Juggling between ex‐ante and ex‐post audit in Greece: A difficult transition to a new era

• Date: 01 March 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12147
• Published date: 01 March 2019
• Author: Georgia N. Kontogeorga

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Juggling between ex‐ante and ex‐post audit in Greece: A

difficult transition to a new era

Georgia N. Kontogeorga

International Board of Auditors for NATO

(IBAN), Brussels, Belgium

Correspondence

Georgia N. Kontogeorga, International Board

of Auditors for NATO (IBAN), Brussels,

Belgium.

Email: kont_georgia@yahoo.gr

Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) contribute decisively to the quality and efficiency of

financial management in each country. Over the last few years, SAIs have adopted

new approaches to government auditing, which has led to a fundamental change of

the public finances control model.

However, the Hellenic Court of Audit still follows a traditional model of preventive

audit in almost all transactions of public entities without parallel performance audit.

This paper looks at which audits are deemed effective by auditors and auditees.

The research result shows that both categories converge on the view that the existing

system needs to be modernized, despite difficulties that seem to delay progress. This

article will be relevant to other SAIs that are in a transitional period.

KEYWORDS

accountability, external audit, public sector audit

1|INTRODUCTION

In the public sector, external audit is conducted on public entities by

the independent supreme audit institution (SAI) of each country. An

SAI, as defined in International Organization of Supreme Audit

Institutions ([INTOSAI], 2016, article 2, §2), is

a public body of a state or supranational organization

which, however designated, constituted or organized,

exercises, by virtue or law, or other formal action of the

state or the supranational organization, the highest

public auditing function of that state or supranational

organization in an independent manner, with or without

jurisdictional competence.

SAIs provide external audit services and do not constitute part of

the organizational structure of the audited entities (INTOSAI, 1988,

section 3, §1). Stapenhurst and Titsworth (2001) mention that their

legal mandates, reporting relationships and effectiveness vary,

reflecting different governance systems and government policies.

Santiso (2006, p. 99) points out the most important differences

between these models, which include:“the timing of control (whether

ex‐ante or ex‐post control), its nature (whether emphasizing compliance

or performance auditing), its effects (the follow‐up of audit recommen-

dations), as well as its status (the legal standing of audit rulings).”

The literature contains several categories of SAIs according to

different criteria. However, according to International Standards for

Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs) the three most common

systems are (International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions,

n.d.‐a, §46):

1. The jurisdictional model (Court of Accounts, Court of Audit, or

Napoleonic model).

2. The model of the Auditor General (Anglo‐Saxon, or Westminster

or monocratic model).

3. The collegiate model (or board model).

Jurisdictional systems traditionally focus on compliance, with

detailed rules and regulations, but there is often less focus on

wider financial management issues relating to the economy,

efficiency, and effectiveness (the three e's) of expenditure (Blume

& Voigt, 2011). In the jurisdictional model, the SAI is a court and

its members are judges who can impose penalties or corrections

on audited officials who are normally held personally liable

for the sums involved should an unauthorized or illegal payment

be made. This model is widespread in countries that have a

French legal origin and in some Latin and French‐speaking African

countries (DFID Department for International Development

[DFID], 2004).

Received: 26 December 2017 Revised: 22 October 2018 Accepted: 30 October 2018

DOI: 10.1111/ijau.12147

86 © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Int J Audit. 2019;23:86–94.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ijau