External sources of finance and value creation of Chinese mergers and acquisitions: does ownership type matter?

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-10-2020-0159
Published date01 July 2021
Date01 July 2021
Pages452-471
Subject MatterAccounting & finance,Accounting/accountancy,Accounting methods/systems
AuthorXiaogang Bi,Agyenim Boateng
External sources of nance and
value creation of Chinese mergers
and acquisitions: does ownership
type matter?
Xiaogang Bi
Nottingham University Business School China, The University of Nottingham
Ningbo China, Ningbo, P. R. China, and
Agyenim Boateng
Department of Finance and Accounting, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to investigatethe effects of external sources of nance and ownership type on
the value creationof Chinese acquiring rms.
Design/methodology/approach The data set consists of domestic-listed mainland Chinese rms
engaged in domestic mergers and acquisitions during the period 20042012. Standard event study
methodology and cross-sectionalregression analysis are used to examine the relationship between external
nance,ownership type and value creation of the acquiring rms.
Findings This paper nds thatwhereas bank nancing is positively related to the rm value of privately-
owned enterprises(POEs), bank nancing has a negative but insignicant inuenceon the rm value of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover, equity nancing has a negative and signicant effect on the value
creationof SOE acquirers, however, this appears not to be the case of POEs.
Research limitations/implications The results suggest that the capitalmarkets in China take into
consideration the discriminatory and cheap access to bank loans available to SOEs as negative signals to
stock markets, which cause capital markets to punish SOEs through price depreciation. Conversely, capital
marketsreward POEs in respect of Chinese banksdiscrimination againstPOEs in bank nancing.
Practical implications The results suggest that the capital markets in China take into account the
discriminatoryand cheap access to bank loans available to SOEs as negative signals to stock markets,which
cause capital markets to punishSOEs through price depreciation. Conversely, capital markets rewardPOEs
in respect of Chinesebanksdiscrimination against POEs in bank nancing.
Originality/value The results of this study show that external sources of nance and ownership
type inuence acquiring rm valuein an environment where the corporate governance systemis weak and
the banking sector is dominated by state banks. Further reforms in the nancial sector, particularly, in the
corporategovernance system appear warranted.
Keywords External nancing, Ownership type, Firm value, Mergers and acquisitions
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
How are acquisitions are nanced has implications for rm value (Faccio et al.,2005;
Schlingemann, 2004;Hartford,1999;Golubov et al.,2016).Prior studies (Liu et al.,2009;Hou
et al., 2015) have reported a negativeassociation between the external sources of nance and
The authors would like to thank the Editor and three referees for their comments and suggestions.
IJAIM
29,3
452
Received7 October 2020
Revised26 January 2021
20March 2021
27April 2021
Accepted27 April 2021
InternationalJournal of
Accounting& Information
Management
Vol.29 No. 3, 2021
pp. 452-471
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1834-7649
DOI 10.1108/IJAIM-10-2020-0159
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/1834-7649.htm
stock returns. However, raising external nance, particularly bank nancing [1], in an
emerging country suchas China may be linked to the ownership type of the rm (Allen et al.,
2005;Cull et al., 2009). Studiessuch as Firth et al. (2009),Zhou et al. (2015) indicate that state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in emerging countries have easier access to bank nancing to
fund their activities compared to private-owned enterprises (POEs). Despite the banking
sector reforms in China, POEs are still discriminated against in terms of the allocation of
bank credit (Allen et al., 2005;Culland Xu, 2003). Lin and Bo (2012),Poncet et al. (2010) echo
similar views and found that rms with state ownershipin emerging countries tend to face
fewer nancial constraints whenconducting acquisitions compared to POEs. Yet, we know
relatively little attention has been given to how ownership type (SOE versus POE) and the
source of external nance impact on the acquirer returns in the emerging country context.
This study lls the above research gap by examining the effects of external nancing used
by SOEs and POEs on value creation.
The choice of Chinese acquisitionsis motivated by the following reasons, namely, rst, it
has been documentedthat SOEs have preferential access to banks loans administeredby the
big ve state-owned banks whose loans portfolios constitute over 70% of the bank credit to
the industrial sector(Cull and Xu, 2003;Boateng et al., 2015;Ayyagari et al., 2015). Moreover,
after three decades of enterprise reforms,SOEs remain an important feature of the Chinese
economy. SOEs have a stakein most Chinese listed rms (Chen et al., 2009). China, therefore,
provides an ideal setting to explorethe impact of external sources of nance and ownership
type on the rm value. We do so by using the standard event study methodology to
investigate the wealtheffects of 481 Chinese acquiring rms over the period 20042012.
Our results document a negative but insignicant relationship between acquirer returns
and external sources of nance. However, when we classify the sources of external nance
into equity and bank nancing, we nd that whereas equity nancing has a negative and
signicant effect on the value creation of SOE acquirers, this appears not to be the case of
POEs. In contrast, bank nancing has a positive effect on the rm value of acquirers and
creates value for POEs compared to SOEs. The results suggest that whereas the capital
markets may take into consideration the Chinesebanksdiscrimination against POEs in the
formal nancing and reward them, capital markets in China appear to punish (reduce
returns) SOEs due to preferentialaccess to bank nancing through non-marketfactors.
Our study makes two primary contributionsto the literature. First, this paper contributes
to rm ownership mergers and acquisitions(M&A) performance discourse by drawing on
insightsof agency theory in an emergingcountry context where capitalmarket imperfections
such as information asymmetry, weak institutions and poor corporate governance systems
are prevalent. We believe that analyzing how ownership and sources of nancing
acquisitions impact on performance is important and timely in that M&As are particularly,
sensitiveto the efciency of the nancial marketsand the market for corporate control(Peng,
2008). Acquisition transactions greatly rely on an institutional framework that ensures
transparency, a good corporate governance system, efcient allocation of funds in the
nancial markets and contract enforcement (Chen et al.,2017;Giroud and Mueller, 2011). In
this regard, our study constitutes one of the rst attempts to extend prior studies such as
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) and Schlingemann (2004), which focused on sourc es of
nancing and acquirersgains without taking into consideration the distinctive nature of
rmownershipinemergingcountries(La Porta et al.,1999,2002).
Second, we show that the ownershiptype of the rm and the choice of external sources of
nance have implicationsfor acquisition performance. More specically, our analysisshows
that the impact of the use of external sources of nance on the value creation of M&As is
conditioned by the nature of rm ownership. A signicantnegative price revision following
Finance and
value creation
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