Report No. 27 (2019) IACHR. Petition No. 1229-08 (Argentina)

• Year: 2019
• Petition Number: 1229-08
• Report Number: 27
• Respondent State: Argentina
• Case Type: Admissibility
• Court: Inter-American Comission of Human Rights
• Alleged Victim: Miguel Ángel Córdoba

REPORT No. 27/19

PETITION 1229-08

REPORT ON ADMISSIBILITY

MIGUEL ÁNGEL CÓRDOBA

ARGENTINA

OEA/Ser.L/V/II.

D.. 32

16 M. 2019

Original: Spanish

Adopted electronically by the Commission on M. 16, 2019

Cite as: IACHR, Report No. 27/19. A.. Petition 1229-08. A.. Miguel Ángel Córdoba. Argentina. M. 16, 2019.

www.cidh.org

I. INFORMATION ABOUT THE PETITION

Petitioner:	Miguel Ángel Córdoba
:	Miguel Ángel Córdoba
Respondent S.:	Argentina
Rights invoked:	Articles 7 (right to personal liberty), 8 (right to a fair trial), 10 (right to compensation), 11 (right to privacy), 24 (right to equal protection), and 25 (right to judicial protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights1; Articles I (right to life, liberty and personal security), V (right to protection of honor, personal reputation, and private and family life), XXV (right of protection from arbitrary arrest), and XXVI (right to due process of law) of the American D. of the Rights and Duties of Man2 and other international treaties3

II. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IACHR⁴

Filing of the petition:	October 21, 2008
Additional information received at the stage of initial review:	November 21, 2008; M. 12, 2013; September 16, 2016
N. of the petition to the S.:	June 8, 2017
S.’s first response:	October 3, 2017
Additional observations from the petitioner:	J. 16, 2018
Additional observations from the S.:	September 25, 2018

III. COMPETENCE

Competence Ratione personae:	Yes
Competence Ratione loci:	Yes
Competence Ratione temporis:	Yes
Competence Ratione materiae:	Yes, American Convention (instrument of ratification deposited on September 5, 1984)

IV. DUPLICATION OF PROCEDURES AND INTERNATIONAL RES JUDICATA, COLORABLE CLAIM, EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES AND TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

Duplication of procedures and International res judicata:	No
Rights declared admissible	Articles 5 (humane treatment), 7 (personal liberty), 8 (fair trial), 11 (privacy), and 25 (judicial protection) of the American Convention, in connection with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the same instrument
E. of domestic remedies or applicability of an exception to the rule:	Yes, A.2., 2008
Timeliness of the petition:	Yes, October 21, 2008

V. ALLEGED FACTS

1. The petitioner, a political activist from the province of Buenos Aires, says that the Argentine S. bears international responsibility for the violation of his human rights on account of: (i) his arbitrary detention and the unwarranted length thereof; (ii) his unequal treatment under the law governing appeals; (iii) the harm to his honor and dignity as a result of a defamation campaign and his criminal prosecution; and (iv) his failure to be provided reparation for the injuries suffered during that proceeding.

2. In this regard, the petitioner says that on December 3, 1987, Mr. W.P. (hereinafter "Mr. P.”), the son of his political adversary, was found dead, exhibiting various wounds and a gunshot to the head, and that an investigation was opened to elucidate the facts. He says that the death was initially investigated as a suicide but a year later it began to be investigated as a homicide. He says that the case sent shockwaves through the media and the public in the city where the alleged victim had lived and that there was pressure from public opinion and the authorities to hold someone accountable for Mr. P.'s death. He says that in 1990 the investigators were changed and a number of public officials who were involved in the investigation were prosecuted and made the subject of a preliminary inquiry for the cover-up, including police personnel, a medical examiner, and even the then-Chief of Police of Buenos Aires. The petitioner says that at the time there was much talk of police and judicial corruption and the incompetence of the authorities, and the search began for a scapegoat.

