Jurisdiction (Alien Tort Statute)

Collaborating with Argentinian military and police forces, the Gonzalez Catan plant of Mercedes Benz Argentina (MBA), one of the subsidiaries of DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft’s (DCAG’s) predecessor-in-interest, effectively quelled strikes by plant workers that MBA viewed as union agitators by labeling them as subversives, passing that information on to state security forces, stationing military and police forces within the plant, opening the plant to periodic raids by those forces, installing the police station chief behind much of Argentina’s reign of terror as the chief of security, and providing him legal representation when accused of human rights abuses. MBA knew the result of the collaboration would be the kidnapping, torture, detention, and murder of those workers.

Twenty-two victims or their close relatives (Plaintiffs) brought suit against DCAG in the District Court for the Northern District of California under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350. They alleged MBA had collaborated with Argentinian security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill them and/or their relatives during Argentina’s “Dirty War.”

After attempting to serve process at one of DCAG’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, Plaintiffs attempted to serve DCAG in Michigan. DCAG moved to quash service and to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction; however, after Plaintiffs submitted evidence that DCAG maintained dual operational headquarters in Michigan and Stuttgart, Germany, DCAG withdrew its motion. Because the parties did not dispute MBUSA was subject to personal jurisdiction by virtue of its extensive contacts in California, the only issue was whether the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over MBUSA’s parent, DCAG, comported with due process.

Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, but after allowing limited jurisdictional discovery, the district court granted DCAG’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court based the decision on its conclusion that MBUSA was not an agent of DCAG and that consequently DCAG lacked the requisite contacts with the forum state.

Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reverses and remands because it finds MBUSA did serve as DCAG’s agent and the exercise of personal jurisdiction was, in fact, fair and reasonable. Because the...