Intervention in Libya, yes; intervention in Syria, no: deciphering the Obama Administration.

• Author: Guiora, Amos N.
• Position: International Law in Crisis

Deciphering an American presidential administration is truly yeoman's work. It is still too early to judge whether the Obama Administration is significantly distinct from previous administrations. Arguably, the task should be left to historians. Nevertheless, even a casual perusal of President Obama's Middle East policy (perhaps best described as 'policy') reflects a combination of naivete, inconsistency and murkiness. While perhaps by design, the impact--on the ground--is deeply troublesome. While domestic political considerations are a reality, the implications of the Administration's policy in an area of the world as treacherous as the Middle East are, potentially, staggering.

Precisely because international law does not articulate either normative or architectural standards as to when international humanitarian intervention is justified, national leaders arguably have a responsibility to act. The oft-cited phrase "when the cannons roar, the muses are silent" is particularly relevant to this discussion. For a variety of reasons, the international community has determined--whether actively or passively--that the massacre of the Syrian population by the Assad government does not justify international humanitarian intervention. While the human rights violations occurring on a daily basis do not compare to the horrors of Rwanda, Kosovo, or Sierra Leone they are not less compelling than the events transpiring in Libya. If by metaphorical analogy, the international community is the cannons and the U.S. is the muse; does that mean that the Obama Administration is required to be silent? After all, if the quote were to be rigorously applied, then many of the institutions created to minimize human suffering would neither exist, much less function in wartime. While the distinction--from the perspective of international humanitarian intervention between Libya and Syria is as unclear as the criteria that justifies intervention; that must not serve as a misguided basis for the Obama Administration to largely turn its back on the Syrian people.

1. INTRODUCTION II. INTERVENTION: A BRIEF SURVEY III. THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY IV. LIBYA AND SYRIA V. LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION VI. FINAL WORD I. INTRODUCTION

   Deciphering an American presidential administration is truly yeoman's work. Whether the Obama Administration is significantly distinct from previous administrations is too early to judge. Arguably, the task should be left to historians. Nevertheless, even a casual perusal of President Obama's Middle East policy (perhaps best described as 'policy') reflects a combination of naivete, inconsistency and murkiness. (1) While perhaps by design, the impact--on the ground--is deeply troublesome. While domestic political considerations are a reality, the implications of the Administration's policy in an area of the world as treacherous as the Middle East are, potentially, staggering. (2)

   President Obama's policy (assuming a coherent policy exists) has been particularly problematic on two distinct fronts: inconsistency in determining under what conditions intervention is justified and a sharp dissonance between suggested expectations and actual delivery. (3) The latter is most clearly demonstrated both in the President's Cairo speech4 and his May 19, 2011 talk in which he called on Israel to return to the 1967 (pre Six Day War) borders: In the former, President Obama overtly suggested a distinct change forthcoming in U.S. policy regarding the Israel-Palestinian conflict; the failure to 'deliver' has led to extraordinary disappointment amongst Palestinians who assumed change was in the offing. (6) Arguably, the Palestinian demand for declaration of Palestinian statehood by the U.N. General Assembly is a direct result of disappointment with the President's failure to 'deliver' the suggested change.

   With respect to the second example, the President's speech reflected the oft-used expression in college basketball referring to a student-athlete who leaves college after his freshman year for the NBA: "one and done." (7) Simply put: the President's speech was absolutely lacking in any follow-up (8) as neither details nor the identity of a new Peace Negotiator (9) were revealed. That lack of detail, particularly in the aftermath of the Cairo and Washington, D.C. speeches, which hinted at significant policy movement and direction, has directly contributed to inconsistent policy articulation and development. That inconsistency is particularly evident when comparing the decision to intervene militarily in Libya (10) with the decision to not intervene in Syria.

   While perhaps the inconsistency is predicated on careful geopolitical analysis, the Administration's actions raise questions regarding the essence of intervention, regardless of whether it is predicated on military or humanitarian considerations. It is essential to underscore that intervention--the theme of this essay--defines the historic relationship between Western powers and the Middle East. A brief historical recounting of that specific relationship is telling; however, it is important to add that Western intervention has largely defined the relationship between the West and non-Western peoples in general.

