Japan's international cooperation to Latin America and the Caribbean in the changing development landscape/La cooperaci

• Author: Velasquez, Carlos David Zavarce

INTRODUCTION

The greatest desideratum facing the world population, especially developing countries, is to achieve sustainable development. Diverse development cooperation initiatives are driven by actors, such as international organizations, developed and developing countries; however, there are still gaps to close.

Among the most relevant modalities for promoting development cooperation initiatives is the Official Development Assistance (ODA), defined as:

A voluntary transfer of public resources, from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an international organization (such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program) with at least 25 percent grant element, one goal of which is to better the human condition in the country receiving the aid (Lancaster, 2007, p.7). Although Asia is the first destination of Japanese aid disbursements, ODA to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has increased steadily (Tuman et al., 2001). Moreover, after the United States (the U.S.), Japan, at times, especially during the 1990s, accounted for the second-largest amount of net aid to the region, exceeding the amount given by other OECD donors.

At this point, it is necessary to highlight that according to Orr, Jr. (1990) and Potter (2015), Japan has not aimed to take a preponderant role in LAC since the region is seen as the closest U.S. sphere of influence. Consequently, the U.S. has had to some extent, an important role in shaping Japan's aid focus on the region. This dynamic exemplifies what Keohane and Nye (1989) defined as trans-governmental relations. Therefore, Kahn (2016) emphasized that Japan's relations with LAC countries have established a diverse and continually evolving partnership that encompassed more than trade and included interdependencies and relations that involved governments, peoples, and corporations.

Japan's Development Cooperation policy to LAC is reflected in the ODA Charter (2015) and the White Papers on Development Cooperation annually published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA). It is observed that Japan's ODA's purpose is to contribute to closing the gaps in the sustainable development of Latin American and the Caribbean nations while considering the presence of Nikkei communities in the region as a catalyst to foster cooperation processes between Japan and LAC.

For Asplund and Soderberg (2017), foreign aid donors are facing new challenges in the changing development architecture, and the political component influences the allocation and distribution of these resources, which affects not only recipients but also relationships between countries that in the new world architecture are allies and strategic partners, or competitors and rivals in some regions of the planet. Thus, it is recognized that the affinity of interests and a shared vision of the world between governments attract cooperation.

In this context, Asplund and Soderberg (2017) also suggested that Japanese foreign aid provides an extremely interesting case through which regional and even global changes in development cooperation may be understood. Japan plays an important role due to its long history as one of the leading countries in development cooperation, being today one of the OECD countries with the highest donation of ODA globally ($16.27 billion in 2020), just behind the U.S., Germany, and the U.K. (OECD, 2021).

Nevertheless, the rise of China in the economic and political fields has challenged development initiatives promoted by traditional donors, including Japan. China's foreign aid allocated to LAC increased from 5% to 20% of its total budget from 1990 to 2016 (Maggiorelli, 2017). In this sense, according to Gelvez and Gachúz (2020), the cooperation between China and LAC has been increasing significantly in the last few years.

Amidst this changing reality in the development landscape, this paper aims to answer the following questions: Have foreign countries' interests, especially those of the U.S., influenced Japan's development cooperation initiatives to Latin America and the Caribbean during the 21st century? Does China's increasing involvement as a nontraditional donor country in the region challenge Japan's strategic interest?

The answers to these questions unveil how and to what extent the U.S. interests and the rise of China as a non-traditional donor have influenced Japan's development cooperation in the region during this century, but also how the country has adapted its approach to not lose its identity and remain as a relevant donor to LAC countries.

To advance in this direction, the researcher, when considering which authors incorporate in this work, following the recommendation of Gisbert and Panes (2009), decided to use the "impact factor" from Clarivate, which assesses the value of a Journal in a given area of knowledge, and the "h index" proposed by Jorge Hirsch, and provided by Scopus, which measures both the scientific productivity and the impact of a scientist.