3. He says that in 1991, after more than four years of investigation without identifying the person or persons responsible for the killing and after the chief suspect was acquitted, the family of Mr. P. began a public campaign in which they started accusing the alleged victim of being the mastermind of the homicide. So it was that in 1991 a witness suddenly appeared who directly implicated him in Mr. P.'s killing. He says that as a result of that witness's testimony and the testimony of others supporting her testimony, on M. 23, 1992, he was arrested and charged with secondary participation in the homicide.

4. He says that he was initially detained at a police station and that on M. 26 he was taken to Penal Unit 6 in Dolores in an excessive display of police manpower, with officers cordoning off the area and even preventing access to journalists, while he was taken in handcuffs with personal guards and treated as if he were a dangerous terrorist. He says that in addition, on arriving at the prison, he was placed in a punishment cell where he remained incommunicado for two days without anything to eat or drink. On April 4, 1992, the First Lower Criminal Court in and for Dolores (hereineafter the “L.C.”), based on a summary of the accumulated evidence in the case file, but without analyzing the procedural risks, ordered him remanded in pretrial detention.

5. The petitioner said that he initiated various proceedings to end his detention. In this regard, with the argument that his detention was arbitrary because it was based on perjury, he filed a petition of habeas corpus in which he sought to have the veracity of the witness discredited. On April 15, 1992, the Lower Court rejected the habeas corpus petition on the ground that there was no arbitrary restriction of liberty in the case and, on J. 2 of that year, on the grounds that the detention was lawful and the evidence collected warranted the restriction of liberty, it rejected the motion for dismissal. The petitioner did not appeal against that decision.

6. The petitioner also filed an interlocutory motion for the witness to be declared ineligible. H., the judge overseeing the investigation ruled that the witness was eligible to give evidence, and therefore dismissed the interlocutory motion. That decision was appealed and upheld at second instance. In similar fashion, the petitioner filed a motion for dismissal, which was denied, and on September 3, 1992, the Dolores Court of Appeals confirmed the denial of dismissal for the reason that the procedural situation of the petitioner had not changed since the order of pretrial detention was issued, and therefore it was appropriate that he remain a defendant in the proceeding, for which reason his liberty should be restricted.

7. The petitioner says that the pretrial detention was kept in place while the case was being heard and lasted until J. 7, 1993, when the L.C. accepted a motion for special release from custody based on the challenge alleging the falsehood of the only testimony that identified him as a participant in the crime under investigation. H., in spite of the fact that the only direct evidence against him had been disproved and the witness convicted of perjury in October 1996, he said that he had to endure the criminal proceeding until August 14, 1998, when he was finally acquitted for lack of evidence against him.

8. H. been acquitted, on August 9, 2000, the petitioner filed a claim for compensatory damages in which he sought an indemnity for the arbitrary detention, the unwarranted length of it, and the injuries suffered as a result of the criminal proceeding that he was made to endure. On September 3, 2003, the Civil Court rejected the suit, finding that the S. can only be held responsible for a judicial error if the adjudicatory act that originated the injury is declared unlawful and voided, which did not occur in this case. It also found that the acquittal judgment did not disqualify the precautionary measure of restriction of liberty in respect of the petitioner based on elements of prima facie evidence, that there was nothing blameworthy in the way that the S. had acted, and that ordering the precautionary measure did not grant the right to claim compensation. In response, an appeal was filed on September 10, 2003, in spite of which, the Court of Appeals issued its ruling on August 26, 2004, upholding the decision at first instance in all respects.

9. On September 15, 2004, a special appeal alleging inapplicability of law was filed against the decision of the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the decision applied the law and doctrine mistakenly, violated the rules of evaluation of evidence, and failed to weigh the evidence appropriately. The Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires (hereinafter the “Supreme Court”) refused the appeal, arguing that compensation for deprivation of liberty during trial should not be recognized...