   To facilitate an understanding of the Obama Administration's Middle East policy through the lens of the intervention/non-intervention dilemma, this article will be divided as follows: Section Two is a brief survey of Western intervention in the Middle East; Section Three is a survey of recent Middle East events; Section Four is an analysis of U.S. policy in Libya and Syria; Section Five is a discussion of the law of international humanitarian intervention; and Section Six is 'Looking Forward'.

2. INTERVENTION: A BRIEF SURVEY

   Whether through colonization, military, or humanitarian intervention, Western intervention in the Middle East has, in many ways, defined the relationship between the West and the Middle East. At one time or another Western powers have had a significant presence in Palestine (British Palestine Mandate, 1917-1948), (11) Lebanon (France 1920-1946; U.S. 1958), (12) Syria (France 1920-1946), (13) Jordan/Transjordan (U.K. 1922-1946), (14) Libya (France 1942-1951), (15) Iran (U.K. 1941-1945), (16) Iraq (British Mandate of Mesopotamia 1920-1932, (17) U.S. 2003-present), (18) Afghanistan (U.K. 1839-1919, U.S.S.R. 1980-1989, U.S. 2001-present), (19) and the United Arab Emirates (U.K. 1819-1968). (20) The principle of intervention raises profound questions regarding both the limits of national sovereignty and articulation of national self-interest. (21) Needless to say, what is defined as intervention can also be described as imperialism (as evidenced in many of the aforementioned cases of Western intervention in the Middle East); after all, Western powers have historically perceived Middle East oil and trade routes as essential to their national interests and have, therefore, imposed themselves on indigenous populations. (22)

   The historical basis for Western imperialism was, largely, a combination of: availability of much needed natural resources; cheap labor; geopolitics; and Christian missionaries. (23) The result was both taking (natural resources) and purported giving (Christianity and democratic values). (24) The intended beneficiary was the Western power; in large part, the indigenous people were enormously victimized. That said, some have suggested Western powers also contributed to local cultures by introducing democratic values and traditions, but the grim tale of post-colonial Africa suggests a significantly different reality.

   One of the clear results of World War II is the dusk that settled on traditional Western powers; while the sun (as the expression went) never set on the British Empire, since World War II, the U.K. has become almost exclusively domestic-focused (this incorporates the 'troubles' in Northern Ireland) and France has largely disengaged (following withdrawals from Algeria, Vietnam and Lebanon) from any international involvement. The post-World War II dawn was largely dominated by the Cold War (until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989), as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (until its fall in 1991) largely 'divided' the world into two (with the exception of non-aligned nations) spheres of influence with extraordinary, but ultimately restrained, competition for geo-political gains.

   From an American perspective, the desire to achieve a particular regional gain often resulted in the U.S. supporting unsavory regimes and leaders (25) for the sole purpose of denying the Soviet Union a perceived gain. (26) In the Cold War context, "victory" was piecemeal (if at all), largely limited by the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and mainly devoid of principle other than perceived gain (however defined) at the expense of the other side.

   The obsession with the other side led both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to costly military interventions; Brezhnev's decision to invade Afghanistan (1979) (27) was arguably the beginning of the end of the U.S.S.R., and the Kennedy-Johnson (28) decision to deploy the U.S. military to Vietnam (early 1960's) continues to have a dramatic impact on the U.S. budget, psyche and armed forces. In both cases, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. intervened in a conflict that was 'not theirs.' Soldiers were sent to countries whose language, culture and conflict were foreign to the ordinary soldier, whose mission (other than to stay alive) was unarticulated beyond vague and confused rhetoric.

   Unfortunately, the vagueness of overseas missions continues to haunt U.S. policy makers to this day: a talk before cadets at the U.S. Military Academy (29) reinforced that the mission in Iraq (30) was as unclear and vague to today's military officers as it was to their predecessors in Vietnam a mere forty years earlier. (31) Doubtlessly, a similar talk to Soviet cadets in 1980 would have resulted in the same ambiguity regarding their mission in...