Global Luck Egalitarianism and Border Control

• Author: Kim Angell,Robert Huseby
• Date: 01 June 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12236
• Published date: 01 June 2019

© 2019 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2019 John Wi ley & Sons Ltd.

Ratio Juris. Vol. 32 No. 2 June 2019 (177–192)

Global Luck Egalitarianism

and Border Control

KIM AN GELL AND ROBERT HUSEBY*

Abstract. This paper di scusses what implications g lobal luck egalitarian ism (GLE) has for bor-

der control. Some authors suggest th at an open-borders policy follows from GLE. The idea is

that various uncho sen inequalities inevitably follow f rom differences in birthplace, suc h that

GLE will always have principled reas on to condemn closed borders. Ot hers are skeptical of the

assumption that GLE wi ll have liberal implications for border control, becau se open borders

may have other, adverse effects that outweigh t he reductions in u njust inequality. Agains t

such skeptics, we argue th at GLE will (typically) have quite liberal i mplications for border

control. However, this connection i s not a principled one: Whether (and to what extent) GLE

favors opening or closing b orders will depend upon empirical c ircumstances.

1. Introduction

In debates about distributive justice, luck egalitari anism has received substant ial

attention in recent years. As far as gl obal dist ributive justice is concerne d, however,

the theory has bee n less dominant (though not absent).1 In this paper we discuss

what implications global luck egalitaria nism (GLE) may have for the important

question of whether states are justi fied in (completely or partially) closing their bor-

ders to outsiders seeking entrance.2 As should be ev ident, the answer will depend to

some extent on the actual state of the world, but we think t hat there are nevertheless

some theoretical points wort h making about the issue.

1 Note that some authors disti nguish between global justice a nd international justice, where

the former refers to relat ions between ind ividuals and the latter to re lations between states

(Brock 2015; Caney 2005, 2). We will mostly be concerned with indiv iduals.

2 For recent important di scussions releva nt to the theme of this paper, see Car ens 2013 and

Miller 2016. Holtug (2017) discusses the related que stion of whether GLE can justif y asymmet-

rical rights bet ween immigrants and cit izens.

* Earlier version s of this paper were presented at semi nars and workshops at the University of

Gothenburg, the Un iversity of Oslo, and the Oslo and Akershus University Col lege of Applied

Sciences. We are grateful t o Chris Armst rong, Sarah Fine, Jakob Elst er, Edmund Henden,

Fredrik Dybfest Hj orthen, Nils Holtug, Patti Len ard, Anders Molander, Cara Nine, Kieran

Oberman, Göran D uus-Otterst röm, and two anonymous revie wers for many helpful

comments.

Kim Angell and Robert Huseby178

Ratio Juris, Vol. 32, No. 2© 2019 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2019 John Wi ley & Sons Ltd.

We start, in the next section, by briefly pres enting luck egalitarianism and GLE.

While our aim i s not to justify GLE as such,3 we nevertheless point to some intu itive

support for the general ideal. Further, in Sect ion 3, we discuss some met hodological

questions. Subsequently, in Section 4, we offer some initia l reasons to think that GLE

is relevant to the question of the extent to which st ates can justifiably close thei r

borders, and more specifically, some reasons to th ink that the implications of GLE

would be rather liberal in thi s regard.4 We then consider some argument s that indi-

cate an opposite conclusion (Section 5). We argue that GLE will, for the most part,

have liberal implications for border control, but that there may be exceptions, for

instance in ca ses where open borders will result in the worst off in sender count ries

becoming unjustly worse off i n absolute terms, in cases where open borders threaten

to produce more unjust inequality i n receiver countries, and in cases where u n-

checked imm igration leads to economic costs i n receiver countries, with associated

(prohibitive) welfare losses. Empirically, these possibilities are to some extent con-

tested. We take no stand in those debates, but hold that GLE will have liberal i mpli-

cations up to the point at which such adverse effects b ecome sufficiently large.

Section 6 concludes.

Before proceeding, two cla rifications are in order. First, when we refer to immi-

grants (and immigration), we intend to refer to people who wish to move from one

state in order to settle in anot her (see Wellman and Cole 2011, 1), but who are not

victims of perse cution (and hence do not legally qualify as refugees, according to t he

UN Convention).5 It seems safe to say th at the category of immigrants we focu s on

will be quite sizeable. It is also worth not ing that, persecuted and severely deprived

people aside, very many (but of course not all) immigra nts will still be badly off and

needy in a more general sense of the ter m.

Secondly, by the term closed borders we do not mean to imply that states tend, or

are permitted, to close t heir borders completely. We assume that states honor in-

ternational conventions, and that they h ave a duty to admit (a certain number of)

Convention refugees, people with other special cl aims to entrance (arising, for i n-

stance, from family reun ification), and possibly people who are otherwise in severe

need. The general question is thus whet her states have a right to deny entry to peo-

ple who wish to enter and settle (temporarily or permane ntly), but who do not fall

into any of the said categories. We also assume that when a state open s its borders

for a person, this ty pically gives access, at least over time, to various other benef its

that contribute to people’s welfare (such as economic, social, and political rights).

3 In part because we do not agre e on whether it is, in the end, defensible. We do think, t hough,

that GLE is interesti ng and plausible enough to merit serious consideration.

4 We do not address objections to luck egalitarianism as such. We assu me that luck egalitarian-

ism is plausible in order to, first, spel l out a version of it in the global context, and then, more

centrally, ask what implications the globa l version will have for the question of border cont rol.

For criticisms of luck ega litarianism i n general see, for instance, Ander son 1999, Eyal 2006, and

Scheffler 2003.

5 There is debate about the most plausible defi nition of refugees. We do not engage in t hat

debate here. See Lister 2013; Miller 2016, chap. 5; and Schacknove 1985. Note, however, that on

the so-cal led “humanitar ian” definition (Shack nove 1985), people in severe need might be

classified as “ref ugees” regardless of whether they are a lso persecuted.