findings –The major findingof this research work is that an application of practical reasonis necessary for

the moral agency but it is not a sufficient condition for moral agency. The existential realities demand a

synthetic applicationof reason and emotion in moral issues. So then,a good will is determined by the rational

principle.The reason is an organic whole that is capable of functioning bothpractically and theoretically. The

practical reasonis not reasoned functioning to acquire knowledge butreason operating as a guide and as the

directing force of the will. The applicationof pure, practical reason and relevant emotional considerationsis

both necessaryand sufficient for moral agency.

Originality/value –This paper is the outcome of deep critical reflectionson Kant’s moral philosophy by

the author.

Keywords Virtue, Emotion, Morality, Reason, Pure reason, Moral virtue

Paper type Research paper

Introduction

Kant’s ethics as articulated in his Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals

(originally published 1785)could be aptly summarized as a formalistic, deontological and

ethical theory. The basic principleof deontological ethics is that right (what we ought to do)

is not basically or entirely dependent on the result or outcome or consequences of our

action(s) (Taylor, 1967, p. 213). Kant also insisted that determine whether an act is good or

bad, right or wrong that we should examine suchin the light of its conformity with a valid

moral rule. Given that the test for a valid moral rule is a purely formal exercise, Kant’s

ethical system has equally been tagged formalisticethics. One of the important implications

of Kant’s ethics is that the search foran ultimate criterion for the validity of moral rules is an

attempt to build morality on an objectiveprinciple. Again, by establishing such rules on the

basis of rationality, Kant made morality ratio-centric and absolutely stripped of emotion.

Prominently, he presented the concept of Goodwill as an all-encompassing moral virtue. In

his words, “Nothing can be conceived in the world or even out of it, which can be called

good, without qualification, except Goodwill”(Kant, 1987, p. 214). This implies that a good

will is determined by rational principles. The reason, he argued, must move in the direction

of the will, as both ensure from the same faculty. Kant dismissed the qualities of

Kant’s concept

of moral virtue

205

Received27 November 2018

Revised11 January 2019

25March 2019

Accepted12 November 2019

InternationalJournal of Ethics and

Systems

Vol.36 No. 2, 2020

pp. 205-216

© Emerald Publishing Limited

2514-9369

DOI 10.1108/IJOES-11-2018-0171

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