Fair Play, Reciprocity, and Natural Duties of Justice

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12297
• Published date: 01 December 2020
• Author: George Klosko
• Date: 01 December 2020

© (2020) John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Ratio Juris, Vol. 33 No. 4 December 2020 (335–350)

Fair Play, Reciprocity,

and Natural Duties of Justice

GEORGE KLOSKO*

Abstract. In this paper, I respond to what is currently the most significant criticism of the prin-

ciple fair play as a basis for political obligations. In a series of cases in which obligations appear

to be established by fair play, important scholars contend that the moral principle at work is not

fair play but a natural duty of justice to provide essential benefits to other people. Such natu-

ral duty accounts strikingly ignore requirements of reciprocity, to make appropriate return for

benefits received. In addition, careful examination of possible natural duty explanations of such

cases indicates severe difficulties explaining exactly to whom the natural duties in question are

owed and why they may require significant costs.

1. Introduction

It is now more than sixty years since H. L. A. Hart presented the principle of fair play

(or fairness), as a basis for political obligations (Hart 1955). During this period, the

principle has been worked into a developed theory—actually, a family of theories—

and scholars hold that that such a theory is now the most promising approach (Green

2002, 530; Soper 2002, 103). In this paper, I respond to an important criticism of fair

play, which concerns its underlying moral logic. Prominent theorists argue that the

moral principle at work in cases that are alleged to turn on fair play is actually a

natural duty of justice. Because of the importance of these critics and the consistency

of their criticisms, it is necessary to respond. In addition, while my purpose in this

paper is not to refute natural duty theories of political obligation, I believe that view-

ing them against a backdrop of fair play affords important insight into their workings

and difficulties they must overcome.

The principle of fair play defended in this paper centers on a requirement of rec-

iprocity. On this interpretation, it is a “self-benefit” principle (Arneson 1982). In a

well-known work, Lawrence Becker (1990, 3) describes reciprocity as follows:

We ought to be disposed, as a matter of moral obligation, to return good in proportion to the

good we receive and to make reparation for the harm we have done.

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Sun Yat Sen University and the University of

Virginia Political Theory Colloquium. I am grateful to the audiences at both sessions, especially

John Simmons and Jiafeng Zhu. I am also grateful to Ryan Pevnick, David Lefkowitz, Massimo

Renzo, and Ross Mittiga for comments on previous versions.

George Klosko336

Ratio Juris, Vol. 33, No. 4© (2020) John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

This construal is clear in Hart’s (1955, 185) initial formulation:

[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict

their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a

similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission.

These points are important, because the scholars I critique focus on benefits owed to

other people rather than received by the obligee herself.

The specific version of fair play I defend may be described as “nonvoluntarist.”

(I will refer to this as FP, for short.) One reason FP is important is its ability to generate

requirements to reciprocate even when benefits are not voluntarily accepted. Because

the benefits are public goods that are received by all members of the community, all

incur obligations almost without regard to what they do or think or believe. Such a

theory is able to overcome the problem of “generality” that plagues other theories of

obligation, notably ones based on consent. Because individuals receive the relevant

public goods from particular cooperative schemes, the “particularity” condition is

satisfied as well.1 If these points are accepted, then central questions of political obli-

gation may be viewed as largely solved.

2. Nonvoluntarist Fair Play

As indicated, FP is centrally concerned with moral requirements to contribute to the

supply of public goods. While the principle’s workings in these cases are subject to

controversy, there are fewer difficulties with “voluntarist” versions of the principle.

Voluntarist theories concern excludable goods, which can be accepted in the usual

sense. Consider a potluck supper. (Call this Potluck.) Assume that Alice’s neighbors

organize a potluck dinner, and it is understood that each neighbor is to bring a dish.

If she comes to the dinner without bringing a dish but eats food others had brought,

clearly she is doing something wrong. Potluck illustrates the wrong of accepting ben-

efits without doing one’s fair share of the effort involved in producing them. In the

literature, it is generally agreed that the principle of fair play establishes moral re-

quirements to contribute in regard to excludable goods.2 Although they have the

considerable advantage of clarity, voluntarist interpretations of the principle are of

limited usefulness in regard to political obligations, because the most important ben-

efits provided by the state are public goods, which cannot be “accepted” in any usual

sense.3 Familiar goods or benefits that fall under this description are national de-

fense, law and order, environmental protection, and public health.4 In addressing

1 A requirement along these lines is discussed at length, below. For discussion of these criteria

and, more generally, the criteria theories of political obligation should satisfy, see Simmons

1979, chap. 1; Klosko 2005, 9–12.

2 I should note that the precise nature of the wrong can be interpreted as turning on consent or

fair play, depending on how one fills in the examples.

3 In an influential discussion, Simmons (1979, chap. 5) argues that public goods can be “ac-

cepted” in a sense, if they are taken “knowingly and willingly.” For criticism of this view, see

Klosko 1992, 50–4.

4 Exactly where we draw the line between excludable and nonexcludable goods is subject to

argument, as the latter category could also include roads, airports, and other public accommo-

dations. Although it is possible to exclude people from their use, in practice it is often prohibi-

tively expensive or inconvenient to do so.