Report No. 16 (2017) IACHR. Petition No. 101-03 (Ecuador)

Year2017
Petition Number101-03
Report Number16
Respondent StateEcuador
Case TypeAdmissibility
CourtInter-American Comission of Human Rights
Alleged VictimEva Cristina Allan Ramos
R. No. 16/17
















REPORT No. 16/17

PETITION 101-03

REPORT ON ADMISSIBILITY


E.C.A. RAMOS

ECUADOR


OEA/Ser.L/V/II.

D.. 17

27 January 2017

Original: Spanish



























Approved by the Commission on January 27, 2017.






Cite as: IACHR, R. No. 16/17. A.. E.C.A.R.. Ecuador. January 27, 2017.





www.cidh.org


REPORT No. 16/17

PETITION P-101-03

REPORT ON ADMISSIBILITY

EVA CRISTINA ALLAN RAMOS

ECUADOR

JANUARY 27, 2017



  1. SUMMARY

  1. On January 31, 2003, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Commission,” “the Commission” or “the IACHR”) received a petition alleging the international responsibility of the Republic of Ecuador (hereinafter “Ecuador” or “the S.”) for the purported violation of rights to the detriment of Eva Cristina Allan Ramos (hereinafter “the petitioner,” “the alleged victim” or “M.A.”).

  2. The petitioner alleges that on October 23, 1984 she was arrested, isolated and taken to a provisional detention center on the charge of participating in embezzlement against the Ministry of Social Welfare of Ecuador. She alleges that her right to the presumption of innocence was violated inasmuch as she was deprived of liberty for 22 months without any proof of her guilt. She declares that the criminal proceedings against her extended for 16 years due to reasons attributable to the S., and that she was dismissed from her job at the Ministry of Social Welfare through administrative law proceedings concerning which she was not notified of or given the opportunity to defend herself. She says alleges a smear campaign against her that affected the courts’ decisions. In turn, the S. says that the alleged victim did not exhaust domestic remedies before resorting to the IACHR, as she did not file a habeas corpus when she was deprived of liberty. L., it declares that according to the petitioner’s statements, there were no serious procedural shortcomings affecting the alleged victim’s rights, and that this petition is intended to get the IACHR’s intervention as a “fourth instance.”

  3. Without prejudging the merits of the complaint, after analyzing the position of the parties and in accordance with the requirements established in A. 46 and 47 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the American Convention” or “the Convention”) and A. 31 to 34 of the IACHR’s R. of Procedure (hereinafter “the R.”), the Commission decides to declare this petition admissible to assess the facts concerning the alleged violation of the rights enshrined in A. 7 (Right to Personal Liberty), 8 (Right to A Fair Trial) and 25 (Right to Judicial Protection) of the American Convention, in accordance with Article 1.1 of said treaty. The Commission moreover decides to notify the parties of its decision, to publish this report and include it in its Annual R. to the General Assembly of the Organization of American S.s.

  1. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IACHR

  1. The IACHR received the petition on January 31, 2003 and, at the initial study stage, it requested additional information to the petitioner on December 10, 2003; J.2., 2004; J.5., 2005 and January 29, 2007; these were replied on January 20 and J. 12, 2004; August 18, 2005 and October 24, 2010, respectively.

  2. On January 24, 2011, the IACHR transmitted to the S. a copy of the relevant parts of the petition and of the additional information received at the initial study stage, and granted it a two-month deadline to submit observations, under Article 30.3 of the R. then in force. On July 3, 2014, the IACHR received the S.’s response, which was transmitted to the petitioning party on September 17, 2014. The petitioner submitted additional observations on J. 29, 2015, which were transmitted to the S..



