IFRS adoption/reporting and auditor fees: the conditional effect of audit firm size and tenure

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-09-2019-0107
Pages639-666
Published date28 April 2020
Date28 April 2020
AuthorMedhat N. El Guindy,Nadia Sbei Trabelsi
Subject MatterAccounting/accountancy,Accounting & Finance
IFRS adoption/reporting and
auditor fees: the conditional ef‌fect
of audit f‌irm size and tenure
Medhat N. El Guindy
Department of Accounting and Finance, American University in Dubai,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Department of Accounting,
Tanta University, Tanta, Egypt, and
Nadia Sbei Trabelsi
Department of Accounting and Finance, American University in Dubai,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to investigatethe impact of International Financial Reporting Standards(IFRS)
adoption on audit and non-audit fees in the UK setting. The study investigates whether UK f‌irmsadopting
IFRS for the f‌irst time or reporting under IFRS, in general, are being charged higheraudit and non-audit fees
and whetherthis impact is conditional on audit f‌irm size and tenure.
Design/methodology/approach Using empirical data for UK listed f‌irms from 2003-2007,the paper
uses a regressionmodel that explains audit and non-audit fees by independentvariables measuring auditors
and auditeescharacteristicsincluding IFRS adoption and reporting. Additionalregressions with interaction
terms were performed to testthe hypothetical conditional impact of auditor size and audit f‌irm tenureon the
above-mentionedassociation.
Findings Audit and non-audit fees increasesignif‌icantly for companies adopting IFRS for the f‌irst time
and this increase is persistent during later years.In addition, results suggest that both Big four and non-Big
four auditors charge higher audit and non-auditfees to their clients adopting or reporting under IFRS in a
similar manner. Furthermore,f‌indings indicate that audit f‌irms increase auditand non-audit fees for old and
new clientsusing IFRS which suggests no low-balling effect is detected.
Research limitations/implications Results reported in this study provide insights to regulators in
jurisdictions similar to the UK regarding the cost of IFRS adoption which includes higher audit and non-audit fees
imposedbybothBigfourandnon-Bigfourauditf‌irms. In addition, this study argues, to some extent, against the
notion that auditors may charge lower fees in the early years of the audit engagement to win new audit clients.
Originality/value To the best of the knowledge, the f‌indings are unique at two levels.First, the paper
provides evidence on the cost of using IFRS in the UK jurisdiction which was not explored by previous
research. Second,the paper investigates the potential conditionaleffect of auditor size and audit tenure on the
associationbetween IFRS adoption and auditorsfees.
Keywords IFRS, Audit fees, Non-audit fees, Audit f‌irm tenure, Low-balling, IFRS adoption,
Audit f‌irm size
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) aim at developing a single set of high-
quality global accounting standards that bring transparency, accountability and eff‌iciency
to f‌inancial markets around the world. IFRS are now mandatory in more than 140
jurisdictions, with many others permitting their use (IFRS, 2019). The adoption of IFRS in
IFRS adoption/
reporting and
auditor fees
639
Received15 September 2019
Revised8 January 2020
4 February2020
17March 2020
Accepted26 March 2020
InternationalJournal of
Accounting& Information
Management
Vol.28 No. 4, 2020
pp. 639-666
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1834-7649
DOI 10.1108/IJAIM-09-2019-0107
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/1834-7649.htm
European countries (EC16/06/2002)has raised a lot of concerns for accounting and auditing
research regarding the potential costs and benef‌its of such adoption. For instance, several
studies tested the impact of IFRS adoption on f‌inancial reporting quality (Isaboke, 2019;
Capkun and Collins, 2018;Bassemir and Novotny-Farkas, 2018;Dayanandan, 2016;El
Guindy, 2014;Ahmed et al.,2013;Liu et al.,2011;Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008;Soderstrom
and Sun, 2007) while other studies tested the cost of IFRSadoption (Christensen et al., 2007;
Daske, 2006;Daske et al.,2008;De George et al., 2012;Lepone and Wong, 2018). This study
adds to this body of knowledge throughtesting the impact of such a transition on audit and
non-audit fees in the UK as one of the main costsof IFRS adoption.
The purpose of this paper is to empiricallytest the impact of using IFRS on each of audit
and non-audit fees in the UK setting. IFRS adoption in the UK provides an interesting
setting for our empiricalanalysis for the following reasons. First, IFRS adoption in the UK is
mandatory for group f‌irms listed in the London stock exchangesmainmarketfor
accounting periods starting January 1, 2005 and voluntary for other f‌irms at the same date.
However, it became mandatory for f‌irms listed in the alternative investment market (AIM)
since January 1, 2007. This setting allows for parallel reporting under the two sets of
accounting standards for the periods from 2005 to 2007 where some f‌irms are reporting
under UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and other f‌irms switched to
IFRS. Consequently, it is feasible to test the impact of IFRS in the year of adoption and in
subsequent periods in comparison to localGAAP. Second, non-audit services in the UK are
not only permitted but also f‌irms are required to disclose non-audit fees data in details
unlike many other countries where non-audit services are prohibited or disclosure is not
mandatory. Therefore, it became possible to test whether using IFRS might lead to some
additional non-audit services compared to UK GAAP. Finally, the UK setting provides a
setting of a common lawcountry similar to the USA where results can be used by regulators
to assess one of the main costsof IFRS adoption.
Prior literature provides severalempirical studies analyzing the cost of IFRS adoption in
different countriessuch as New Zealand (Griff‌inet al., 2009;Houqe, 2017), Malaysia(Yaacob
and Che-Ahmad, 2012), China (Lin and Yen, 2016;Shan et al., 2016), Finland (Vieru and
Schadewitz, 2010), Jordan (Abu Risheh and Al-Saeed, 2014), Korea (Jung et al.,2016) and
Australia (De George et al.,2012;Morris et al.,2013). This study has several motivations.
First, most prior studies document empirical evidence of increased audit fees in the year of
IFRS adoption. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the previous studies tested
the UK setting as one of the importantcommon law countries with strong law enforcement.
In addition, most priorstudies tested audit fees before and after IFRS adoption. However,we
argue whether this increase in fees is persistent or only evident in the f‌irst year. Therefore,
we conduct our tests using two IFRS variables,namely, IFRS adoption, which indicates the
f‌irst year of using IFRS only and IFRS reporting, which includes all accounting periods in
which the company is using IFRSfor f‌inancial reporting.
Second, Brochet et al. (2013) argue that despite accounting standards in the UK had
already been very similar to IFRS prior to the mandatoryadoption in 2005, they investigate
the improvement in information comparability following IFRS adoption. They found that
the mandatory adoption of IFRS reduces insidersabnormal returns following insiders
equity purchases. Therefore, the evidence provided by Brochet et al. (2013) suggests that
even f‌irms having domestic standards similar to IFRS can benef‌it from IFRS adoption.
However, this raises concerns regarding the cost of IFRS adoption in such countries and
whether auditors will charge higher fees because of such adoption. Houqe (2018) considers
that accounting researchon IFRS adoption has examined much more the quality of f‌inancial
IJAIM
28,4
640

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT