The new U.S.-European detente: why the Europe of 2005 is nothing like the Europe of 2003 or even 2004.

• Author: Zoakos, Criton M.

There is more than meets the eye in the pledges--on both sides of the Atlantic--to put behind the recriminations and tensions that have marked U.S.-European relations since 2003 and the invasion of Iraq.

Underneath the lowering of diplomatic decibels there is the convergence of a set of American policies and certain European self-interests long neglected by the post-Cold War European leadership. There is also the quiet death of the Gaullist vision of a European super-state that would "challenge" (whatever that means) the United States a tout azimuth, a vision that for far too long led to the neglect of the cited European self-interests.

If a smoothing of U.S.-European relations is to proceed in 2005, as widely expected, it will occur along the lines of three U.S. policy aims that are fundamental to U.S. strategic interests. They are also top priorities for the second Bush administration:

* Accelerated economic growth rates in the European Union and especially the eurozone;

* Greater EU participation in the Middle East democratization strategy, including:

* An Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement and

* The consolidation of representative government in Iraq; and

* Continued EU involvement in counter-proliferation efforts, especially with respect to Iran.

The Europe of 2005 is nothing like the Europe of 2003 or even 2004. Its political and institutional landscape is radically new in various ways. First, of course, the European Union no longer consists of fifteen members but of twenty-five. The addition of the ten new members in 2004 changed the political dynamics of the "European project." The enlargement itself represented the collapse of the Gaullist vision of a European super-state managed jointly by France and Germany, and gave new life to the vision supported by the majority of the EU-15 nations (and the United States) of an enlarged, economically integrated community of nations. All but one (Malta) of the ten new members, representing about eighty million people, have far lower tax rates than the EU average. Their labor force is at the same educational and skill levels as Western Europe's but at much lower wage levels. They are locked in varying degrees to continuing policies of further tax cuts, privatizations, and greater economic liberalization. Their national security policies are closely linked with the United States both through NATO and via additional, separate security agreements.

As a group, they exerted a powerful influence when they aligned with older pro-U.S. members of the EU-15 (the United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, and partially Spain) and revamped the European Commission into an emerging advocate of supply-side reforms under the leadership of the newly elected European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso of Portugal, a close U.S. ally.

This new hegemonic group inside the European Union is far more focused on the urgency of removing obstacles to economic growth and of improving Europe's ability to deal with the massive security threats coming from the Muslim world and, to a lesser extent, from Vladimir Putin's dabbling with a new authoritarianism in Russia. The eclipsed Gaullist hegemony, at one point anchored on a Franco-German inner club, was never serious either about economic reforms or about standing up to security threats. Moreover now, in 2005, Germany finds itself distanced from its French partner, cautiously trying "Anglo-Saxon"-style reforms and accommodating to the needs of its Eastern European partners. Finally, French President Jacques Chirac finds himself challenged domestically by an unusual French politician. Former Interior and Finance Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, having won the chairmanship of the President's party, is proposing to his countrymen that they rethink their attitudes toward "Anglo-Saxon" economic policies, cooperation with the United States, and Israel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the political clout of trade unionism in Germany and France--the last two citadels of trade unionism--has collapsed in the course of a few months.

All these developments suggest that a new hope has emerged for some kind of European revival. Whether this hope will be fulfilled or frustrated remains to be seen. U.S. policy in the period ahead will be to encourage and sustain it.

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