Leverage and firm investment: the role of information asymmetry and growth

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-10-2017-0127
Pages56-73
Published date04 March 2019
Date04 March 2019
AuthorAlbert Danso,Theophilus Lartey,Samuel Fosu,Samuel Owusu-Agyei,Moshfique Uddin
Subject MatterAccounting & Finance,Accounting/accountancy,Accounting methods/systems
Leverage and rm investment: the
role of information asymmetry
and growth
Albert Danso and Theophilus Lartey
Leicester Castle Business School, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK
Samuel Fosu
Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Samuel Owusu-Agyei
Leicester Castle Business School, De Montfort University, Leicester UK, and
Moshfique Uddin
Business School, Leeds University, Leeds, UK
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to demonstratehow nancial leverage impacts rm investment and the extent
to which this relationshipis conditional on the level of information asymmetryas well as growth.
Design/methodology/approach The paper relies on data from 2,403 Indian rms during the period
1995-2014, generatinga total of 19,544 rm-year observations.Analysis is conducted by using various panel
econometrictechniques.
Findings Drawing insightsfrom agency theories, the paper uncovers that nancial leverage is negatively
and signicantly related torm investment. It is also observed that the impact of nancialleverage on rm
investment is signicant for high information asymmetric rms. Finally, the paper shows that the
relationship between leverage and rm investment is signicant for low-growth rms. However, no
signicantrelationship is found between leverageand investment for high-growth rms.
Originality/value This paper provides fresh evidence on the leverageinvestment nexus and, to the
authorsknowledge,it the rst paper to examine the extent to which this leverageinvestmentrelationship is
driven by the level of informationasymmetry.
Keywords India, Leverage, Information asymmetry, Investment
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
This paper provides a new contribution to the existingliterature by examining the effect of
rm leverage on investment with a specic focus on Indian rms. It also distinctively
examines the extent to which the leverageinvestment relationship is driven by the levelof
information asymmetry as well as rm growth. The analysesare conducted and the results
interpreted withina classic agency theoretical framework.
The central proposition of Modiglianiand Millers (1958) (hereafter MM) seminal work is
that, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, capital structure is irrelevant to rm
value and hence a rmsnancing and investment decisions are independent. This means
JEL classication G14, G30, G31, G32
IJAIM
27,1
56
Received26 October 2017
Revised13 November 2017
Accepted23 November 2017
InternationalJournal of
Accounting& Information
Management
Vol.27 No. 1, 2019
pp. 56-73
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1834-7649
DOI 10.1108/IJAIM-10-2017-0127
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/1834-7649.htm
that rm managers could not maximise the value of their rms by altering the debt-equity
mix. Thus, in the view of Modigliani and Miller (1958),arm with protable investment
opportunities could still obtain the external funds required regardless of the state of its
nancial position. Subsequent developments, however, suggest that a rms capital
structure is essentially relevant as nance affects real investment decisions. For instance,
Myers (1977) shows that rms with more debt service are likely to have their positive net
present value (NPV) projects go unfunded because of the issue of debt overhang created by
prior debt nancing. Consequently,this suggests that the leverage level of a rm matters in
its investment decision. In respect of this, a signicant number of studies (Bradley et al.,
1984;Friend and Lang, 1988;Denis and Denis, 1993;McConnell and Servaes, 1995;Lang
et al.,1996;Aivazian et al., 2005a;Cleary, 2006) have been devoted to examining the
leverage-investment relationship. However, these empirical studies are heavily biased to
data originating in developed nation settings, ignoring potential variations in the
investment outcome of nancial leveragein rms located in less developed markets. Given
this gap, it is therefore important to probe the leverage-investment relationship in the
context of an emerging marketsuch as India. Thus, by relying on large-scale data from over
2,400 rms, this study offers a freshinsight into the leverageinvestment relationship from
the context of an emerging economy India. Our work is closely related in spirit, though
distinct from prior studies (Aivazian et al., 2005b;Ahn et al., 2006) in one major respect: we
argue on the basis of prior scholarly works (Lang et al., 1996) that management chooses
leverage based on its private information about the rms future growth opportunities.
Thus, as a way of extension, the paper assesses the extentto which the leverageinvestment
relationship is conditional on the level of information asymmetry. Consistent with other
empirical works (Lang et al.,1996;Aivazian et al., 2005b;Ahn et al., 2006), the results
indicate that leverage is negativelyrelated to rm investment and signicantly stronger for
high information asymmetricrms. Moreover, it is observed that this negative effect is also
signicantly strongerfor low-growth rms than for high-growth rms.
The paper contributes to the nanceliterature in the following ways. First, by relying on
data from India, it is among the rst to examine the leverageinvestment nexus outside the
context of a developed market. By so doing, it demonstrates that the leverageinvestment
relationship evidentin the developed context is also applicable in the context of an emerging
market. Second, despite the burgeoning managerial and academic interest in capital
structure issues, scholarly research is yet to examine if information asymmetry drives the
leverageinvestment relationship. Given this, the paper extends extant knowledge on the
nancial leverageinvestment relationship by showing how the relationship is shaped by
degrees of information asymmetry. By relying on analystsforecast properties, the paper
demonstrates that leverage is negatively related to investment and that this negative effect
is signicantly stronger for high information asymmetric rms. To the best of the authors
knowledge, this is the rststudy to examine this.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows:Section 2 provides a brief background of the
study; Section 3 examines relevant literature and its theoretical underpinnings; Section 4
discusses the sample,empirical design and measurement of variables; Section5 presents the
regression results and discussion;nally, Section 6 provides a summary of the ndings and
concludes the study.
2. Background of study
An overview of the unique features of Indiaseconomic, nancial and investment structure
puts this paper into perspective. In India, there has been continuously rapid economic
growth over the past three decades, for instance,the institutionalisation of the 1991 nancial
Leverage and
rm
investment
57

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