  1. POSITION OF THE PARTIES

  1. Position of the petitioner

  1. The petitioner declares that on May 18, 1981 she was appointed to the office of “Payer No. 4” at the Social Welfare Ministry of the Republic of Ecuador, with the responsibility to verify “the legality, exactness and truth of supporting documents, and the payment information” concerning the checks to be paid at said institution. She alleges that on October 23, 1984 she was arrested by state officers and taken to a Provisional Detention Center, but was not shown any constitutional arrest warrant for the charge of participating in embezzlement against the Ministry of Social Welfare. She argues that the criminal proceedings began on October 26, 1984 and eight days later, she was taken to the Women’s Prison, where she was deprived of liberty for 22 months while the proceedings against her took place. On July 30, 1986, thanks to a provisional stay of the proceedings, she was released and the F.M. of the Ministry of Social Welfare was the only one accused of fraud. She alleges the violation of the rights to the presumption of innocence and to personal liberty inasmuch as she was deprived of liberty and in solitary confinement for six days without an arrest warrant and then deprived of liberty for 22 months without any proof of her guilt.

  2. She declares that on February 13, 1989 she was notified of the confirmation of the provisional stay order issued by the First Chamber of the Superior C. of Justice of Quito. On December 9, 1996, the final stay of the criminal proceedings was issued by the Ninth Criminal Judge of Pichincha, which had to be confirmed by the Superior C.. She alleges that the Ninth Criminal Judge of Pichincha retained the petitioner’s case file until she lodged several requests through the Ombudsman so that said judge sent it to the Superior C.; this situation lasted for four years. She declares that on November 11, 2002, the final stay was confirmed.

  3. The petitioner states that after her release, she claimed her job to the Ministry of Social Welfare; however, the authorities of the Ministry told her that her employment file had gone missing. S., the petitioner accessed a copy of employment action No. 1771 of December 17, 1984, under which her office was declared temporarily vacant inasmuch as she was allegedly guilty of an offense; and of employment action No. 007 of January 7, 1985, under which she was completely dismissed of her office as “Payer No. 4.” She argues that the procedures of vacancy and dismissal were made in her absence and that she was never notified of any such actions.

  4. She says that on May 22, 1989 she requested her reinstatement to the President of the Claims Board, which was rejected on September 25, 1990 inasmuch as it was filed out of the time established by the Law of Civil Service and Administrative Career to assert her rights. The petitioner alleges that the Ministry of Social Welfare purposefully lost her “employment file” to damage her and not reinstate her, since in that file were all the petitions to the Ministry of Social Welfare and the alleged victim’s employment history that proved that she had worked at said institution. She alleges that the S. declared that the petitioner never worked at the Ministry of Social Welfare on the grounds that there is no employment file to prove the contrary.

  5. Moreover, the petitioner declares that the S. “distorted her reputation” and made “public statements to the media” that led to a partial judgment by the President of the Claims Board, violating the rights to due process and to the protection of honor and dignity; however, she submits no additional information on this. The Claims Board’s decision was appealed to the Administrative Law C., which confirmed the previous sentence on April 10, 1992 “based on the same grounds and without assessing other aspects.”

  6. Concerning the S.’s argument about the non-exhaustion of habeas corpus in relation to her deprivation of liberty, the petitioner alleges that it was not necessary to file said remedy inasmuch as, under the existing legal framework, it had to be lodged with the M. of the city of Quito and results were often negative in cases where the deprivation of liberty had been ordered by a competent judge or in cases connected with the charge of wrongful use of public funds.

  7. The petitioner also says that the delay in lodging the petition with the Commission is due to the many procedures that she had to file to the judicial authorities in Ecuador in order to get certified copies of the documents needed to support the petition; therefore, she believes that the petition must be considered timely.

  8. Based on the foregoing, the petitioner alleges that the S. violated, to her detriment, the rights protected by A. 1.1 (Obligation to Respect Rights), 7 (Right to Personal Liberty), 8 (Right to A Fair Trial) and 11 (Right to Privacy) of the American Convention; A. II (Right to Equality before Law), V (Right to Protection of Honor, Personal Reputation, and Private and Family Life), XVIII (Right to A Fair Trial), XXV (Right of Protection from Arbitrary Arrest) and XXVI (Right to Due Process of Law) of the American D. of Rights and Duties of Man; A. 9, 14, 17 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and A. 2, 7, 10, 11 and 12 of the Universal D. of Human Rights.

  1. Position of the S.

  1. According to the S., M.A. worked as a career public officer in the position of “Payer No. 4” at the F.M.’s Office of the Ministry of Social Welfare. In 1984 she was accused of alleged...

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