Domestic legal traditions and the dispute settlement body. Are certain states more litigious than others?
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JITLP-10-2013-0029 |
| Pages | 123-135 |
| Date | 10 June 2014 |
| Published date | 10 June 2014 |
| Author | Christina Fattore |
| Subject Matter | Strategy,International business,International business law |
Domestic legal traditions and the
dispute settlement body
Are certain states more litigious than others?
Christina Fattore
Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, Morgantown,
West Virginia, USA
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to focus on the inuence of domestic legal traditions on dispute
behavior, which has been widely examined in the conict literature, within the World Trade
Organization (WTO). States with a civil legal tradition hold treaties and agreements in high esteem.
Therefore, they will be more likely to le trade complaints and pursue adjudication when compared to
states with common or mixed legal traditions.
Design/methodology/approach – The hypotheses in this study have been tested using a
quantitative test with data from the WTO regarding trade disputes.
Findings – While civil law states are more likely to le complaints, they are less likely to pursue
adjudication over a negotiated settlement.
Originality/value – This study brings to light how domestic legal systems affect state behavior
within an international legal body.
Keywords Legal systems, World Trade Organization, Dispute resolution, Islamic states
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The post-1945 period was a time for the growth and strengthening of the international
law and the forums by which they are enforced and adjudicated. The World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) (2013) and Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (1994) is one
of them. While dispute resolution has always been a part of the General Agreement on
Tariffs & Trade (GATT), members were able to block the creation of a panel, which was
to consider a trade complaint (until this was revised in 1989). Additionally, if formed,
members also had the opportunity to impede the adoption of a panel decision. Therefore,
dispute settlement under the GATT had no real impact on state behavior. The problems
with GATT dispute resolution were corrected by the DSU in that not only can disputes
go to a panel if negotiations failed to result in a solution but also that panel decisions
could not be blocked by a single state.
The greater emphasis on the judicialization in the DSU has led to it being used more
often than dispute resolution under the GATT. There have been ⬎450 disputes led
over the past 18 years. However, numerous scholars have observed that the use of the
DSU mechanism is not universal. Instead, only certain states have led complaints
within the dispute settlement body (DSB), specically advanced industrialized countries
located in Europe, North America, Latin America and Asia. Busch et al. (2009) explain
that a state’s propensity to engage in trade dispute resolution focuses on their wealth,
which allows them to better “plug” into the WTO system. Davis (2012) claims that
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
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Domestic legal
traditions
123
Received 15 October 2013
Revised 9 April 2014
Accepted 13 April 2014
Journal of International Trade Law
and Policy
Vol. 13 No. 2, 2014
pp. 123-135
© Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1477-0024
DOI 10.1108/JITLP-10-2013-0029
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