Currency risk premia: Perceptions of downside risk and deviations from benchmark values

AuthorJoshua Stillwagon,Steven Furnagiev
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.1647
Date01 January 2019
Published date01 January 2019
Received: 17 February 2017 Revised: 27 January 2018 Accepted: 26 June 2018
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.1647
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Currency risk premia: Perceptions of downside risk and
deviations from benchmark values
Steven Furnagiev1Joshua Stillwagon2,3
1Center for People, Politics, and Markets,
Goucher College, Baltimore, Maryland
2Economics Division, Babson College,
Babson Park, Massachusetts
3INET Program on Imperfect Knowledge
Economics, New York,NY, USA
Correspondence
Joshua Stillwagon, Economics Division,
Babson College, Babson Park, MA 02457.
Email: jstillwagon@babson.edu
Funding information
Institute for New Economic Thinking
JEL Classification: F31
Abstract
This paper examines the empirical performance of an alternative model of the
currency risk premium. This model relates risk not to the variance of returns
but rather to potential crash risk based on the deviation, or “gap,” between the
exchange rate and perceptions of its benchmark value. The model is testedusing
a novel data set of traders' exchange rate forecasts, from 1986:08 to 2013:09. The
forecast data eliminate the need for a joint hypothesis about expectations forma-
tion through direct measurement of the market's ex ante premium. To measure
the benchmark value, rather than use purchasing power parity, we relate it to
recent levels through a moving average. Strong support is found for the pre-
diction that the premium comoves positively with the “gap” measure of risk,
according to cointegrated vector autoregression analyses for all four markets
examined. This result is robust for moving averages from six to 24 months and
when controlling for exchange rate volatility.The findings suggest how investors
assess downside risk ex ante, at least in part, and may rationalize the application
of certain technical analysis.
KEYWORDS
CVAR,exchange rates, IKE gap model, risk premia, survey data, technical analysis
1INTRODUCTION
Explaining foreign exchange returns remains one of
the central challenges in international finance, branded
the excess returns puzzle. This puzzle stems from the
ubiquitous rejection of traditional risk premium models
founded on the rational expectations hypothesis (REH)
and expected utility theory (EUT).1The problem is that
standard measures of the risk premium, such as the volatil-
ity of consumption or asset supplies, are insufficiently
variable, requiring implausible degrees of risk aversion.
These models are also inconsistent with frequent sign
reversals in the premium, or alternating periods when the
premium is positive or negative in value (Mark & Wu,
1998; Lewis, 1995). This result has led to numerous stud-
ies that attribute excess returns instead to systematic and
persistent forecasting errors.2It is possible though that
the problem lies, also or instead, with the specification
of risk preferences. Psychologists have in fact uncovered
substantial evidence that the predictions of EUT are incon-
sistent with the behaviour of actual individuals towards
risky gambles (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992).
In this paper, we test a new portfolio balance model
of the currency risk premium, the imperfect knowledge
economics gap model of Frydman and Goldberg (2003,
2007), which replaces EUT with endogenous prospect the-
ory (EPT). EPT builds upon traditional prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)—which includes the find-
ing that participants are “loss averse” receiving much
greater disutility from a loss than utility from an equal
Int J Fin Econ. 2019;24:33–48. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ijfe © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 33
34 FURNAGIEV ANDSTILLWAGON
magnitude gain—but allows for the degree of loss aver-
sion to be endogenous to position size. When incorporated
into a standard portfolio balance model, EPT allows Fryd-
man and Goldberg (2003) to relate the market's premium
to participants forecasts of potential losses, or downside
risk, from speculation. To represent these forecasts, Fry-
dman and Goldberg appeal to a lost insight of Keynes
(1936) that market participants tend to view potential
losses in light of deviations of asset prices from benchmark
values.3
The gap model generates novel time-series implications
for the properties of excess returns.In particular, the model
recognizes the existence, and importance, of both bulls and
bears in real-world financial markets. Frydman and Gold-
berg (2003) derive a market premium that depends on the
difference between how those betting on an appreciation
(bulls) and those betting on a depreciation (bears) respond
to the gap. The intuition is that as a currency becomes
further overvalued, bulls (betting on a continued appreci-
ation) will become more concerned about the potential for
a reversal (i.e., they perceive greater downside risk) and
the losses it would generate. Bears (betting on a reversal),
meanwhile, become less worried about a further move-
ment against them (i.e., they perceive less downside risk).
