Intranational Consumption Risk Sharing in South Korea: 2000–2016

AuthorJoongsan Ko
Published date01 March 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/asej.12195
Date01 March 2020
Intranational Consumption Risk Sharing in
South Korea: 20002016
Joongsan Ko*
Received 20 November 2018; Accepted 18 January 2020
This paper examines consumption risk sharing among 16 regions in South Korea
over the 20002016 period. The empirical results show that 91.8 percent of
shocks to gross regional domestic product are smoothed in South Korea. Capital
markets, the tax-transfer system and credit markets absorb 29.9, 28.9 and 33.0
percent of shocks to gross regional domestic product, respectively. Most notably,
South Korea relies more on credit markets for risk sharing than capital markets,
an opposite pattern to advanced countries like the USA, Canada and Australia.
Furthermore, the patterns of consumption risk sharing are different before and
after the 20072008 global nancial crisis, and differences in regional industrial
structure and local development can inuence these patterns. This paper attempts
to infer the connection between these ndings and both the rapid economic
growth of South Korea and the Asian and global nancial crises.
Keywords: consumption risk sharing, risk-sharing channel, South Korea.
doi: 10.1111/asej.12195
I. Introduction
Households in a nation earn income through production and then consume in
proportion to income. Thus, if idiosyncratic shocks cause a decrease in produc-
tion, the households take it for granted that their income and consumption con-
sequently decrease too. However, the degrees of decline in income and
consumption depend on how consumption risk sharing works. Theoretically, if
nancial markets are complete or institutions exist that implement the optimal
allocation in a nation, regional consumption will no longer depend on regional
output but will mutually covary, and, hence, covary with aggregate consumption
(Asdrubali and Kim, 2011). Specically, output shocks can be shared within a
nation through capital markets, the tax-transfer system and credit markets, which
is known as consumption risk sharing.
1
*Dr. Ko (corresponding author): Doctoral Candidate, Department of Economics, Seoul National
University, 1 Gwanak-ro,Gwanak-gu, Seoul 08826, South Korea. Email: joongsan@snu.ac.kr.
1 Capital markets share risks through cross-ownership of productive assets, while credit markets
share them through lending and borrowing. The tax-transfer system serves as a medium for further
consumption risk sharing. (See Section II for more details.)
© 2020 East Asian Economic Association and John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
Asian Economic Journal 2020, Vol.34 No. 1, 2949 29
The earliest studies that related to the above tested the null hypothesis of full
consumption risk sharing at various aggregation levels, such as individuals in
villages (Townsend, 1994), households (Altug and Miller, 1990; Cochrane,
1991; Mace, 1991) and countries (Canova and Ravn, 1996; Lewis, 1996; Kim
et al., 2004). The null was rejected indicating consumption risk sharing is
incomplete. To understand the cause of this incomplete risk sharing, Asdrubali
et al. (1996) developed the cross-sectional variance decomposition method and
identied risk-sharing channels in the USA from 1963 to 1990. They showed
that capital markets, credit markets and the federal government absorb
39, 23 and 13 percent of shocks to gross state product, respectively, while the
remaining 25 percent of shocks are not smoothed. In addition, based on the
results, capital markets are the major channel for risk sharing in the USA.
The method introduced by Asdrubali et al. (1996) has been used frequently
for measuring the degree and identifying the channels of consumption risk shar-
ing among regions and countries, and the results are easily comparable with
those presented in other studies. Based on the scope of analysis, subsequent
studies are categorized into two groups distinguished at the international and
intranational levels.
The rst group focuses on international consumption risk sharing to analyze
the risk-sharing effect of economic and monetary unions. The OECD and the
European Community, East Asia, and ASEAN absorbed approximately 40, 20,
and 24 percent of shocks to GDP, respectively (Sørensen and Yosha, 1998; Kim
et al., 2006; Ko, 2020). The CFA franc zone consists of two monetary unions in
Africa: the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).
2
Yehoue (2011)
also showed that for the CEMAC and WAEMU, approximately 24 and 22 per-
cent of shocks to GDP are shared, respectively. The common nding of these
studies is that capital markets play a minimal role in the smoothing process.
Moreover, several studies have analyzed the impact on international consump-
tion risk sharing of: (i) nancial globalization (Kose et al., 2009); (ii) social and
political integration (Balli et al., 2018);
3
and (iii) the quality of institutions
(Balli and Pierucci, 2020). They show that these factors are signicantly interre-
lated with risk sharing among advanced countries (or high-income countries)
but not in emerging countries (or low and middle-income coun tries).
In contrast, the second group focuses on intranational consumption risk shar-
ing and shows that consumption risk sharing at the intranational level is far
greater than that at the international level. For example, in Norway, Australia
2 CEMAC consists of six countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Its currency is the Central African CFA franc. WAEMU
consists of eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal
and Togo. Its currency is the West African CFA franc.
3 Balli et al. (2018) offer well-organized information about several studies that have opposite
views on the relation of risk sharing and globalization.
ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 30

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