Latin American public opinion vis-

• Author: Alvarez, Mar
• Position: Texto en ingl

INTRODUCTION

Outside Europe, nowhere but in Latin America have integration attempts and thinking developed so extensively across space and so consistently over time (1). After the Second World War, Latin American efforts at regionalism have been pursued through different waves. The most recent one, post-liberal or post-hegemonic regionalism, is now being dismantled, after a decade coexisting with projects like the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) or the Andean Community and seeing how the Pacific Alliance gains momentum.

In this particular context, it is more important than ever to study the opposition to regional integration and their implications. The study of opposition to regional integration is relevant not only due to its political implications but also because it helps explain citizens' basic ways of thinking about it. Indeed, such analysis can shed light on the integration process as such as well as on the dissenting actors.

This research relies on quantitative methods and a comparative framework. Comparative integration studies are as old as integration projects. European Union (EU) studies emerged from the efforts of intellectuals who used the European case as a basis to develop a general theory of regional integration. In addition, integration theory arrived in Latin America through the impulse of these very same neofunctionalist scholars such as E. Haas and P. Schmitter who first developed grand theories of the integration process in Europe (Malamud,2010; Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond, 2010).

Such a comparative framework has great methodological benefits because it liberates from the "N=1" problem, particularly infamous among EU scholars who tend to be parochially European in their focus (Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond, 2010). We will therefore benefit by using the European experience in comparative regional integration studies but by using the Latin American case to nuance hypothesis developed exclusively in the EU case so far.

Until now, the literature on resistance to regional integration has concentrated on the EU. Research has developed exponentially in order to understand and explain the variety of attitudes of actors towards integration but with an exclusive EU focus. This is not surprising since the EU is the most institutionalized case of regional integration and the one that engendered complex and highly visible oppositions at both the mass and elite levels.

However, so far, very few systematic attempts have been pursued to study opposition or resistance to regional integration in Latin America. This should not come as a surprise at least for three reasons. First, Latin American regionalism is mainly an elite-driven or top-down phenomenon relying on both a generally positive opinion at the mass level and a quasi-monolithic pro-integration propensity among political elites which incarnates a type of intergovernmentalism,"interpresidentialism" (Malamud 2003). Second, low rates of mobilization are found on regional integration issues compared to other policy issues (2); and finally, public opinion surveys have not developed extensively in the region.

It is acceptable to claim that Europe and other regions are not 'comparable' and therefore require different concepts and frameworks. Indeed, comparing the EU with other forms of regionalism highlights the difficulty faced by scholars when moving across the divide separating advanced industrial states from developing countries/emerging economies (Söderbaum 2013).

Too often regional specialization tends to lead scholars to develop conceptual toolboxes and theories that are developed from/for their own 'region,' without really trying to engage other cases or competing discourses. Such parochialism prevents the development of a more general and universal discourse. It prevents scholars from recognizing that they may be analyzing similar phenomena but with different languages and conceptualizations in different regions (Söderbaum, 2013).

Nonetheless, a comparison between the European and the Latin American cases can be particularly fruitful to have an in-depth understanding of the resistances engendered by regional integration and of their consequences for the legitimacy of the integration process despite the substantial differences in historical experiences, social and economic structures, geo-strategic location and political regimes. Indeed, although each case of regional integration is obviously different in terms of institutionalization, context and political culture, such differences are usually exaggerated and do not in themselves preclude comparative analysis (Söderbaum, 2009). Finally, as noted by A. Malamud (2010), Latin America has been an interesting laboratory for scholars on regionalism to test hypotheses drawn from the European experience on various issues.

Thus, as correctly pointed out by Breslin and Higgott, "when conducted properly, the comparative approach is an excellent tool... it is a key mechanism for bringing area studies and disciplinary studies together, and enhancing both. It provides new ways of thinking about the case studies whilst at the same time allowing for the theories to be tested, adapted and advanced" (2000: 341).

This article examines the opposition to regional economic integration among public opinion in Latin America. Our approach is different from standard literature on public opinion since we tackle the question from a rather "negative" perspective: we focus on opposition and not support. The reason for this theoretical and methodological choice is connected to the fact that while regional integration projects continue to be largely elite-driven, "in democracies, public opinion can count a great deal, and a strong opposition to integration might well spell the end of the regionalist movement in Latin America" (Seligson, 1999: 130). In times when Latin American regionalism is complex, at times contradictory and even chaotic (Van Klaveren, 2018), it is clear that the probability that Latin American governments will move forward or turn their backs on the integrationist project depends today far more on public opinion than it did in the authoritarian past (Seligson, 1999).

Therefore, we prefer an approach that emphasizes the opposition dimension of public attitudes toward integration. Since different assumptions may be chosen to illuminate different aspects of mass attitudes vis-àvis regional integration, however, the two perspectives--support and opposition--and their concomitant narratives are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: in the first section, it briefly discusses some basics about Euroscepticism/opposition within the field of EU studies and political science. It continues by offering a synopsis of the (rather scarce) literature on Latin American public opinion on regional integration. The third section develops the analytical framework to apply to the Latin American case and the subsequent section presents a succinct appraisal of the determinants of public opinion vis-à-vis regional integration based on the vast EU literature. This is followed by a presentation of hypotheses, data and methods. Next, the article introduces the results from our study, whereas the final section offers some conclusions.

SOME BASICS ABOUT EUROSCEPTICISM/OPPOSITION TO THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

Opposition to the European integration process has been a marginal and even a "taboo" issue for scholars. Historiography of European integration has overlooked manifestations of conflict and little attention has been devoted to political and social resistances to EU integration within and beyond national states (Crespy and Verschueren, 2009). Of course, the failure of the European Defense Community or the 'empty chair crisis' for example, appeared in books devoted to the history of European integration. But overall "The federalist narrative, which dominated the European historiography from the 1940s to the 1970s, generated a linear and finalist history of European integration. This historical lecture tended to play down conflicts and breakdowns while over-emphasizing the continuity of integration through a functionalist perspective" (Crespy and Verschueren, 2009: 379) (3).

Indeed, European integration was studied almost exclusively by Europhiles. During the first decades of its existence, opponents to the European project were understood by most of those studying European integration simply to be "on the wrong side of history", and therefore of little importance as objects of study (Katz, 2008: 152).

However, many scholars have embraced the assumption that the debates over the Maastricht treaty in the 1990s have triggered the end of a 'permissive consensus' which had so far prevailed (Lindberg and Steingold, 1970). The broad picture is that the end of the 'permissive consensus'--the historical elite consensus over Europe was in favor of European integration and public opinion was quiescent--has given rise to a 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe and Marks, 2008).

The change in mood towards European integration that occurred in many EU countries during the 1990s and 2000s was labelled as 'Euroscepticism' The term Euroscepticism is a catchall generic label for negative attitudes to the EU. As Flood argues, "Euroscepticism remains a somewhat elusive phenomenon with unclear contours and borderlines" (Flood, 2002: 2): it can be used to refer "to Greek communists, Hungarian neo-Nazis, Dutch Christian conservatives, Greens, farmers, workers and even national institutions" (Leruth, Startin and Usherwood, 2018: 4). This diversity reflects the absence of a commonly agreed definition of Euroscepticism. Even the terms that intend to play as synonyms are debatable.

Euroscepticism has proven highly elusive. First, Euroscepticism is a dynamic phenomenon, which makes it difficult to apprehend: it has changed over time as it has evolved with the integration process itself...