Consequently, bulls raise and bears lower the premium
they require in order to retain their open positions. It is
through this asymmetry that as the gap rises (or falls), so
too does the market's premium.
Using the gap between current and benchmark levels
has also been advocated by Edmund Phelps as a new
means of assessing systemic risk, including in an open
letter to Gordon Brown and other leaders of the G20
(April 1, 2009).4Arguably, however, the gap measure of
risk remains an intuitive yet seldom tested hypothesis in
exchange rate modelling; as such, it requires more suf-
ficient testing including extensions that examine more
recent data.
The gap model is similar to specifications of risk prefer-
ences employed elsewhere in the literature. For example,
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) derive and conduct sim-
ulations for a heterogeneous agent model, where fun-
damentalists become less risk averse as the currency
moves further away from the fundamental value. It is
also similar in nature to the crash risk of Brunnermeier,
Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), where ex post returns to the
carry trade are positive on average but subject to nega-
tive skew (or crash risk). In Brunnermeier et al. (2009),
they do not elaborate on the mechanism through which
investors assess the potential for downside risk ex ante,
which provokes investors to require the excess return or
premium to begin with, whereas the gap model does.
Survey data are ideal to investigate this ex ante risk
behaviour.
One of the chief obstacles to fully surmounting the
excess returns puzzle is that the vastmajority of studies use
ex post returns, which are made up of both an expected and
unexpected component. In order to explain ex post returns
in light of a risk premium, which pertains to the expected
portion, we need a hypothesis about the unexpected part
as well. These studies invoke the REH auxiliary hypoth-
esis that forecast errors of expectations are white noise,
enabling researchers to proxyexpected returns with ex post
returns. The consequence, however, is that it cannot be
discerned whether the rejection of these models derives
from violations of REH, an inadequate specification of
risk preferences (EUT), or both. By using survey data to
measure the market's ex ante excess returns, this paper
avoids the joint-hypothesis nature of most tests and pro-
vides for a more direct assessment of risk preferences. Sur-
vey data allow for myriad forecasting strategies, whatever
they may be, from fundamentalist to chartist approaches
and the incorporation of noneconomic news and cen-
tral bank announcements, which are inherently difficult
to model.
Numerous studies have used survey data to test whether
expectations are rational and whether a general risk pre-
mium is present (i.e., expected returns do not equalize).5
Veryfew studies however have examined the determinants
of the time-varying risk premium found in survey data to
illuminate market participants' risk behaviour.Prior stud-
ies to do so use data spanning only to 1997 (Frydman &
Goldberg 2007; Stillwagon 2015, 2018). Since then, vol-
ume in the foreign exchange market has exploded from
$1.53 trillion in 1998 to $5.34 trillion in 2013 Bank of I. S.
(2013), a common currency was implemented in the Euro
area, and the world has undergone its greatest economic
crisis in nearly a century. Given these dramatic, transfor-
mational occurrences, another contribution of this study
is to update those initial analyses of the survey-data based
risk premium with an extra 15 years of data.
The survey data employed here characterize 3-month
ahead forecasts, surveyed monthly by FX4Casts from
August 1986 to September 2013, and cover the spot
U.S. dollar exchange rate against the Japanese yen,
Swiss franc, British pound, and Canadian dollar. The
survey-based forecasts are collected from nearly 50 major
financial institutions, and, according to the 2013 BIS tri-
ennial report, these four currency pairs account for over
a third of all FX transactions.6The breadth of the survey
and currency cross section in this case provides an expan-
sive analysis of currency risk premia, ideal for testing the
Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) gap model.
In formulating the gap model, Frydman and Goldberg
incorporated Keynes' (1936) discussion of liquidity pref-
erence as behaviour towards risk. Keynes argued that a
low interest rate left “more to fear than to hope” (in

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