Frequency and Motives for Stock Dividends in a Unique Environment

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12020
AuthorKhamis H. Al‐Yahyaee
Date01 June 2014
Published date01 June 2014
Frequency and Motives for Stock
Dividends in a Unique
Environment
KHAMIS H. AL-YAHYAEE
Department of Economics and Finance, College of Economics and Political Science,
Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman
ABSTRACT
We investigate the possible differences in the information content of stock
dividends between firms that distribute stock dividends frequently (frequent
distributors) and firms that distribute stock dividends infrequently (infre-
quent distributors) using a unique data set from Oman where the market
microstructure frictions are either absent or limited. We find that infrequent
stock dividend distributors have higher postdistribution operating perfor-
mance relative to frequent distributors. We also find that the illiquidity
measure is significantly related to the announcement effect only for frequent
stock dividend distributors, whereas short-term performance is significantly
related to the announcement effect only for infrequent distributors. Our
findings indicate that infrequent stock dividends are used mainly to convey
favorable private information about the firms’ future prospects, and frequent
stock dividends are used to reduce stock price to an optimal trading range in
order to improve trading liquidity.
JEL classification: G14, G35.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stock dividends are a puzzling corporate behavior. In theory, stock distributions
either by stock dividends or by stock splits are cosmetic operations aimed at
dividing the corporate pie into more pieces with no change in the total firm
value (Adaoglu and Lasfer 2011). However, numerous empirical studies report a
significant positive market reaction to stock dividends. The underlying reasons
for this positive market reaction remain unsettled.1One plausible explanation is
that there is an ‘optimal’ trading range, and that stock dividends realign stock
prices to this range (Copeland 1979; Adaoglu and Lasfer 2011; Nguyen and
Wang, 2013). Realigning stock price could attract more attention to a stock
(Grinblatt et al. 1984), which may lead to an increase in the liquidity of the
stock (Muscarella and Vetsuypens 1996). In fact, Baker and Powell (1992) find
1 For a recent literature review on this topic, see Bechmann and Raaballe (2007), Adaoglu and
Lasfer (2011), Al-Yahyaee (2014), and Nguyen and Wang (2013).
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International Review of Finance, 14:2, 2014: pp. 295–318
DOI: 10.1111/irfi.12020
© 2013 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2013
that moving the stock price into a better trading range and improving the
stock’s liquidity are the primary motives for managers to split their firms’ stocks.
The empirical evidence from previous studies on improved liquidity follow-
ing stock distributions is mixed. In this vein, Bechmann and Raaballe (2007)
study the stock distribution effect using a sample of stocks on the Copenhagen
Stock Exchange. They report weak evidence for the liquidity effect. Likewise,
Adaoglu and Lasfer (2011) examine the motives for Turkish companies to pay
stock dividends. Similar to Bechmann and Raaballe (2007), they document
weak evidence that stock dividends improve liquidity. Conversely, Lin et al.
(2009) find that the incidence of no trading decreases and liquidity improves
after stock distributions using daily data for the period 1975–2004. Similarly,
Metha et al. (2011) conduct a survey of Indian managers and find that the
improvement of liquidity is the primary motive for stock distributions. Nguyen
and Wang (2013) find greater participation of small investors following stock
dividends for a sample of Chinese firms that distribute stock dividends from
1996 to 2010.
A competing explanation for stock distributions is the signaling hypothesis.
This theory suggests that firms split their stocks and distribute stock dividends
to signal information about their future profitability. According to the signaling
hypothesis, stock distributions are associated with positive announcement
excess returns because managers use stock distributions to convey favorable
private information about their firms’ future prospects. In this vein, Foster and
Vickrey (1978) show that stock dividend announcements signal positive infor-
mation to investors, and larger stock dividends convey more favorable infor-
mation. Similarly, Grinblatt et al. (1984) document that managers convey
favorable private information concerning future earnings to investors through
stock dividends. Kunz and Rosa-Majhensek (2008) demonstrate that Swiss com-
panies are using stock distributions to send positive signals to the stock market,
which is consistent with the signaling hypothesis. Adaoglu and Lasfer (2011)
document some evidence that the market reaction is higher for firms that
underperformed in the previous 6 months before the announcement. Their
results imply that firms announce stock dividends to signal future recovery.
Al-Yahyaee (2014) examines shareholder wealth effects of stock distributions
using a sample of Omani firms. He finds a positive stock market reaction to
stock dividend distributions. His results indicate that stock distributions are
used primarily to signal future operating performance and to a lesser extent to
reduce stock prices to an optimal trading range.2Nguyen and Wang (2013) find
positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of stock dividends
and a positive association between these returns and managers’ private infor-
mation. These findings are largely consistent with the signaling theory. On the
other hand, many previous empirical studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lev 1987;
2 This study notably differs from that of Al-Yahyaee (2014) in that it investigates the possible
differences in the information content of stock dividends between firms that distribute stock
dividends frequently and firms that distribute stock dividends infrequently. This important
issue has not been examined in Al-Yahyaee (2014).
International Review of Finance
296 © 2013 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2013

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