Enemies through the gates: Russian violations of international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict.

AuthorCutts, Noelle M. Shanahan
PositionInternational Conference in Commemoration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Negotiation of the Genocide Convention

A good neighbor is a fellow who smiles at you over the back fence, but doesn't climb over it. (1)

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] (2)

  1. INTRODUCTION II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF GEORGIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA III. OVERVIEW OF THE GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA CONFLICT IV. RUSSIA'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW A. Peacekeepers Unauthorized to Provide Weapons or to Take Military Action B. Civilians are Unlawful Targets C. Russia Violated Georgia s Sovereignty D. Provision of Russian Passports E. Withdrawal of Consent V. QUESTIONING THE EFFICACY OF U.N. JOINT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS VI. GEORGIA'S POSSIBLE RECOURSE VII. CONCLUSIONS I. INTRODUCTION

    Soviet successor states are ripe for conflict, especially ethnic conflict, as their citizens "struggle over the redistribution of power." (3) The 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation and the Soviet successor states resulted in numerous wars and ethnic conflicts, including those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniester, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. (4)

    After declaring independence from the Soviet Union, the Georgian government sent troops to the ethnically non-Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia "rather than consider[ing] their demand for federalization." (5) War broke out in both regions. In 1992, South Ossetia declared itself independent from Georgia, intending to join North Ossetia to the Russian Republic. (6) Ethnic Ossetians in South Ossetia established an "alternative government" and an alternative presidency in an attempt to break away from Georgia. (7)

    The war in Abkhazia, where the ethnic Abkhaz were a minority of the total population, was a result of Russia's military interference on the side of the Abkhaz, which substantially improved Abkhazia's bargaining position. (8) Accordingly, Abkhazia was able to declare de facto (9) independence and set up its own government complete with a President, Parliament, and cabinet. (10) While South Ossetia and Abkhazia are de facto independent, no other nation formally recognizes them, (11) and the ethnic and political conflicts in those regions still endure after sixteen years. (12) Grudgingly, both remain de jure parts of Georgia.

    Georgia blames Russia for the continuing Abkhazian conflict. Russia's political, economic, and military support of the separatist government in Abkhazia prompted the Georgian Parliament's July 17, 2006 resolution, "calling on the [Georgian] government to 'start procedures ... immediately to suspend [Russia's] so-called peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia' ..., claiming that they 'represent one of the major obstacles on the way to solve these conflicts peacefully.'" (13) Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, a U.S.-educated lawyer, went even further, saying Abkhazia is "under a form of gangster occupation which hopes the international community will lose interest and reward the results of ethnic cleansing." (14) He continued: "[t]he painful, but factual truth is that these regions are being annexed to our neighbor to the north--the Russian Federation has actively supported their incorporation." (15) Georgia believes that Russia supports Abkhaz separatists as part of a larger Russian plan aimed at curtailing Georgian sovereignty. (16) Georgia insists that it is necessary to replace the U.N.-sanctioned Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) (17) peacekeeping force in Abkhazia, comprised almost exclusively of Russian military, with another force that will be more neutral, effective, and results-oriented. (18)

    In spite of this, there are those who accuse Georgia of shifting the blame to Russia for the continuing Georgia/Abkhazia conflict and the lack of a peaceful resolution. International Crisis Group (Crisis Group), an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization warns that "Georgians and Abkhaz have been living in parallel realities that are drifting further apart.... Unless they make a genuine effort to build on the progress that there has been in a few areas, 2007 will be a dangerous year." (19) The two views are as polarizing and confounding as the conflict itself. Nevertheless, an examination of the facts makes it clear that Russia has violated international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict.

    With the hope of providing an impartial analysis, this paper will address (1) how Russia's "peacekeeping" and other activities in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict violate international law; (2) how these actions raise questions about the credibility and efficacy of joint U.N. peacekeeping missions; and (3) what recourse, legal or otherwise, Georgia may have against Russia.

