Machiavelli, Guicciardini and the “Governo Largo”

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12081
• Date: 01 June 2015
• Published date: 01 June 2015
• Author: Cesare Pinelli

Machiavelli, Guicciardini

and the “Governo Largo”

CESARE PINELLI

Abstract. Niccolò Machiavelli’s support for what he calls governo largo, or popular

government, is usually contrasted with the diffidence towards it of Francesco

Guicciardini, the Florentine aristocrat. The article argues that both these authors

grounded their vision on Polybius’ theory of “mixed government,” though adapt-

ing it in different directions. In examining this difference, the article reaches the

conclusion that it concerns far less the degree of popular participation in political

decision-making and government than the value that Machiavelli and Guicciardini

respectively ascribe to it in comparison with that of safety-liberty (or legal cer-

tainty). In this respect, their theories may be viewed as anticipating the tensions

between democracy and the rule of law, the co-presence of which provides the

essential foundation of the structure of present-day constitutional democracies.

1.

After the Medici family were first thrown out of Florence in 1494, a Great Council

was established. Comprising approximately 3,000 representatives of the aristocracy

and the middle classes, the Great Council rapidly became the emblem of a “governo

largo,” i.e., a “broad” or a “popular” government. It was fiercely contested by the

aristocracy, or “ottimati,” who championed the return of a “governo stretto” (or

“narrow government”) under their control (Gilbert 1970, 60). Florence had more

than 100,000 inhabitants, so we should not project onto the Great Council the idea

of political egalitarianism that we associate with the concept of democracy (Gilbert

1977, 73). Rather, the “broad/narrow” dichotomy signified the inclusion or exclu-

sion from the city government of what was referred to at the time as “the people.”

This fact is confirmed by the distinction current at the time between two ways

of consulting citizens about decisions. “Pratiche larghe” (broad-based consultative

meetings) were attended by between 100 and 500 citizens representing every

district of Florence in equal measure, whereas “pratiche strette” (“narrow” meetings)

convened between 10 and 20 members and were reserved for representatives of the

richest and most powerful families. Those in favour of the 1494 Constitution soon

clashed with the aristocracy over this as well (Gilbert 1977, 72).

The contrast between “governo largo” and “governo stretto” was also used to refer

to the choice between drawing lots and elections for the purposes of conferring

government appointments. The nobles, who had been able to manipulate the

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Ratio Juris. Vol. 28 No. 2 June 2015 (267–85)

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drawing of lots in the past, feared that the decision to have recourse to elections to

the Great Council would put them at a disadvantage. This was until they realised

that drawing lots allowed members of the middle classes to gain access to office by

means of a wider field of candidates, whereas elections resulted in the appointment

of well-known names, generally aristocrats (Gilbert 1970, 55). At this point drawing

lots came to be systematically associated with a governo largo and elections with a

governo stretto (Manin 2010, 69).

The preference for popular government of Niccolò Machiavelli (who was then

Chancellery Secretary) has from time immemorial been contrasted with the diffi-

dence towards it by Francesco Guicciardini, who “had the family pride of a

Florentine aristocrat” (Gilbert 1970, 236). However, if we shift the comparative

focus onto the different interpretations of “governo largo” just indicated and, above

all, attempt such a comparison from a constitutionalist perspective, I believe there

are grounds for revisiting this contrast.

A useful starting point is to be found in an examination of the two authors’

approaches to the subject of forms of government. This is in order to identify the

lowest common denominator that might make the comparison plausible. I will then

consider the instances when the two writers use the term “governo largo” and the

nature of the arguments supporting their respective theses, according to whether it

was the Roman republic or the Florence of the time that was the issue under

discussion. On this basis, I propose to show how their positions on the concept of

governo largo may correspond to competing visions of a constitutional order and,

albeit in embryonic form, represent some of the structural dilemmas facing con-

temporary constitutionalism. The intention is to rule out an over-simplistic exploi-

tation of the classical authors, and Machiavelli in particular, that is still found in

contemporary debates.

2.

In the wealth of literature dedicated to Machiavelli and Guicciardini, the question

of forms of government is one of the subjects attracting the greatest attention. It is

also one of the most controversial, given the historical and theoretical aspects

discernible in the two authors’ most important works. This is only of interest to us

here for the purpose of ascertaining whether their positions regarding a governo

largo stem from premises that are sufficiently similar to permit a subsequent

comparison. This condition is both necessary and sufficient for comparative pur-

poses and, in searching for it, I will allow the two authors to speak for themselves

by citing well-known, fundamental passages. Thus, after declaring his desire “to

represent things as they are in real truth, rather than as they are imagined,”

Machiavelli warns that:

[m]any have dreamed up republics and principalities which have never in truth been known

to exist; the gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man

who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way to self-destruction

rather than self-preservation. The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every way

necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. (Machiavelli 1984, 59)

The allusion to the humanist rhetoricians who dreamed up republics and princi-

palities “never known to exist” confirms, by counterpoint, that the writer is looking

268 Cesare Pinelli

© 2015 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Ratio Juris, Vol. 28, No. 2