Legislating International Legal Ambiguity in A Contentious Democracy: Indonesia's Interpretation of Global Maritime Cabotage Princples

AuthorElfrida Ratnawati & Siti Nurbaiti
PositionUniversitas Trisakti Faculty of Law, Indonesia
Pages75-94
ξ€Ÿe Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law
ISSN: 2338-7602; E-ISSN: 2338-770X
http://www.ijil.org
Β© 2021 ξ€Ÿe Institute for Migrant Rights Press
We would like to thank Pranoto Iskandar and Abdurrachman Satrio for their valuable
assistances throughout both the research and writing process that enabled us to com-
plete this article.
LEGISLATING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
AMBIGUITY IN A CONTENTIOUS
DEMOCRACY
IndonesIa’s InterpretatIon of Global MarItIMe
CabotaGe prInCIple
Elfrida Ratnawati & Siti Nurbaiti
Universitas Trisakti Faculty of Law, Indonesia
Email: elfrida.r@trisakti.ac.id & siti.n@trisakti.ac.id
In this paper, we show that the ambiguousness of international legal principle is
an open vessel for the receiving domestic politics to appropriate, so much so that
it becomes self-contradictory. To a great extent, this international legal ambigu-
ity has rendered international legal principle to be meaningless. To substantiate
it, we discuss how global maritime cabotage principle is being translated in In-
donesia. ξ€Ÿe Indonesian case suggests that both legal and extra-legal consider-
ations have equally informed the ever-shiξ€›ing meaning of cabotage principle.
Clearly, this signiξ€žes that the process of domestic legislation plays the determin-
ing role in deξ€žning the semantic content of an international legal principle. In
other words, it is important to take the domestic process of legislation seriously.
As such, this paper presents a contribution to the discourse of the rule of law
building in developing legal systems, such as Indonesia.
Keywords: law and development, international legal theory, comparative law, legisla-
tion theory, legal transplant.
X Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law 75-94 (January 2023)
76
Ratnawati & Nurbaiti
INTRODUCTION
It is stated that β€œthe law is a profession of word”.1 In spite of the fact that
it seems trite, this particular proposition implies that legal ambiguity,
i.e., the capacity of the law to be understood in more ways than one, is
something inevitable. ξ€Ÿus, grappling with legal ambiguity as a result
of indeterminate language is a perennial question in jurisprudence. For
that matter, it is hardly a surprise that β€œ[s]igniξ€žcant portions of the
institutional legal system, especially courts at the appellate level and
supreme courts, are for the most part concerned not with disentangling
the facts of cases but with the indeterminacies of the law”.2
Supposedly, legal ambiguity has something to do with the concept
of modern law itself as primarily relying on the use of words. From
that perspective, an understanding that only textual or plain meaning
matters becomes conceivable.3 In short, it is through words that modern
human societies constitute, order and regulate their legal aξ€œairs.4
What is more, legal ambiguity is not conξ€žned to the domestic
context. It may also be present at the supranational level. For instance,
a noted commentator has explored β€œways in which the institution(s)
is founded upon a long list of antinomies and ambiguities that allow
various participants to take things how they will”.5 It would not be a
stretch to say: β€œinternational law is replete with deliberately created
ambiguities. Most treaty provisions are ambiguous because the parties
were able to agree only on studied ambiguity instead of concrete
1. Dξ€ξ€Žξ€“ξ€Š Mξ€‘ξ€”ξ€”ξ€“ξ€—ξ€…ξ€˜ξ€’ξ€’, T Lξ€ξ€—ξ€Œξ€‡ξ€ξ€Œξ€‘ ξ€˜ξ€’  L vii (1963).
2. Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness In Legal Interpretation, in T
Oξ€ξ€’ξ€˜ξ€•ξ€Š Hξ€ξ€—ξ€Šξ€ˆξ€˜ξ€˜ξ€… ξ€˜ξ€’ Lξ€ξ€—ξ€Œξ€‡ξ€ξ€Œξ€‘ ξ€ξ€—ξ€Š L 128, 128 (Lawrence M. Solan &
Peter M. Tiersma eds., 2012).
3. V C ξ€ξ€—ξ€˜, Sξ€‘ξ€•ξ€Žξ€“ξ€—ξ€Œ  Wξ€˜ξ€•ξ€Š: L  A ξ€’ξ€•ξ€˜ξ€‚
 P ξ€ξ€˜  B (2001).
4. Lξ€“ξ€—ξ€Šξ€ Cξ€˜ξ€”ξ€”ξ€‘ξ€†, T G,  S ξ‚€  P: W, Cξ€˜ξ€—ξ€ƒξ€ξ€“ξ€ξ€‡ξ€ξ€“ξ€˜ξ€—ξ€ƒ
ξ€ξ€—ξ€Š  Mξ€ξ€…ξ€“ξ€—ξ€Œ ξ€˜ξ€’  Mξ€˜ξ€Šξ€‘ξ€•ξ€— Wξ€˜ξ€•ξ€”ξ€Š (2021); Rξ€“ξ€‹ξ€ξ€ξ€•ξ€Š Tξ€ξ€˜ξ€‚ξ€–ξ€ƒξ€˜ξ€—
Fξ€˜ξ€•ξ€Š, D Cξ€˜ξ€Šξ€‘ξ€ƒ: Hξ€˜ξΏ  L ξ€˜ξ€’ Fξ€ξ€ƒξ€ξ€“ξ€˜ξ€— Mξ€ξ€Šξ€‘ Hξ€“ξ€ƒξ€ξ€˜ξ€•ξ€† (2021).
5. Kenneth Anderson, Ambiguity in International Law and Diplomacy, and the
Ambiguous Meaning of Multilateralism at the UN [Scholarly Commentary],
Oξ€–ξ€“ξ€—ξ€“ξ€˜ J (2008), http://opiniojuris.org/2008/08/23/ambiguity-in-
international-law-and-diplomacy-and-the-ambiguous-meaning-of-
multilateralism-at-the-un/.

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