Do Interest Rate Liberalization and Fintech Mix? Impact on Shadow Deposits in China

Date01 January 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12304
Published date01 January 2020
©2020 Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
China & World Economy / 4–22, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2020
4
*Stephanie Chan, Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, School of Economics and WISE, Xiamen
University. Email: stephaniechan@xmu.edu.cn; Yang Ji (corresponding author), Assistant Professor,
Department of Finance, School of Economics and Gregory and Paula Chow Center for Economics Research,
Xiamen University. Email: jiyang@xmu.edu.cn. The authors would like to thank Yan Zeng, Qiang Gong, and
Yiping Huang for helpful advice and comments. Stephanie Chan acknowledges support from Central University
Startup Fund Grant (No. 20720181045). Yang Ji acknowledges the support from the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (No.71803163) and Central University Startup Fund Grant (No. 20720181039).
Do Interest Rate Liberalization and Fintech Mix?
Impact on Shadow Deposits in China
Stephanie Chan, Yang Ji*
Abstract
In this paper we attempt to characterize the stability of shadow deposits in China with
interest rate liberalization and ntech developments. We emphasize that shadow banks
provide higher but riskier returns and such characteristics affect the stability of shadow
deposits. In our setting, the stability of shadow deposits is inuenced by two offsetting
effects, namely: the patience effect, which makes investors more willing to wait because
of the potentially higher returns; and the uncertainty effect, which makes investors
more likely to withdraw as a result of higher risk. Under liberalized interest rates, the
patience effect will erode and the uncertainty effect will be heightened because the
post-liberalization higher return of traditional banks undermines the importance of
the extra return of shadow deposits to depositors, while preserving the importance of
the risk aspect. Fintech development is modeled as a reduction in the withdrawal cost
that facilitates runs. This affects the stability of shadow deposits because of their wider
fintech reliance. Regulators should be cautious in pushing interest rate liberalization
and ntech application alongside building a safety net for shadow banking.
Key words: bank run, ntech, interest rate liberalization, shadow banking
JEL codes: E26, E422, G18
I. Introduction
The rapid development of wealth management products (WMPs) in recent years has
led to shadow banking deposits becoming the most important part of Chinese shadow
banking (Ehlers et al., 2018). Maturity transformation of shadow banking deposits,
©2020 Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Interest Rate Liberalization and Fintech 5
much like traditional bank deposits, occurs when banks take funds from individuals and
businesses and provide credit to borrowers. However, shadow deposits provide higher
rates of return compared to traditional bank deposits, leading to their popularity.1
Because shadow deposits are demand deposits, they are fragile as a result of
possible bank runs. By the end of 2016, shadow deposits accounted for approximately
77.1 percent of GDP (Ehlers et al., 2018), creating a potential source of financial
instability in the Chinese economy. The rapid growth of shadow deposits is a form of
regulatory arbitrage aimed at circumventing China’s longstanding policy of low interest
rates on deposits. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) sets a ceiling on the interest
rate that can be paid on savings deposits.2 This policy grew out of the historical need
to maintain a relatively low nancing cost for state-owned enterprises and to prevent
vicious competition among banks. However, this interest rate policy is detrimental to
depositors. For most of the past decade, the deposit rate has been below the ination
rate, giving savers a negative real rate on their deposits. Unsurprisingly, Chinese savers
have sought alternatives with higher returns. Shadow deposits, such as WMPs, give
investors both liquidity and a sense of security as their money is placed in a deposit-like
investment.
Another driving force behind the growth of shadow deposits is nancial innovation,
specically, the rapid growth of nancial technology or “ntech.” An important segment
of growth in shadow deposits is fintech-backed WMPs offered online. This includes
well-known products by ntech giants such as Alipay and WeChat, as well as WMPs
offered by traditional banks. Yu’E Bao, a popular WMP provided by Alipay that invests
the surplus money of Alipay users into money market mutual funds, is one signicant
example of how ntech has led to the buildup of short-term pools of funding (Borst,
2013; Xu, 2017). Yu’E Bao not only offers higher returns than bank deposits, but daily
returns are also convenient to track because Yu’E Bao is linked to Alipay’s mobile phone
application. As a result, mobile phone users have quickly adapted to Yu’E Bao, leading
to its rapid spreading across the country. As of 2019, more than 600 million users have
joined Yu’E Bao, nearly half of the Chinese population, while the total amount invested
in Yu’E Bao reached RMB1.13tn last year.3 However, while most users treat Yu’E
Bao as an alternative saving instrument, the product itself is outside of the connes of
deposit protection.
Considering the popularity of fintech companies and the large scale of shadow
deposits that circumvent regulation, Ehlers et al. (2018) reported that by the end of
1We use the term “shadow deposits” to refer to shadow banking deposits.
2As of 10 July 2019, the benchmark rate for one-year deposits is 1.50 percent.
3http://www.chinairn.com/hyzx/20190109/102055746.shtml (online; cited 19 November 2019).

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