Making Economic Policy in a Democratic Indonesia: The First Two Decades
Author | Hal Hill,Chatib Basri |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/aepr.12299 |
Published date | 01 July 2020 |
Date | 01 July 2020 |
Making Economic Policy in a Democratic
Indonesia: The First Two Decades
M. Chatib BASRI
1
and Hal HILL
2
†
1
University of Indonesia and
2
Australian National University
After three decades of rapid economic growth during the authoritarian Soeharto era, followed by
the deep but relatively short-lived Asian financial crisis, Indonesia transitioned rapidly to demo-
cratic and decentralized governance. We examine policy-making processes and economic out-
comes during the first two decades of this new era, leading up to the 2019 national elections
where it was widely conjectured that Indonesia might follow the global trends of authoritarian
rule and illiberalism. We conclude that, thus far, Indonesia has navigated the transition from
authoritarian to democratic rule quite successfully. Compared to the Soeharto era, growth has
been somewhat slower, inequality has risen, and policy reform is slower and generally incremen-
tal. But living standards continue to rise and all major political players have elected to operate
within the new democratic parameters. Macroeconomic management has continued to be effec-
tive. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for complacency: there is a large outstanding reform
agenda, and the economy is not providing enough economic opportunities for the better-
educated senior secondary and tertiary graduates entering the workforce.
Key words: decentralization, democracy, economic policy, Indonesia, reform
JEL codes: D72, E02, H11, O53
Accepted: 16 December 2019
1. Introduction
Few countries have experienced as much economic and political volatility as Indonesia
over the past quarter-century. In the mid-1960s it was one of the poorest countriesin the
world, it had withdrawn from the global economy and its institutions, it was experienc-
ing hyperinflation, and there were deep political schisms. However, in the wake of terri-
ble conflict, a new, authoritarian, growth-oriented regime under the leadership of
President Soeharto took control in 1966, and oversaw three decades of very rapid eco-
nomic growth and improved living standards. All this abruptly came to an end during
the Asian financial crisis (AFC), when the economy shrank by over 13% in 1998. And,
unlike its crisis-affected neighbors, these events triggered fundamental political change.
We are grateful to the Editors and designated discussants for helpful comments, to Takatoshi Ito
for very detailed comments, and to Abrar Aulia for excellent research assistance.
†Correspondence: Hal Hill, Arndt Corden Department of Economics, Crawford School, College
of Asia and Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 2601, Australia. Email: hal.
hill@anu.edu.au
214 © 2020 Japan Center for Economic Research
doi: 10.1111/aepr.12299 Asian Economic Policy Review (2020) 15, 214–234
The seemingly impregnable Soeharto regime suddenly collapsed in May 1998. Indonesia
then made four major transitions: From decades of authoritarian rule to a relatively open
and democratic state; from one of the deepest economic crises in recent times to a
growth recovery within 3 years; from highly centralized rule to what is in effect a federal
system of governance with significant local-level fiscal and administrative autonomy; and
from seemingly insuperable public indebtedness to effectivefiscal consolidation.
Against this backdrop, we examine Indonesia’s economic development and eco-
nomic policy making during the two-decade democratic era, from the early transition
and recovery period through to the 2019 elections that were conducted in an era rising
global polarization and authoritarianism. The present paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides an analytical sketch of the new institutional and political environ-
ment in which Indonesian economic policy-making is conducted. It also highlights
some of the key economic policy reforms that have been enacted. Section 3 provides
an overview of economic development from the mid-1990s, that is, the late Soeharto
era, to the present. In Section 4 we examine the outcome of the 2019 general election,
as a case study of how Indonesia’s evolving political system has responded to both the
current global discourses and to domestic socioeconomic challenges. A concluding
section sums up. The present paper can be read in conjunction with our companion
piece (Basri & Hill, 2020, hereafter BH2020), which provides additional information
on Indonesia in comparative Southeast Asian context.
2. Political Economy: From Authoritarian to Democratic Governance
In the aftermath of the AFC, Indonesia’s political economy framework changed funda-
mentally in the transition from the Soeharto to the democratic era. The former was
characterized by a commitment to economic growth, and its policy regime was shaped
by this imperative, as mediated by the constellation of political forces surrounding the
authoritarian presidency and by an array of external circumstances (Mackie &
MacIntyre, 1994). In difficult economic times –notably the late 1960s and the mid-
1980s –the technocrats led by Professor Widjojo Nitisastro were in the ascendancy,
and they pursued a broadly market-oriented, orthodox strategy combined with prudent
macroeconomic management. However, in “good times”their political influence was
circumscribed, as during the 1970s oil boom and the first half of the 1990s.
The AFC swept aside this economic and political model. Five key features of the
new political system were quickly established.
1
First, the president and vice-president
are directly elected, as part of a multiparty political system, and who are permitted to
hold office for a maximum of two consecutive terms. Second, there are separate elec-
tions for the two houses of parliament, with the lower house, the Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat (DPR), the major law-making institution. The DPR was essentially a rubber
stamp for the Soeharto presidency, but it is now an independent and occasionally
assertive body, and one in which no one party has a majority. As a result, and third,
since the president’s party does not command a majority of seats in the DPR (and
internal party discipline is quite weak), “rainbow coalitions”of parties are necessary
Chatib Basri and Hal Hill Making Economic Policy in Indonesia
© 2020 Japan Center for Economic Research 215
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