Report No. 79 (2020) IACHR. Petition No. 347-09 (Mexico)

• Year: 2020
• Petition Number: 347-09
• Report Number: 79
• Respondent State: México
• Case Type: Admissibility
• Court: Inter-American Comission of Human Rights
• Alleged Victim: Sandra Juárez Domínguez

REPORT No. 79/20

PETICION 347-09

ADMISSIBILITY REPORT

SANDRA JUÁREZ DOMÍNGUEZ

MEXICO

OAS/Ser.L/V/II.

D.. 89

24 A. 2020

Original: Spanish

Approved electronically by the Commission on A. 24, 2020.

Cite as: IACHR, R. No. 7920. Petition 347-09. A.. S.J.D.. M.. A. 24, 2020.

www.cidh.org

I. INFORMATION ABOUT THE PETITION

Petitioner	Sandra Juárez Domínguez
Alleged Victim	Sandra Juárez Domínguez
Respondent S.	M.
Rights invoked	Article 8 (fair trial), 9 (freedom from ex post facto laws), 11 (privacy), 24 (equal protection) and 25 (judicial protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights1 in relation to Article 1.1 (obligation to respect rights).

II. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IACHR²

D. of filing	M. 25, 2009
Additional information received during the study phase	October 17, 2016
N. of the petition	October 25, 2016
S.’s first response	June 6, 2017
Additional observations from the petitioner	November 29, 2017

III. COMPETENCE

Ratione personae	Yes
Ratione loci	Yes
Ratione temporis	Yes
Ratione materiae	Yes, American Convention on Human Rights (deposit of instrument of ratification on M. 24, 1981)

IV. DUPLICATION OF PROCEDURES AND INTERNATIONAL RES JUDICATA, COLORABLE CLAIM, EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES AND TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

Duplication of procedures and international res judicata	No
Rights declared admissible	Article 8 (fair trial), 9 (freedom from ex post facto laws), 21 (right to property), 23 (right to participate in government), 24 (equal protection), 25 (judicial protection) and 26 (economic, social, and cultural rights) of the American Convention in relation to Articles 1.1 (obligation to respect rights) and 2 (domestic legal effects).
Exhaustion of domestic remedies or applicability of an exception to the rule	Yes, May 23, 2012
Timeliness of the petition	Yes, M. 25, 2009

V. SUMMARY OF ALLEGED FACTS

1. Sandra Juárez Domínguez (hereinafter “the petitioner”) reports alleged violations of her human rights, alleging that she was removed from the position of M. of the Superior C. of Justice of the S. of Tlaxcala through a process not previously established, despite her having met the conditions for her tacit confirmation in the position. She also reports that in the process political evaluations were made of which she was not notified so she could participate in the judicial proceedings affecting her, that the rules governing the evaluation process against her were not adhered to, and that an amparo appeal (seeking protection of constitutional rights) she filed was not resolved within a reasonable period of time.

2. The petitioner reports that on January 31, 1999 she was appointed M. of the Superior C. of Justice of the S. of Tlaxcala for a period that ended on January 31, 2005. She states that Article 116 of the Mexican Constitution was amended in 1987 in order to promote judicial independence, establishing in paragraph III of the article that “M.s shall remain in their position for the time indicated by local constitutions and may be reelected to that position and, if so, may only be deprived of their positions under the terms determined by the constitutions and laws on the responsibilities of public servants.…” She alleges that it was not until 2008 that the S. of Tlaxcala complied with its obligation to adapt its regulations to the mandate of the constitutional reform of 1987. For this reason, upon the completion of the period of her appointment in 2005, Tlaxcala had no established procedure for the evaluation and confirmation of magistrates.

3. She states that, while she was carrying out her position, the representatives of the Congress of the S. of Tlaxcala conducted a surprise evaluation of the people who were holding magistrate positions, which was later invalidated by the Supreme C. of Justice of the Nation when it resolved a constitutional dispute filed by the Superior C. of Justice of the S. of Tlaxcala. She reports that she was neither informed of or called upon to participate in this process despite the fact that it affected her rights. She maintains that, given that there was no valid evaluation of her performance at the time the period of her appointment concluded, what was appropriate according to the jurisprudence of the Supreme C. of Justice of the Nation was that she be tacitly confirmed.³

4. She states that on A. 26, 2006 the Congress of Tlaxcala issued an agreement approving “the procedure for evaluating Completed Term M.s,” the validity of which was confirmed by the Supreme C. of Justice of the Nation in a proceeding in which she did not participate. Later, on M. 24, 2007, the Congress of the S. of Tlaxcala issued an opinion that she should not be confirmed in her position, following a process unregulated by any legal provision and that left the specific rules for rating the evaluation totally to the discretion of the S. Congress. She alleges that in order to recommend that she not be confirmed, the Congress based its opinion on her not having delivered a report on her performance, despite there being no provision that would require her to submit said report. She emphasizes that she noted that the Congress could evaluate her based on the reports submitted annually by the Chief Justice of the Superior C. of Justice, which was available at the premises of the Congress. H., the Congress failed to do this, violating its own agreement providing that the Congress should “avail itself” of all means at its disposal for performing the evaluation. She believes that having delivered the report they requested of her would have represented an endorsement of the illegal procedure to which she was subject.

5. She continues by reporting that in 2007 she challenged the resolution that ordered that she not be confirmed by means of an indirect amparo appeal. She reports that the appeal was not resolved until September 17, 2009 (which she feels exceeded the reasonable timeframe) and that, unlike other magistrates who filed appeals for the same reasons, she was not granted suspension of the action being challenged, thus violating her right to equality before the law. She states that the appeal was partially dismissed without entering into the merits of the matter, but ruled as groundless the resolution that determined not to confirm her and ordered that the Congress and the evaluation Commission issue a new well-founded decision on suitable grounds, following certain guidelines such as “availing itself” of all means at its disposal for the evaluation.

6. She states that on September 29, 2011, the full Congress of the S. of Tlaxcala issued a new opinion, again deciding not to confirm her. She alleges that this new opinion did not comply with the appeal judge’s order as the Congress again ignored the reports of the C.J. of the Superior C. of Justice and utilized her refusal to submit the report as an argument on which to base its decision. She also reports that in its report the Congress criticized her having voted in favor of the reelection of the Chief Justice of the Superior C. of Justice of the S. of Tlaxcala, alleging that she acted illegally by voting in the absence of a quorum, ignoring the fact that she had been legally convened to attend the session and that the Supreme C. of Justice of the Nation had already issued its opinion concluding that the reelection of the C.J. had not been illegal. S., she stated that the Congress felt that she and her colleagues had abused their power by promoting a constitutional protection case to prevent the evaluation of magistrates before the full court of the Judicial Branch; that case was admitted for processing by the C.J. of the Branch and granted by an examining magistrate appointed for the purpose. She alleges that the real interest of the Congress was to be able to install a magistrate that proved to be convenient for their political purposes.⁴

7. Additionally, she states that the opinion ordering that she not be confirmed also ordered that she be paid an indemnity. H., when she sought that indemnity, the new C.J. of the Superior C. of Justice of the S. of Tlaxcala refused, indicating that said point in the opinion had been invalidated with the resolution of a constitutional dispute in a proceeding in which she did not participate. She states that after several judicial appeals and petitions she finally obtained payment five years after her non-confirmation became final, causing her economic damages due to the delay and because the payment was made with devaluated currency.

8. The S., for its part, considers that the petition should...