Manufacturer warranty service outsourcing strategies in a dual‐channel supply chain

AuthorShuguang He,Dongfan Wang,Yiwen Zhang,Zhen He,Keyuan Cai
Date01 November 2020
Published date01 November 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12769
Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 27 (2020) 2899–2926
DOI: 10.1111/itor.12769
INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS
IN OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH
Manufacturer warranty service outsourcing strategies
in a dual-channel supply chain
Yiwen Zhang, Zhen He, Shuguang He, Keyuan Cai and Dongfan Wang
College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China
E-mail: zhang_yiwen@tju.edu.cn [Zhang]; zhhe@tju.edu.cn [Z. He]; shuguanghe@tju.edu.cn [S. He];
keyuancai@tju.edu.cn [Cai]; dfwang@tju.edu.cn [Wang]
Received 24 March 2019; receivedin revised form 16 December 2019; accepted 17 December 2019
Abstract
Warranty management for durable products has received increasing attention in recent years. In addition
to conventionally keeping warranty in-house, more manufacturers choose to outsource warranty service to
agents.This paper explores outsourcing strategies formanufacturer warranty services in a dual-channel supply
chain by which the demand-enhancing service can be undertaken by different supply chain parties. We show
the results of three alternative outsourcing strategies for manufacturers whereby (a) the retailer undertakes
the service, (b) a third party undertakes the service, and (c) both the retailer and a third party undertake the
service simultaneously. According to Stackelberg game theory, we build a two-echelon supply chain model
and discuss the corresponding expressions for supply chain members’ equilibrium decisions. Additionally,
we compare the profits of each supply chain member and derive interesting managerial insights. When the
base market size is relatively large, Scenario R helps the manufacturer and the retailer reach a “win-win”
situation.
Keywords:warranty service outsourcing; game theory; dual-channel supply chain; warranty cost
1. Introduction
A good warranty service can boost demand and help a company build its brand image (Guajardo
et al., 2015). Many manufacturers have resorted to providing warranty service to avoid traditional
competition that depends solely on price to lure customers (Wei et al., 2015). For instance, Dell and
Apple have gained reputation from high-quality after-sales customer service and support (Li et al.,
2016). However, these companies must realize a trade-off between the benefits and the associated
cost of providing warranty services. Like Tesla, the warranty services cost it $123 million in 2017
(Guajardo et al., 2015). Global warranty cost cannot be calculated with the same accuracy. It is
estimated to vary from 1% to 5% of the total sale price (Kurvinen et al., 2016).
Corresponding author.
C
2020 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2020 International Federation ofOperational Research Societies
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA02148,
USA.
2900 Y. Zhang et al. / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res.27 (2020) 2899–2926
Facing huge maintenance costs, more manufacturers choose to outsource their warranty service
to a third party or retailer as a service agent, since the service outsourcing allows the companies
to avoid establishing huge costly service networks and to instead focus on its core competencies
(Kurvinen et al., 2016). Moreover, considering service agents are more specialized in after-sales
service, companies prefer to outsource the service than doing it in-house. The global outsourcing
market reached $952 billion in 2013 and continues to grow (Fersht and Snowdon, 2013; Ouyang
and Su, 2016).
Different companies use different service outsourcing strategies. And there is a considerable
variety in dual-channel supply chains. Many companies including Sony Electonics, IBM, Dell, and
KIA sell products through independent retailers such as Best Buy as wellas through their respective
e-commerce websites or Tmall.com (Ding et al., 2016; Chen et al. 2017). Consumers spent more
than $89 billion shopping online in the last quarter of 2015 in the United States alone (Chen et al.,
2017).
Facing the flourish service outsourcing industry in dual channel, some questions are raised.
How to choose the strategies from the perspective of manufacturers? Furthermore, how these
strategies benefit the companies? This program is devoted to explore and clarify. We discuss three
common warranty service outsourcing strategies in dual-channel supply chains: (a) Scenario R,
where the manufacturer outsources all the warranty service to the retailer. This is common in
automobile industry, for example, Toyota, Volkswagen consign warranty services for customers
to auto dealerships after products have been sold (Li et al., 2014); (b) Scenario 3P, where the
manufacturer outsources all the warranty services to the third party. Company such as BMW
outsources its warranty services to a third party instead of its dealerships (Esmaeili et al., 2014). A
similar strategy is also adopted by Renault for after-sales services for its electric Zoe model (Chen
and Perez, 2017); (c) Scenario 3PR, where the manufactureroutsources the warranty services of the
direct channel and the retail channel to a third party and a retailer, respectively. Some companies
adopt this hybrid warranty service outsourcing strategy. In the case of Apple, for example, its
products are insured by both resellers and third parties (Esmaeili et al., 2014).
To serve this program, we examine warranty service outsourcing strategies by establishing theo-
retical models with the Stackelberg game theory. Assuming a manufacturer sells products through
both direct and retail channels bundled with warranty service, the retailer needs to decide the retail
price for both channels. Many companies adopt the equal-pricing strategy setting the equal price
under different sales channels. Like Dell, each model of their laptops is priced the same on their
website and retail outlets. This pricing strategy can help the company to alleviate channel conflict
between the traditional and direct channels. Thus in this paper, we assume that the supply chain
adopts the equal-pricing strategy to avoid channel conflict, which is widely used in the literature
(Li et al., 2014; He et al., 2018). Although dual-channel supply chain management is discussed in
substantial literature, we examine this subject from a new perspective, service outsourcing, and we
answer the following questions:
(a) Which strategy brings the highest profits to the supply chain members?
(b) With which strategywill the customers perceive the highest warranty service level and the lowest
retail price?
(c) How do the strategies differ in terms of system parameters such as customer preferences and
service cost sensitivity?
C
2020 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2020 International Federation ofOperational Research Societies

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