Do fine feathers make a fine bird? The influence of attractiveness on fraud‐risk judgments by internal auditors
Date | 01 November 2018 |
Author | Marc Eulerich,Jochen C. Theis,Junpeng Lao,Meike Ramon |
Published date | 01 November 2018 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12137 |
SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLES
Do fine feathers make a fine bird? The influence of
attractiveness on fraud‐risk judgments by internal auditors
Marc Eulerich
1
|Jochen C. Theis
1
|Junpeng Lao
2
|Meike Ramon
2
1
Mercator School of Management, University
of Duisburg–Essen, Duisburg, Germany
2
Department of Psychology, University of
Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
Correspondence
Marc Eulerich, University of Duisburg–Essen,
Mercator School of Management, Chair for
Internal Auditing, Lotharstraße 65, 47057
Duisburg, Germany.
Email: marc.eulerich@uni‐due.de
Independence and objectivity are key principles assumed to underlie internal auditors'
fraud‐risk judgments. However, a substantial body of evidence suggests that physical
attractiveness of suspects may influence internal auditors' fraud‐risk judgments. In
this experimental study we investigated whether internal auditors are susceptible to
appearance‐related biases, or whether they correct for them due to their expertise
and motivation. A total of 193 internal auditors were presented a misappropriation‐
of‐assets scenario in which the attractiveness of a suspect was manipulated. To
determine whether professional expertise is associated with increased resilience to
appearance‐related biases, their fraud‐risk judgments were contrasted with those
acquired from 240 subjects without auditing experience (“naive subjects”). In line with
our predictions, attractiveness modulated naive subjects' fraud‐risk judgments,
whereas internal auditors did not show any indication for appearance‐related biases.
Our findings suggest that internal auditors' experience and motivation may immunize
them to the phenomena of physical attractiveness stereotyping and the attractiveness
halo effect.
KEYWORDS
audit failure, ethics, fraud, internalaudit, professionalism
1|INTRODUCTION
A perpetual problem for the management of all types of companies is
the misappropriation of assets and fraud. According to a study of the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), organizations lose
5% of their annual revenue due to asset misappropriation, corruption,
and financial statement fraud, with more than one‐fifth of the cases
causing losses of at least $1 million for each respective company
(ACFE, 2012); for comparable statistics, see also Beasley, Carcello,
Hermanson, and Neal (2010) and Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and
Lapides (2000). Consequently, fraud detection and prevention have
recently become significant concerns, especially for the top manage-
ment and internal auditors (IAs)—top management's support unit
(Abbott, Park, & Parker, 2000; Cooper, Dacin, & Palmer, 2013; Kaplan,
Pope, & Samuels, 2010; Moeller, 2004; Norman, Rose, & Rose, 2010;
Prawitt, Sharp, & Wood, 2012). Typically, internal auditing acts as a
direct agent of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the audit
committee. One can define internal auditing as follows (Institute of
Internal Auditors [IIA], 2013):
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance
and consulting activity designed to add value and
improve an organization's operations. It helps an
organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and
improve the effectiveness of risk management, control,
and governance processes.
There is a growing literature showing the value of internal
auditing for management, especially in fraud‐risk judgments
1
and
detection (ACFE, 2012; Norman et al., 2010).
According to the IIA Standards, the paramount principles of IAs'
work are independence and objectivity (IIA, 2013). Hence, in a poten-
tial fraud case an IA should be objective in his or her fraud‐risk judg-
ments (AICPA, 2002; IIA/AICPA, 2008) and should not consider any
Received: 21 September 2017 Revised: 26 June 2018 Accepted: 27 June 2018
DOI: 10.1111/ijau.12137
332 © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Int J Audit. 2018;22:332–344.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ijau
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