Leaks, legislation and freedom of speech: How can the law effectively promote public‐interest whistleblowing?

Published date01 March 2014
Date01 March 2014
AuthorDavid LEWIS,Björn FASTERLING
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1564-913X.2014.00197.x
International Labour Review, Vol. 153 (2014), No. 1
Copyright © The authors 2014
Journal compilation © International Labour Organization 2014
Leaks, legislation and freedom of speech:
How can the law effectively promote
public-interest whistleblowing?
Björn FASTERLING* and David LEWIS**
Abstract. Attention is increasingly being focused on leaking, whistleblowing and
associated compliance and incentives questions. The authors outline the differences
between leaking and whistleblowing, notably on protection of the disclosers. They
review provisions of international conventions on human rights and corruption,
and compare approaches to protecting freedom of speech in France, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States. Their ndings highlight the complex,
sometimes conicting issues involved: public, individual, commercial and nancial
interests; abuse of power; security; condentiality; the individual as law enforcer;
and the employment relationship.
Both leaking and whistleblowing may be vital to the preservation of life
and the promotion of healthy democracies. Disclosure by an organiza-
tional insider of concerns about suspected wrongdoing may prove to be a crit-
ical information source for those responsible for dealing with health and safety
risks or for combating nancial crime. According to Agalgatti and Krishna
(2004), the world’s worst industrial disaster (in Bhopal, India, in 1984) could
have been avoided by whistleblowing. At this Union Carbide plant where
thousands died as a result of escaping toxic gas, the concerns of workers and
a journalist had been ignored by the local authority. Detailed investigations
revealed that warnings had been disregarded and that cost-cutting measures
had adversely affected working conditions and the maintenance of safety sys-
tems. In addition to helping to expose nancial scandals, such as those involv-
ing the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Enron (Sterling,
2002) and WorldCom (Jeter, 2003), public-interest disclosures by organiza-
tional insiders are important tools in the ght against corruption which itself
contributes to poverty (Carr and Lewis, 2010). Because corruption is notoriously
* Professor of Law, LegalEdhec Research Centre, EDHEC Business School, email: bjorn.
fasterling@edhec.edu. ** Professor of Employment Law, Law School, Middlesex University, email:
d.b.lewis@mdx.ac.uk.
Responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles rests solely with their authors, and
publication does not constitute an endorsement by the ILO.
International Labour Review72
difcult to detect and address through formal legal channels, especially in de-
veloping countries, it is important to devise other means by which to expose
corrupt practices.
The usefulness of such public-interest disclosure for remedying prob-
lems, on the one hand, and the vulnerability of the person who discloses, on
the other, have motivated some to seek to elevate “whistleblowing” to a fun-
damental employment right (Lewis, 2008). Although this demand has not been
met, there are laws which promote public-interest disclosures by organiza-
tional insiders by protecting them from dismissal or other forms of reprisal.
This is generally achieved either through human rights and civil liberties guar-
antees, in particular freedom of speech at the workplace, or through specic
legislation on whistleblowing. Additionally, some countries have developed -
nancial incentives to encourage whistleblowing. Many employers have estab-
lished internal reporting procedures that encourage the disclosure of suspected
wrongdoing; in some cases this has been in response to a legal obligation or
regulatory incentive. However, public-interest disclosure through “leaking”
of information is rarely protected and is often unlawful. Despite the threat
of legal sanctions for leaking and the availability of whistleblower protection,
organizational insiders continue to leak information rather than disclose it
through normal communication channels. We believe that this is not only a re-
sult of increased facilities to leak information but also a sign of the inadequacy
of existing protections and incentives for authorized disclosure.
Whistleblowing and leaks
Whereas information leaks may occur on any issue, whistleblowing is usually
associated with disclosures of malpractice, as well as illegal acts or omissions.
The denition of whistleblowing currently used by Transparency International
(a global coalition against corruption) is “the disclosure of information re-
lated to corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or hazardous activities being committed in
or by public or private sector organizations (including perceived or potential
wrongdoing) – which are of concern to or threaten the public interest – to in-
dividuals or entities believed to be able to effect action” (Transparency Inter-
national, 2013, p. 4). One obvious problem is the lack of consensus on what
constitutes “wrongdoing”. Because there is no universally accepted denition
of whistleblowing, the Australian Senate Select Committee on Public Interest
Whistleblowing reached the conclusion that:
…what is important is not the denition of the term, but the denition of the
circumstances and conditions under which employees who disclose wrongdoing
should be entitled to protection from retaliation (Australian Senate Select Com-
mittee on Public Interest Whistleblowing, 1994, para. 2.2).
Although the term “leaking” is normally used to refer to disclosures via
the professional or social media, it is generally accepted that whistleblowing
can occur either inside or outside the organization concerned (Jubb, 1999).
Internal reporting would seem to offer advantages all round: the employer is

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