Doha dead and buried in Nairobi: lessons for the WTO

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/JITLP-01-2017-0001
• Date: 20 March 2017
• Published date: 20 March 2017
• Pages: 49-66
• Author: Antoine Martin,Bryan Mercurio
• Subject Matter: Strategy,International business,International business law,Economics,International economics,International trade

Doha dead and buried in Nairobi:

lessons for the WTO

Antoine Martin and Bryan Mercurio

Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Abstract

Purpose –This paper aims to reect on the outcomes of the Nairobi Ministerial Conference of 2015, which,

for all intents and purposes, put the Doha Round to rest and analyses the policy implications and lessons for

policymaking at the World Trade Organization (WTO), most importantly the abandonment of the “single

undertaking” and return to plurilateral agreements.

Design/methodology/approach –The paper approaches the issue of WTO policymaking by analysing

the various outputs produced both before and because of the Ministerial Conference.

Findings –The paper suggests that the Nairobi Ministerial has nally put an end to the Doha Round

and comes to the conclusion that policymaking at the multilateral level (i.e. through the single

undertaking) will change signicantly in the future because the WTO Members are incapable of reaching

a comprehensive agreement at this time. Instead, the current trend towards trade policymaking via FTA

is likely to continue while the WTO focuses on plurilateral negotiations on narrow and discreet issues.

Originality/value –The paper contributes to the literature on the analysis of global regulatory

fragmentation and on trade policymaking. It draws attention, in particular, to the consequences of the last

Ministerial Conference and highlights prospects for the future of global trade regulation.

Keywords Fragmentation, Doha Round, Nairobi Ministerial, Single undertaking,

Trade negotiations, World Trade Organization (WTO)

Paper type Research paper

The Doha Round – also referred to as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) – has

been troubled almost from the beginning and left many onlookers concerned for the

future of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the multilateral trading system.

Suspended and revived several times over the past decade, the Doha Round

seemingly ended in defeat in 2008 (World Trade Organization, 2006;International

Center for Trade and Development, 2006;Castle and Landler, 2008;Stewart, 2008).

Since that time, attempts to revive the Round have been unsuccessful, and the Round

is essentially dead. The reasons for the collapse are numerous, but perhaps the most

important reason is that Members were simply not able to overcome longstanding

differences over old economy issues, most prominently agriculture-related policies.

Fourteen years after the launch of the Doha Round and following months of

contentious consultations, the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference held in Nairobi,

Kenya (“Nairobi Ministerial”), attempted to breathe new life into the Round by

reaching an agreement on the issues of export competition and agricultural

subsidies – the so-called Nairobi Package (World Trade Organization, 2015a). The

Nairobi Package has been described as an historic and ground-breaking sign of

progress, but the reality is less glowing, as there remain a number of issues that

have been left for the Members to determine and manage at a later stage. Moreover,

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:

www.emeraldinsight.com/1477-0024.htm

Lessons for

the WTO

49

Received 10 January 2017

Revised 10 January 2017

Accepted 10 January 2017

Journalof International Trade Law

andPolicy

Vol.16 No. 1, 2017

pp.49-66

©Emerald Publishing Limited

1477-0024

DOI 10.1108/JITLP-01-2017-0001

the status and future of the Doha Round remains uncertain, and it is our contention

that the Nairobi Ministerial nally buried the Round. From here forward, at least in

the short and medium term, WTO negotiations will focus on small, manageable

issues and, in so doing, depart from the organization’s core concept of the “single

undertaking”[1].

This article provides commentary and analysis on these developments. Part I serves

as a refresher to the Doha Round deadlock by briey explaining why the Members failed

to conclude the negotiations in a timely manner. Part I also provides an overview of the

Nairobi Package as a means to show where the Doha Round stands as of early-2017. Part

II starts by discussing the consequences of the outcomes decided (or otherwise) at

Nairobi in terms of multilateral trade policymaking and suggests that, owing to the

Organization’s structure, subsequent negotiations will have to be undertaken in a

step-by-step rather than holistic basis. More specically, the negotiating climate and

institutional governance constraints simply will not allow the WTO to maintain the

all-or-nothing “single undertaking” approach to institutional progress. Instead, the

WTO will have to shift its leadership style and focus on smaller self-contained narrow

issues so as to progress and remain relevant to its Members. In essence, this means

moving past the albatross that has become the Doha Round – and there are signs that

this is in fact occurring. Part III then questions the WTO’s continuing ability to help

shape the future of the international trade landscape and considers the idea that the

organization might essentially act merely as an umbrella for trade negotiations in the

future. Part IV concludes.

1. The state of play: the Doha round and the Nairobi package

After 15 years of relatively fruitless negotiations, it is clear that a number of issues have led

to the failure of Members to conclude the Doha Round. The rst section of this Part reviews

the main issues leading to the deadlock and ultimate death of the Round in late-2008. The

second section analyses what was accomplished, and left untouched, in the “Nairobi

Package”.

1.1 The Doha deadlock

Commentators have pronounced the death of the Doha Round many times over the past 15

years (Abbott, 2009;Schwab, 2011;Kleimann and Guinan, 2011;Mavroidis, 2011), and the

literature is replete with details on the failings of the Doha Round and its continuing deadlock

(Mercurio, 2007,2009;Lanoszka, 2008). Upon reection, and perhaps even obvious at the

time, the failure of Doha is rather unsurprising, for several reasons.

Launched with grand ambition as the “Doha Development Agenda”[2], the Round

suffered from a crowded negotiating programme, unrealistic deadlines and perhaps

more importantly a negotiating model which ensured that nothing would be agreed upon

until everything was agreed – the “single undertaking”. While the term “Doha

Development Agenda” is catchy, Members never agreed to its meaning and never

determined what role “development” would play in a negotiating context. Given these

issues, it should have been expected that the Round would suffer and perhaps even end

in legal and political impasse.

While the Round has many killers, blame has then mostly been apportioned to the issue

of agriculture. Despite its steadily declining role and importance as a percentage of world

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