Leverage and firm investment: the role of information asymmetry and growth
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-10-2017-0127 |
Pages | 56-73 |
Published date | 04 March 2019 |
Date | 04 March 2019 |
Author | Albert Danso,Theophilus Lartey,Samuel Fosu,Samuel Owusu-Agyei,Moshfique Uddin |
Subject Matter | Accounting & Finance,Accounting/accountancy,Accounting methods/systems |
Leverage and firm investment: the
role of information asymmetry
and growth
Albert Danso and Theophilus Lartey
Leicester Castle Business School, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK
Samuel Fosu
Business School, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Samuel Owusu-Agyei
Leicester Castle Business School, De Montfort University, Leicester UK, and
Moshfique Uddin
Business School, Leeds University, Leeds, UK
Abstract
Purpose –This paper aims to demonstratehow financial leverage impacts firm investment and the extent
to which this relationshipis conditional on the level of information asymmetryas well as growth.
Design/methodology/approach –The paper relies on data from 2,403 Indian firms during the period
1995-2014, generatinga total of 19,544 firm-year observations.Analysis is conducted by using various panel
econometrictechniques.
Findings –Drawing insightsfrom agency theories, the paper uncovers that financial leverage is negatively
and significantly related tofirm investment. It is also observed that the impact of financialleverage on firm
investment is significant for high information asymmetric firms. Finally, the paper shows that the
relationship between leverage and firm investment is significant for low-growth firms. However, no
significantrelationship is found between leverageand investment for high-growth firms.
Originality/value –This paper provides fresh evidence on the leverage–investment nexus and, to the
authors’knowledge,it the first paper to examine the extent to which this leverage–investmentrelationship is
driven by the level of informationasymmetry.
Keywords India, Leverage, Information asymmetry, Investment
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
This paper provides a new contribution to the existingliterature by examining the effect of
firm leverage on investment with a specific focus on Indian firms. It also distinctively
examines the extent to which the leverage–investment relationship is driven by the levelof
information asymmetry as well as firm growth. The analysesare conducted and the results
interpreted withina classic agency theoretical framework.
The central proposition of Modiglianiand Miller’s (1958) (hereafter MM) seminal work is
that, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, capital structure is irrelevant to firm
value and hence a firm’sfinancing and investment decisions are independent. This means
JEL classification –G14, G30, G31, G32
IJAIM
27,1
56
Received26 October 2017
Revised13 November 2017
Accepted23 November 2017
InternationalJournal of
Accounting& Information
Management
Vol.27 No. 1, 2019
pp. 56-73
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1834-7649
DOI 10.1108/IJAIM-10-2017-0127
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/1834-7649.htm
that firm managers could not maximise the value of their firms by altering the debt-equity
mix. Thus, in the view of Modigliani and Miller (1958),afirm with profitable investment
opportunities could still obtain the external funds required regardless of the state of its
financial position. Subsequent developments, however, suggest that a firm’s capital
structure is essentially relevant as finance affects real investment decisions. For instance,
Myers (1977) shows that firms with more debt service are likely to have their positive net
present value (NPV) projects go unfunded because of the issue of debt overhang created by
prior debt financing. Consequently,this suggests that the leverage level of a firm matters in
its investment decision. In respect of this, a significant number of studies (Bradley et al.,
1984;Friend and Lang, 1988;Denis and Denis, 1993;McConnell and Servaes, 1995;Lang
et al.,1996;Aivazian et al., 2005a;Cleary, 2006) have been devoted to examining the
leverage-investment relationship. However, these empirical studies are heavily biased to
data originating in developed nation settings, ignoring potential variations in the
investment outcome of financial leveragein firms located in less developed markets. Given
this gap, it is therefore important to probe the leverage-investment relationship in the
context of an emerging marketsuch as India. Thus, by relying on large-scale data from over
2,400 firms, this study offers a freshinsight into the leverage–investment relationship from
the context of an emerging economy –India. Our work is closely related in spirit, though
distinct from prior studies (Aivazian et al., 2005b;Ahn et al., 2006) in one major respect: we
argue on the basis of prior scholarly works (Lang et al., 1996) that management chooses
leverage based on its private information about the firm’s future growth opportunities.
Thus, as a way of extension, the paper assesses the extentto which the leverage–investment
relationship is conditional on the level of information asymmetry. Consistent with other
empirical works (Lang et al.,1996;Aivazian et al., 2005b;Ahn et al., 2006), the results
indicate that leverage is negativelyrelated to firm investment and significantly stronger for
high information asymmetricfirms. Moreover, it is observed that this negative effect is also
significantly strongerfor low-growth firms than for high-growth firms.
The paper contributes to the financeliterature in the following ways. First, by relying on
data from India, it is among the first to examine the leverage–investment nexus outside the
context of a developed market. By so doing, it demonstrates that the leverage–investment
relationship evidentin the developed context is also applicable in the context of an emerging
market. Second, despite the burgeoning managerial and academic interest in capital
structure issues, scholarly research is yet to examine if information asymmetry drives the
leverage–investment relationship. Given this, the paper extends extant knowledge on the
financial leverage–investment relationship by showing how the relationship is shaped by
degrees of information asymmetry. By relying on analysts’forecast properties, the paper
demonstrates that leverage is negatively related to investment and that this negative effect
is significantly stronger for high information asymmetric firms. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, this is the firststudy to examine this.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows:Section 2 provides a brief background of the
study; Section 3 examines relevant literature and its theoretical underpinnings; Section 4
discusses the sample,empirical design and measurement of variables; Section5 presents the
regression results and discussion;finally, Section 6 provides a summary of the findings and
concludes the study.
2. Background of study
An overview of the unique features of India’seconomic, financial and investment structure
puts this paper into perspective. In India, there has been continuously rapid economic
growth over the past three decades, for instance,the institutionalisation of the 1991 financial
Leverage and
firm
investment
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