I know it when I see it: the nature of trust, trustworthiness signals, and strategic trust construction

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/IJLM-11-2016-0268
Published date13 November 2017
Pages914-938
Date13 November 2017
AuthorStanley E. Fawcett,Yao Henry Jin,Amydee M. Fawcett,Gregory Magnan
Subject MatterManagement science & operations,Logistics
I know it when I see it: the nature
of trust, trustworthiness signals,
and strategic trust construction
Stanley E. Fawcett
Department of Business Administration, Weber State University,
Ogden, Utah, USA
Yao Henry Jin
Department of Management, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, USA
Amydee M. Fawcett
Department of Business Administration, Weber State University,
Ogden, Utah, USA, and
Gregory Magnan
Department of Marketing, Seattle University, Seattle, Washington, USA
Abstract
Purpose Trust has long been viewed as a potential governance mechanism. However, recent research
discloses substantive incongruities in trust conceptualization and operationalization especially in the supply
chain buyer/supplier context. The purpose of this paper is to develop an empirically grounded
conceptualization of trust and to explore the trust-construction process.
Design/methodology/approach The authors used the communications rationality approach to elaborate
a three-stage qualitative study of supply chain trust. The authors first monologically examine trust by
interviewing managers from over 50 companies (as described). The list of trust behaviors are then dialogically
refined through 11 focus studies comprised of over 250 managers into different trust dimensions (as agreed
upon). Finally, the authors used two in-depth, dyadic case studies to examine the dynamic trust construction
process (as witnessed).
Findings The authors find divergence in the way academics define trust and the way companies
operationalize trust. Missing in action is the notion of benevolence. In the supply chain setting, managers
describe trust as consisting of credibility and relationship commitment. Companies use an iterative approach
to signal trustworthiness. However, ambiguity increases the costs and decreases the effectiveness of
proactive trust construction as a form of supply chain governance.
Originality/value The authors specify and evaluate novel constructs used to signal trustworthiness and
document why and how companies struggle to use the signaling process efficiently and effectively. For some,
this is an issue of managerial commitment. For others, this represents a lack of understanding of
trustworthiness signals and the trust-construction process. Ultimately, the authors develop a more robust
conceptualization of inter-organizational trust and present a roadmap for proactive trust construction.
Keywords Trust, Value co-creation, Case studies, Supply chain governance
Paper type Research paper
Companies are just beginning to learn what nations have always known: in a complex, uncertain
world filled withdangerous opponents, it is best not to go it alone (Kenichi Ohmae,McKinsey & Co.).
Introduction
Supply chain collaboration can help companies combine capabilities to co-create value and
earn relational rents (Fawcett et al., 2012; Mentzer et al., 2008; Devaraj et al., 2007).
Many firms, however, struggle to create distinctive value across organizational boundaries
(Power, 2005; Fawcett and Magnan, 2004; Jones et al., 2010; Fawcett et al., 2012). Constrained by
organizational conflict as well as by fearof opportunisticbehavior, managers findit difficult to
govern resource-sharing relationships ( Jones et al., 2010; Fawcett and Magnan, 2001;
The International Journal of
Logistics Management
Vol. 28 No. 4, 2017
pp. 914-938
© Emerald PublishingLimited
0957-4093
DOI 10.1108/IJLM-11-2016-0268
Received 17 November 2016
Revised 11 January 2017
Accepted 12 January 2017
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0957-4093.htm
914
IJLM
28,4
Read et al., 2014; Revilla and Knoppen, 2015). Specifically, managers do not effectively employ
trust as a governance mechanism to build relational capital and effective resource-sharing
routines (McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011; Mesquita, 2007; Li et al., 2014). Managers
must therefore rely on contracts to safeguard relationships or they forego investments in
relation-specific assets, avoiding the entanglements inherent in interdependent, integrated
capabilities (Hoyt and Huq, 2000; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). A bsent trust, collaborative supply
chain alliances do not emerge and relational returns are lost (Wallenburg et al., 2011).
Extant research has shown that high levels of trust can improve profitability (Cao and
Zhang, 2011; Fawcett et al., 2012), enhance innovation effectiveness (Cao and Zhang, 2011;
Wang et al., 2011), and promote more collaborative, higher-performing supply chain
relationships (Fawcett et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2014; Ha et al., 2011).
By contrast, researchhas documented the cost of lost trust (Chenet al., 201 1). For example, in
the egregious case of General Motors J. Ignacio Lopez, the early 1990s decision to tear up
existing supplier contracts in order to pit suppliers against each other damaged GMs
reputation among suppliers for over a decade (Magnan et al., 2011; Jin et al., 2013). Now, the
conundrum: theextant research as well as managerialanecdotes demonstratestwo vital gaps
in our understanding of how to use trust as an effective governance mechanism:
(1) Conceptualizationgap: although academics havelong and frequentlyinvestigated trust
as a foundational relational building block (Narasimhan et al., 2008; Fawcett et al., 2012),
recent research argues that trust conceptualizations lack consistency (Whipple et al.,
2013; McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011). Moreover, trust measurement is rudimentary
(McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011) and trust scales are underdeveloped (Ferrin , 2013).
(2) Construction gap: although managers talk knowinglyabout trust as a precursor to
alliance success, they admittedly do not grasp how to proactively cultivate trust as an
effectivegovernance mechanism (Jones et al., 2014; Day et al., 2013; Fawcett et al., 2012).
Given that trust enables collaborative gains, the time has come to close both gaps by taking
a closer look at trust conceptualization in the supply chain context as well as at the
processes and behaviors inherent in the trust-construction process.
Therefore, our purpose is twofold: first, to empirically conceptualize trust as a
governance mechanism and collaborative enabler (i.e. what is trust?) and second, to explore
the dynamics of the trust-construction process (how does trust emerge?). To do this, we use
a longitudinal, multi-method approach to revisit trust conceptualization in supply chain
relationships. We contribute to the study of trusts role in relational advantage in three
ways. First, we propose a refined, capabilities-based conceptualization of inter-organization
trust. Second, we develop a proactive, signaling-based framework for constructing supply
chain trust. Third, we document bias in the way managers assess and interpret
trustworthiness signals, demonstrating a need to research trust using multiple key
informants across relationships.
Relational advantage and trust construction
The capabilities literature clarifies trustsroleasagovernancemechanismaswellasits
contribution to collaboration and competitive advantage. Three points are particularly relevant:
(1) Distinctiveness: the essence of the resource-based view is that to outperform rivals,
firms must possess valuable, inimitable, rare, and non-substitutable (VRIN)
resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).
(2) Resource access: Dyer and Singh (1998, p. 650) emphasize that the capabilities
needed to achieve a VRIN advantage are often embedded in inter-firm resources
and routines.
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Strategic trust
construction

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