Moral standards in managerial decisions: In search of a comprehensive theoretical framework

• Published date: 01 April 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/beer.12216
• Author: Marcos Luís Procópio
• Date: 01 April 2019

Business Ethics: A Eur Rev. 2019;28:261–274. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/beer  

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 261

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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In the field of management, where the dominant paradigm is essen‐

tially positiv ist and operat ionalist (Bran d, 2009; Cab ral‐Cardo so,

2000; C ampbell & Cowton, 2015; Chanlat , 1999; Eastman & Bailey,

1994; Lehnert, Cra ft, Singh, & Pa rk, 2016; Ramos, 1981), decisi on

making in organ izations has been tradit ionally seen as a mental pro ‐

cess based on form al, quantitative, an d morally neutral cr iteria of as‐

sessment and ch oice between al ternatives of ac tion (Etzioni, 1988;

Miller, Hickson, & Wi lson, 1996; Picavet, 2003). Given the hi gh de‐

gree of formalism w ithin that ort hodox theor y, “… rationality (or, if

you like, the ration al virtue of who decides) lies in t he procedure of

the decision … and n ot in the intrinsically good cha racter of the ac‐

tions which spri ng from the decision …” (Picavet, 20 03, p. 392). This

implies, in turn, an eminently “technical” perspective whereby the‐

ory is suppos edly detache d from any ethical o r moral element that

may exist in actu al decisions (Chan lat, 1999; Ramos, 1981). Thus,

“this decision t heory makes no assump tion about what is conside red

‘good’ or ‘better ’” (Picavet, 2003, p. 392) .

However, decisions are mo re than merely tec hnical probl ems.

Morality, i.e., the individual and social conduct driven by interper‐

sonal criteria of “goo d,” “fair,” and “correct,” is something irr educible

regarding huma n decisions, amo ng which are the man agerial ones

(Etzioni, 1988; Provis , 2010). As summarized by C abral‐Ca rdoso

(2000, p. 318),

any decision made i n the context of business is bas ed

on beliefs which a ssume a given system of val ues, and

which influence individuals or relations between in‐

dividuals. Th erefore, any decision made in a busi ness

context is also an et hical decisio n or has an ethical

dimension, jus t as it has a financia l or accounting

dimension.

According to Dewey (1950, p. 278), “… morals has to d o with all activ‐

ity into which alternative possibilities enter. For wherever they enter a

difference between better and worse arises.” Nonetheless, continues

the author,

Received:13Oct ober2017 

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  Revised:30Oc tober2018 

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  Accepted:1Novem ber2018

DOI: 10 .1111/bee r.12216

ORIGINAL ARTICLE





Marcos Luís Procópio

Faculdade de Ci ências Sociais Apl icadas

(FACISA), Univer sidade do Estado d e Mato

Grosso, Sinop, Brazil



Marcos Luís Pro cópio, Faculdade de C iências

Sociais Apli cadas (FACISA), Univer sidade do

Estado de Ma to Grosso, Av. dos Ingás, 3 001,

Jd Imperial , Sinop, Mato Grosso 78 .555‐000,

Brazil.

Emails: prof.marcosprocopio@gmail.com,

marcos@unemat‐net.br

Abstract

Although ethic al decision‐making theory has evolve d over the years, within the field

of management, rese arch still revolves aroun d James Rest’s (1986) four‐step frame‐

work, dominated by a positivist epistemology and a quantitative methodology. Given

that currently the re is a call for a theoreti cal, epistemolo gical, and metho dological

renovation for the enlargement and enrichment of knowledge about how decisions

are morally made in o rganizations, this paper has a doubl e aim. First, by showing the

models’ main flaws and li mitations, it criti cally assesses th e prominent theoret ical

models of Rest, Trevino, and Jon es. Then, for decisi on making in organiza tions, the

paper aims to posit a fres h moral theor y that addresses th e phenomenon from a

comprehensive episte mological perspec tive. To do so, it steps back from those prom‐

inent models in order to r eview John Dewey’s “the ory of moral life.” At the core of

the proposed compr ehensive theoretic al framework are D ewey’s concepts of a

“moral standar d” and “valuation.” Final ly, the paper shows how the Dewey‐base d

framework can bot h overcome the flaws and limit ations that are identi fied in those

prominent models an d can enrich empirical re search, therefore contribu ting to devel‐

oping as a whole the eth ical decision‐making field.