Maritime law

Pages91-96
91
international law update Volume 20, October–December 2014
© 2014 International Law Group, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com
MARITIME LAW
Where cargo operator is seeking to
enforce English court’s judgment on
a forward freight agreement, Second
Circuit reviews whether under § 1333
United States courts have jurisdiction
to enforce a judgment of a foreign non-
admiralty court if the claim underlying
that judgment would be deemed maritime
under the standards of U.S. law
D’Amico Dry Limited (“D’Amico”) brought
this suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York to enforce an
English court’s judgment on a forward freight
agreement (“FFA”) with Primera Maritime (Hellas)
Limited (“Primera”).
D’Amico operates Panamax dry bulk cargo
vessels in the business of carriage of goods by sea. Its
major business risk is that a slowdown in worldwide
commercial activity will lead to diminution
in shipments of cargo, causing vessels to make
expensive voyages partially empty or to lay idle.
During such slowdowns, the rates carriers charge
for carriage of goods fall too. D’Amico’s cost of
maintaining one of Panamax dry bulk cargo vessels
in an unemployed, idle state is roughly $12,000
per day on average. As a way to osetting these
losses D’Amico enters into futures contracts on
international shipping rates called “forward freight
agreements”. FFAs specify a base rate (the “contract
rate”) for a hypothetical shipment of specied
goods over specied routes and future dates for
comparison of the contract rate with the market
rates on such future dates. e responsibility of
contracting parties are as follow: if on a specied
future date the market rate is above the contract
rate, then the party that took the downside of the
agreement must pay the other party the dierence,
and vice versa, if on the future date the market
rate is below the contract rate the party that took
upside of the contract must pay the other party the
dierence. In D’Amico’s case, prots realized from
such contracts as rates fall will increase D’Amico’s
revenue when demand is low, counteracting its
losses from underemployment, while losses on such
contracts will decrease net revenues when demand
is high and rate rise.
In September 2008, Luciano Bonaso, D’Amico’s
Chief Executive Ocer, projected that for the
rst quarter of 2009, 280 vessel days remained
unchartered. Bonaso decided that D’Amico should
hedge against the underemployment by entering
into an FFA. On September 2, 2008, D’Amico
entered into an FFA with Primera, taking the
downside of freight rates for forty-ve Panamax
vessel days over four “Baltic Exchange” charter
routes. e FFA used a contract rate of $55,750 per
day to be compared to market rates for the Baltic
Panamax Index (“BPI”), as published by the Baltic
Exchange, at specied dates during the rst quarter
of 2009.
Furthermore, the FFA provided that all
disputes arising under it would be submitted to
the English High Court of Justice. According
to the FFA contract, Primera was obliged to pay
D’Amico if the market freight rates, published in
the BPI, for a specied shipping route on agreed
future dates were lower than the price specied in
the contract. By early 2009, the market rate had
declined signicantly and on January 30, 2009,
D’Amico invoiced Primera for $795,963.20 under
the terms of the FFA. Primera failed to pay.
D’Amico brought suit in England at the High
Court of Justice to enforce the agreement. e case
was heard by the Commercial Court of Queen’s
Bench Division, not the Admiralty Court. e
court entered a judgment in D’Amico’s favor in
the amount of $1,766,278.54, including interest
and other components. Primera did not pay the
judgment.
D’Amico brought the suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New
York to enforce the English judgment. D’Amico
asserted federal subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1333. is statute gives the federal
district court exclusive jurisdiction to hear “[a]ny
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.”
Primera moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. e District Court granted Primera’s
motion to dismiss. e district court concluded
that it lacked admiralty jurisdiction to enforce

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