Do key audit matters impact financial reporting behavior?

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12190
AuthorChristiane Pott,Anna Gold,Melina Heilmann,Johanna Rematzki
Date01 July 2020
Published date01 July 2020
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Do key audit matters impact financial reporting behavior?
Anna Gold
1,2
| Melina Heilmann
3
| Christiane Pott
3
| Johanna Rematzki
4
1
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The
Netherlands
2
Norwegian School of Economics, Norway
3
TU Dortmund University, Germany
4
Independent Researcher, Germany
Correspondence
Anna Gold, Department of Accounting, School
of Business and Economics, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Email: anna.gold@vu.nl
This study experimentally examines whether the implementation of key audit matters
(KAMs) in auditors' reports affects managers' reporting behavior. In line with prior
research in psychology, we argue that greater transparency through KAMs leads to
higher accountability pressure as managers may expect their judgments to be scruti-
nized more strongly in the presence of KAMs and, hence, to an improvement of
financial reporting quality. Further, we examine whether informational precision
(firm-specific versus nonfirm-specific information) in a KAM section moderates the
effect of KAM presence on reporting behavior. Our findings show that managers'
tendency to make an aggressive financial reporting decision is reduced in the pres-
ence of KAMs (compared to the absence of KAMs). This effect remains even when
the description of the KAM is of low informational precision. Thus, our results sug-
gest that KAMs serve as a beneficial mechanism for enhancing financial reporting
quality by attenuating aggressive financial reporting behavior, regardless of the preci-
sion employed by auditors.
KEYWORDS
accountability, audit regulation, financial reporting behavior, informational precision, Key
Audit Matters (KAMs)
1|INTRODUCTION
Standard-setters and audit regulators worldwide, including the Pub-
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), have recently ini-
tiated an expanded audit reporting model to respond to concerns
about the lack of transparency in auditor reports (IAASB, 2015;
PCAOB, 2017). One significant change in both PCAOB and IAASB
amendments is the implementation of key audit matters (KAMs),
which are new disclosure requirements providing information about
significant matters auditors encountered during the audit.
1
The pri-
mary objective of the new audit report is to communicate those
matters and to enhance investors' understanding of the auditor's
role and responsibility.
2
One essential benefit recognized by regula-
tors, but largely ignored thus far in the ongoing debate, is the effec-
tiveness of KAMs regarding the financial reporting environment.
Bruce Webb, chairman of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants auditing standards board, states that the
presence of KAM sections in audit reports may cause management
to think more carefully about the quality and the robustness of
their processes and controls(Katz, 2013).
3
This statement suggests
that KAMs may not only improve transparency for users of financial
statements, but also enhance managerial financial reporting
behavior. In this article, we experimentally examine whether
indeed KAM disclosures can mitigate aggressive financial reporting
behavior.
4
Our theoretical predictions are motivated by accountability the-
ory and findings from the disclosure transparency literature. Prior
accountability research indicates that the expectation that one may
be called upon to justify one's view to others affects judgment and
decision quality as individuals feel more pressure to provide justifiable
explanations and, hence, exert greater effort in their judgment and
Received: 2 July 2018 Revised: 16 January 2020 Accepted: 22 January 2020
DOI: 10.1111/ijau.12190
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reprodu ction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. International Journal of Auditing published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
232 Int J Audit. 2020;24:232244.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ijau

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