    Part two briefly explains the historical context of the relationship between the Russian Federation and Georgia. Part three explains the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict and Russian involvement in peacekeeping missions, and addresses the response of the international community including the United Nations. Part four explores the relevant international law. Part five describes how Russian violations of international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict raise questions about the efficacy of U.N. joint peacekeeping missions and why the U.N. should create a framework for engaging in joint peacekeeping missions with Russia. Part six examines Georgia's possibilities for action against Russia.

  2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF GEORGIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA

    Although the Republic of Georgia is a small nation of approximately five million people, (20) its location between the Black Sea, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey blesses (or curses) it with strategic importance far beyond its size. (21) Former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze (22) often said that Georgia is "the tastiest morsel of the former Soviet Union and the Russians want it back." (23)

    During the seventy years of Soviet occupation that began in March 1921 when Georgia became part of the Soviet Union, (24) "the Georgians maintained their unique alphabet and their particular interpretation of the Christian orthodox religion." (25) While not the case in many countries, Georgia considered the Russian occupation "not so much a traumatizing cultural and political subordination as a continuation of an existing relationship of a protectorate state and its imperial master," (26) considering the fact that "[a]s early as 1773, Georgia acceded to the need for protection within the Russian Empire as an annexed state...." (27) However, during the occupation, the Soviet Union recognized "unique ethnic communities in Georgia, the South Ossetians [and] the Abkhazians, as 'titular nations.'" (28) Russia's recognition of these communities foreshadowed the Georgia/South Ossetia and Georgia/Abkhazia ethnic conflicts that continue today. (29)

    Russian interest in the region remained strong during the disintegration of the Soviet Union. (30) After the Supreme Council for the Republic of Georgia declared independence in April 1991 (31)--and during the ethnic conflicts that followed (32)--Russia sought a continued physical presence in Georgia that would allow it to maintain strategic borders, (33) access the Black Sea (34) and important land routes, (35) pursue economic interests, and leave military, garrisons in place. (36) Somewhat alarmingly, and allegedly because of these interests, Russian officials have tried to establish the Kosovo conflict (37) as a precedent that would motivate the international community to endorse the breakaway efforts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, paving the way for a Russian land grab, or at least the creation of smaller nations more willing to "work" with Russia. (38)

    More recently, Russia has viewed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (the BTC winds its way through Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), a major route for delivery of oil from Kazakhstan to Europe, (39) as a serious effort by the West to pry Georgia and all of Central Asia from Russia's sphere of influence. (40) Even the United States is worried that Russia has allowed its interests to get in the way of a peaceful resolution to the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict. The nonprofit Council on Foreign Relations advised President Bush in a policy paper:

    There is nothing legitimate about [Russia] limiting the opportunity of its neighbors [e.g., Georgia] to deepen their integration into the international economy, to choose security allies and partners, or to pursue democratic. (41) political transformation. Notably, the United States has strong interests in Georgia as well; therefore, its criticisms of Russia should be viewed accordingly. U.S. President George W. Bush has listed Georgia as an international terrorism target. (42) In 2002, the U.S. military entered Georgia for limited missions when pro-independence Chechen troops infiltrated the Pankisi Gorge. (43) In January 2007, Georgian authorities and the CIA detained a Russian man who tried to sell weapons-grade uranium to undercover agents. (44) In March 2007, George announced that it would raise the number of its soldiers serving with the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq to more than 2,000. Georgia hopes that its willingness to help in Iraq sends a strong message to NATO that it is ready to join the organization. Russia says that allowing Georgia to join NATO would seriously affect Russian security interests, (45) saying that Georgia's membership in NATO could upset fragile stability in the Caucasus and hurt Russia's interests. (46) Russia fears that Georgia's NATO membership will create a slippery slope culminating in the entire region's NATO membership.

    The United States and Georgia both have something to gain from close relations. Accordingly, Russia and the United States are engaged in a "soft power" duel in Georgia, "from economic and market influence, to democracy support and denial, to aggressive diplomacy--to create a region in their own image." (47) Nevertheless, Russia's desire to create a region in its own image is no excuse for its violations of international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict.

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