A Failure that Transformed Russia; The 1991-94 Democratic State-Building Experiment in Chechnya.

• Author: ISAENKO, ANATOLY V.

We're the children of the mountains, We have been here for years. The wind frightens the heart of any stranger here. Nobody understands us, The mountains will protect us, The wind frightens the heart of any stranger here. (Chechen Folk Song) The purpose of this essay is to redirect the current views on the origins and the nature of Russia's 1999 war against Chechnya. Our argument is that one of the major reasons for the war lies in the "Chechen Revolution of 1991-1994". More immediate reasons for it are imbedded in the Russian political situation of the summer and fall, 1999.(1) But we will stress the most important events that influenced the subsequent transformation of Chechen and Russian society and assisted in determining the intensity of the current tragedy. Much of the information is based on Isaenko's personal experience with Chechnya in the early 1990s. Another part is derived from the official papers of the Chechen Republic that were published by its legal institutions. Finally, another part stems from the research and observations of both authors.

Tracking the so-called "Chechen Problem" or "Chechen Revolution" and its role in Russian history has been a concern for scholars for some time. For us, this effort is connected with our primary interest, namely the exploration of forms of ethnic cleansing in the areas of inter-ethnic and ethnic tensions and conflicts.(2) Before then and since then, dozens of analysis have appeared; Valerii Tishkov and A.S. Orlov (Russia) and Anatol Lieven (Great Britain) have authored the most carefully argued accounts.(3) Lieven's approach contained a particularly comprehensive analysis of the long-standing and immediate reasons and causes for the conflict; it also accurately predicted the latest developments on the local and Russian levels.

In order to better understand the positions connected with the war that started in October, 1999, we will begin with an outline of some of them. Many of these positions were stated clearly in the International Conference, "Chechnya: Unlearned Lessons," which was organized by the editorial board of the Russian weekly, The Moscow News.(4)

Colonel-General Valerii Manilov, the First Deputy to the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Army, presented the official version of the character and goals of this latest military campaign. In his words, Russia's attack is "a counter-terrorist operation"(5) (by contrast, the Russo-Chechen War of 1994-1996 was officially called a "retrieval of Constitutional order"). Manilov's point is popular in Russian society as a whole,(6) but particularly among Russian nationalists, the semi-democratic and military elite, many officials, and some parts of the media. Russia's media, ever mindful of the politics involved and the support it needs from political figures like acting President Vladimir Putin, offers this official version to an already frightened public. Accordingly, Russia supposedly confronts a division of international and local Islamic terrorism in Chechnya.

This version of the confrontation in the south found an attentive ear with Russians because of a series of horrible terrorist acts in Russian cities that were immediately attributed (without convincing evidence) to "Chechen terrorists." Since then, this coverage has carefully exploited genuine and deep-seated fears. We may place them with the long-standing real and perceived danger that Russians see in being encircled. From our point of view, these fears of encirclement may be traced at least as far back as the Polish invasion of 1612, the invasions of Charles XII of Sweden and Napoleon of France. They gained profound reality recently through the German attack of the 1940s and the latest extension of NATO to the East. Today, someone like Yossef Bodansky sees it as originating with Muslim Iranian and Turkic nations and groups, the possible loss of strategic outlets in the Black Sea and Caspian, and Moscow's fear of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist movements.(7)

In this context, Chechens have been seen as more rebellious, politicized and inimical to Russian interests than other ethnic groups living at the periphery of Russia proper, like the Ossetes. These perceptions have been reinvigorated recently because the civil and religious Chechen leadership in the early 1990s began to promote a sense of identity and ethnocentric nationalism; an emphasis that quickly took on a supra-national and extraterritorial dimension. One may argue that long-standing Russian fears and Chechen ethnic extremists thus enabled the success of the current anti-Chechen stance, especially after the victory over Russia in 1996.

The French philosopher Andre Gluksman rejected this version and asserted instead that the Russian military was involved in systematic genocide of the Chechen people.(8) Thomas DeVaal's assessment is fascinating. This British journalist had recently returned from the theatre of action. He argued that a real war is underway in Chechnya.(9) In agreement, Valerii Tishkov, the Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, insisted that as long as those who initiated this conflict, inspired it ideologically and were directly, involved with it are still in power, peace will elude Chechnya. He also proposed a vast program of "social rehabilitation" for different groups of the population that became involved in the conflict.(10) Alia Yazykova, a political scientist, reflecting the opinion of international organizations, stated that a solution to the conflict could only be found through negotiations.(11) Vadim Belotserkovsky, a human rights activist, was alone in his argument that the roots of this bloody confrontation must be sought in the corruption and gradual degradation of the Russian (including Chechen) society.(12)

Interestingly, none of these participants at the Moscow conference placed the roots of the current tragedy in the events of 1991-1994; that is the point at which Chechnya undertook an unsuccessful experiment of building a democratic state and society. We want to assert instead that the breakdown of this attempt negatively affected the democratic process not only there, but also in the rest of Russia. Even the best explorations, like those of Lieven, mentioned this crucial situation of this dramatic period in some detail, but only in passing.(13)

In the fall of 1991, during the final breaths of the Soviet Union, a longstanding economic and political crisis exploded into attempts to build an "independent and sovereign Chechen state." Those who lived in the area still recall the tremendous impact of this moment on the minds of Chechens and non-Chechens alike. Chechnya experienced what can only be called spontaneous and unprecedented mass protests against the corrupt regime of the Communist party elite. This popular movement was headed by the Executive Committee of the National Congress of Chechen People (OKChN); a body that had been established in the fall of 1990 by the First Congress of Chechen People. The Congress reflected a genuine desire among many Chechens to attempt a rebirth of their culture, customs, traditions, language and religion in order to elevate the significance of these issues in national life and to restore the ideologically perverted history of Chechnya and its people. Interestingly, the major points of this agenda correspond with what specialists of ethnic conflicts define as "principal building blocks of ethnicity."(14)

One of the main activities of the Congress was the adoption of the "Declaration of Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic." In spite of its weaknesses, particularly in that it was not a legally binding document and that it did not resolve an underlying issue of statehood, it united most Chechens.

To almost everyone's delight, the Declaration was adopted during the regular session of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingushetian Republic.(15)

The most divisive aspect of the document was Article 1. It states that "The Chechen-Ingushetian Republic is a Sovereign State, that has been created as a result of a free self-determination of the Chechen and Ingushetian people."(16) Possibly because of the presence of some Communist party bureaucrats in the ranks of the framers of the document, it avoided elevating this sovereign state to a completely autonomous status. This compromise could only mean that the framers intended to obtain special status within the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union. This ambivalent character of the "Chechen Revolution" was very skillfully exploited by the local party elite in its approach to balancing between Russian and Soviet leadership.

However, their tactic was a temporary solution to a difficult issue. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the political landscape. Second, many members of the popular movement felt a genuine aversion to official subservience. Third, the ethnocentric radicals took an increasingly aggressive stance against living under Russian "colonial enslavement." Initially, the radicals' strategic goal was to seize the leadership in the popular Executive Committee of Congress and then to turn it against the communist-dominated Supreme Soviet of Chechnya-Ingushetia. Once the Soviet Union had collapsed, they modified their approach to suit the new situation, but they did not waver in their desire to create a parallel power structure.

In the fall of 1990, the leadership of the Executive Committee was dominated by its moderate wing. Lecha Umakhaev, the First Deputy to the Chair of the Supreme Soviet, and Dzokhar Dudaev, a Soviet air force general who was elected almost by...