The use of these criteria facilitated the decisions about selecting, or not, certain authors and their contributions, as well as to have a better understanding of the current debate on Japan's ODA, its evolution and validity, to provide greater objectivity and transparency to the investigative process.

In this way, the approach to impact indexes and recent bibliome-tric studies constituted a useful and objective tool that facilitated a better understanding and evaluation of the research activity of the selected authors.

JAPAN'S AID AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE

Foreign pressure on Japan is a long-standing issue. The contemporary history of Japan's geopolitics reflects that in 1954, as a consequence of the extension of the Cold War to Asia, Japan joined the Colombo Plan, which marked the beginning of its economic cooperation with developing countries. Since then, Japan became a strategic ally of the U.S. against the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea. The initial period of Japan's ODA was characterized by the quest to generate economic growth. During the initial years, the policies promoted by the Japanese Government focused on prioritizing exports of Japanese products to Asian countries, intending post-war reparations.

During the 1970s and the 1980s, Japan increased and diversified its development cooperation initiatives not only in East Asia but around the world. This dynamic led Japan to surpass the U.S. to become the world's largest donor, with Japan's net ODA disbursements reaching $8.97 billion in 1989 (MoFa, 2014).

However, Hiroshi et al. (2016) highlighted that during the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, Japan's economic contribution to solving the conflict was perceived by the international community as "too little, too late" (p.76). Even though the Gulf Crisis was the trigger, Japan was already being criticized for the orientation of its aid. Among the most critical voices was the U.S. Government. In the U.S. view, Japan was showing reluctance to play a prominent role in the world, despite having the status of an economic giant.

By the end of the last century, Orr, Jr (1990) pointed out that the levels of interaction between the U.S. and Japan on aid policy correspond with the concepts of 1) bureaucratic coalition building, 2) preemptive aid package, and 3) direct pressure from the U.S. on Japan. He also emphasized that Japan's ODA purpose is not limited to economic development but that policymakers, especially in the MoFA, have other objectives as well. In this sense, the MoFA acknowledges that the U.S.-Japan relationship is at the heart of its foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the author defended the idea that the U.S.-Japan relationship regarding ODA is mainly based on influence and bargaining between the actors rather than unilateral pressure from the U.S.

Similarly, Miyashita (2001) argued that foreign pressure is often much exaggerated and that the Japanese policymakers are far more proactive and autonomous than the reactive State thesis proposed. Then, Japan's activism has taken place largely in areas where it does not challenge American hegemony or undermine American interest.

In this context, the 1992 ODA Charter was considered to be an effective conflict-solving measure. The ODA Charter announced that Japan's basic Aid Philosophy was to assist developing countries' "self-help" efforts. The goal was for countries to achieve self-reliance. For this, Japan's aid policymakers prioritized modern infrastructure building. At the same time, Japanese policymakers fully recognized the importance of social stability in attracting foreign investors.

Despite Japan's efforts, some Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members still had some criticism of the Japanese model. Given this situation, the Japanese government promoted a series of reforms intending to increase the effectiveness and transparency of aid, which resulted in the issuance of a new ODA Charter in 2003. It emphasized the relevance of Japan's security and prosperity while highlighting the importance of promoting Human Security and poverty reduction.

Regardless of the reforms, the revised charter did not impress foreign observers, unlike the original version of 1992. Authors like Lancaster (2007) affirmed that there was unclear what real changes in ODA policy were made.

Tsunekawa (2014) attributed the inconsistency and criticism of Japan's Development Assistance to its philosophy since it has historically fluctuated between a wide variety of objectives ranging from poverty reduction in developing countries and promoting peace at the international level to guarantee Japan's economic development through aid programs.

As a result, it led to a series of internal and international criticisms, which argued that Japan had no clarity in the purpose of the ODA or its philosophy. Therefore, it always ended up responding passively to the trends promoted by multilateral organizations like the World Bank.

In order to maintain its...