LABORATORIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM.

• Author: Wang, Yueduan

1. Introduction 138 II. The Origins of China's Policy Experimentations: Competing Theories 141 III. Laboratories of Authoritarianism: The Theoretical Framework 147 A. Constitutional Structure 147 1. "Two Initiatives": The Constitutional Principle Governing Ccnter-Local Relations 150 2. Decentralized Policymaking Powers: De Facto Federalism? 154 3. Centralized Appointment and Removal Powers: CCP's Nomenklatura and Disciplinary Systems 157 4. An Experiment-Friendly Constitution? 160 B. Intraparty Competition 162 IV.The Case Studies 165 A. De-Collectivization of the Rural Economy 166 B. Special Economic Zones 169 C. Competitive Elections 173 D. Civil Society 178 V. Distinguishing Features of the Laboratories of Authoritarianism 183 A. Incentivizing Subnational Experimentation 184 B. Accelerating the Spread of Innovation 185 C. Functional Stability 186 D. Illegalities and Unconstitutionalities 187 VI.Conclusions and Implications 189 I. INTRODUCTION

   Three decades ago, Fukuyama famously predicted the coming of "universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." (2) Today, China simultaneously serves as a powerful testament to his prophetic vision and a strong rebuttal of his optimism. China's rise as a global superpower has indeed been a history of adopting ideas and practices commonly perceived as Western, liberal, and even democratizing, such as privatization, a market economy, and a modernized judiciary. In this regard, the Chinese regime is not that different from many other twentieth-century communist and/or authoritarian governments, whose partial subscription to the Western model substantially contributed to their downfall during the third wave of democratization and the color revolutions. What sets China apart is its consistent ability to selectively adapt and integrate components of liberal democracy to turn these potential agents of regime change into building blocks of the authoritarian state. This is a process of continuous innovation, through which numerous unfamiliar ideas and practices are introduced, tested, abandoned, adjusted, and assimilated by the party-state. It has resulted in a regime that continually evolves to meet new challenges but has never fundamentally changed its one-party dominance over the country. The question is: how does it do it?

   The secret--at least part of it--lies in Louis Brandeis's formula of "laboratories of democracy." The U.S. Supreme Court Justice popularized the concept in his famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. (3) The case concerned the constitutionality of an Oklahoma law requiring ice companies to obtain a license before conducting business. The state's legislature determined that the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice was a public business, which required a license to operate. The majority of the Court struck down the statute, ruling that it is beyond the power of a state, "under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily to interfere with private business." (4) In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis voiced his support for Oklahoma's right to experiment with new ways to regulate economic activities, reasoning that:

   To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent an experiment. . . . But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold. (5)

   Since then, the idea of laboratories of democracy has become a frequently cited virtue of U.S. federalism. For example, in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, Kennedy cited New State Ice to support his position that Congress exceeded its powers when regulating the carrying of handguns in schools.'' Kennedy reasoned that because there was no agreement on how best to deter students from carrying guns, "the States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear." (7) A similar rationale--that federalism encourages policy experimentation by the states--has been widely cited by liberal and conservative judges alike in their decisions and dissents. (8)

   Like the United States, China has frequently utilized subnational experiments to test new institutions and ideas without endangering the entire regime. This combination of subnational experimentation and selective national adoption has been directly responsible for some of China's most critical transformations during the past four decades, including the dc-collectivization of agriculture and the introduction of the market mechanism--two reforms directly responsible for the communist country's almost miraculous economic rise. Although most experiments did not become national policies, many nevertheless resulted in policies that addressed local needs and provided inspiration for governments in other jurisdictions.

   There is, however, an apparent difference between Brandeis's vision and China's approach. Instead of being grounded in a democratic federation, China's approach to experimentation is firmly grounded in a formally unitary state under one-party rule. Such divergence raises many questions: Absent competitive gubernatorial elections, how are subnational leaders inccntivized to test new policies and institutions, especially when doing so might conflict with powerful vested interests or even written laws? How can subnational governments have enough discretion and resources to conduct broad policy experiments if the system is genuinely unitary? How does the center government decide which local innovations will become national policies? More generally, do these innovative processes purely result from ad hoc decision-making by unconstrained and arbitrary autocrats, or do they--like their U.S. counterparts--emerge from institutionalized mechanisms that produce semi-consistent policy innovations? This study aims to answer these questions by looking at China's history of policy experiments from the start of Reform and Opening (the late 1970s) until the end of the Hu Jintao administration (2012).

   This study argues that China's expcrimentalism model results from the interaction between its constitutional structure and its often-vibrant intraparty political competition. During the studied period, China's center-local" relationship was characterized by decentralized policymaking powers and centralized appointment/removal powers. This unique combination resembles a federal system in the division of policy powers but changes its accountability structure from bottom-up to top-down and from electoral to authoritarian. Such change results from differences in the de facto holders of state sovereignty. In a democratic federation, the people usually arc both the de jure and de facto sovereign; in China, however, the Communist Party is the de facto sovereign, even though de jure supremacy rests with the National People's Congress (NPC). (10) This means political accountability in China runs from the Party center to the local officials, rather than from the voters to the various levels of governments. Under this arrangement, the decentralized policy powers give subnational leaders significant leeway to conduct bold experiments, while the top-down accountability structure allows the Party center to incentivize experimentation by promoting subnational experimenters and to selectively spread successful policy innovations.

   Based on this constitutional structure, political factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) often serve as powerful vehicles of policy innovation. As factions seek to leverage their policy successes to gain political superiority, some encourage members to try new ideas and practices in their provinces. They hope that these experiments will lead to better governance in their own jurisdictions and national adoption of the innovations, both of which would enhance the responsible faction's national political outlook. In this sense, the Chinese system resembles the multiparty competition within federal democracies, which is a crucial driver of laboratories of democracy. However, the top-down nature of China's center-local structure makes the entire system susceptible to factional turbulence within the central government. Consequently, the laboratories of authoritarianism function less stably than their democratic counterparts.

   This Article is organized as follows: Part I summarizes and discusses existing literature on subnational experiments in China, indicating how studies have failed to account for the interplay between constitutional arrangements and factional competition, which is essential to systematic policy experimentation in the party-state. Part II lays out the theoretical framework for what the author calls "laboratories of authoritarianism," focusing on both China's unique center-local constitutional structure and the competitive dynamics among different political factions. Part III tests this framework through four case studies, each involving a major policy innovation initiated by subnational governments in China: (1) the de-collectivization reform (1978-1983), which kick-started the Reform and Opening process by supplanting the Maoist egalitarian distribution method in agricultural production with household-based systems, (2) the Special Economic Zone reform (1979-early 1990s), which gradually dismantled the planned economy through encouraging foreign trade and investment and liberalizing domestic markets, (3) the election experiments (1998-early 2010s) that introduced...