Inspectors charge Iraq has ongoing nuclear weapons programme.

The 45-member team, in Iraq from 22 to 30 September to conduct the sixth nuclear inspection, was detained for four days by Iraqi authorities in a Baghdad parking lot outside a nuclear facility, after having obtained what was described as "top secret" documentation on Iraq's nuclear-weapons programme. Some of the materials was returned, but the "most sensitive" was confiscated, they reported.

In a preliminary report released in Vienna on 3 October, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix stated there was evidence of: a broad-based effort on an implosion-type nuclear weapon; success in machining nuclear-weapons components from natural uranium; evidence of sophisticated computer codes of develop nuclear weapons; parallel development of a nuclear missile delivery system; substantial nuclear-weapons-related procurement from foreign sources; and on-site, on-the-spot training of Iraqi engineers by foreign equipment manufacturers.

The team, headed by Chief Inspector David Kay, also concluded that:

* Iraq still has substantial nuclear facilities, which were "part of the clandestine programme and which have not been declared";

* "Significant documentary material and equipment" had been removed from identified nuclear programme sites, some shortly before the team's arrival; and

* There was "repeated and wilful non-compliance" by Iraq with Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), as well as violation of privileges and immunities specified for UN/IAEA inspection teams.

In resolution 687 of 3 April, the terms for a formal cease-fire in the Gulf conflict were set out, including provisions calling on Iraq "unconditionally not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems, components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities".

Iraq was to declare all locations, amounts and types of such items; place all nuclear-weapons-usable materials for custody and removal under the "exclusive control" of the IAEA; and accept "urgent on-site inspection" and "destruction, removal, or rendering harmless" of all such items.

The IAEA, assisted by the Special Commission on Iraqi disarmament set up under resolution 687, was to carry out "immediate on-site inspection" of the nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations, as well as additional locations designated by the Special Commission. A plan was to be developed regarding destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, of all items specified.

Resolution 687 made similar provision for Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and facilities, and for long-range ballistic missiles.

Between 14 May and 9 October, 18 UN inspections took place in Iraq--six on nuclear capabilities; five each on chemical weapons and ballistic missiles; and two on biological weapons.

On 15 August, after several incidents in which Iraq blocked UN inspection teams access to facilities and documents, the Council demanded that Iraq comply with the disarmament measures.

By adopting resolution 707, the Council condemned what it termed "serious violations" by Iraq of its disarmament obligations under resolution 687.

The Council also condemned Iraq's non-compliance with obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, in violation of its commitments as a party to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

It specified nine immediate orders, demanding Iraq, among others, to:

* Disclose fully "all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.";

* Allow "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation" to the Special Commission, the IAEA and their inspection teams; and

* Cease immediately "any attempt to conceal, or any movement or destruction of any material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missiles programmes . . . without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission".

'Petro-Chemical Three'

--code name

The IAEA report also linked the Iraqi nuclear programmed--code-named "Petrochemical Three" (PC-3)--to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and Iraq's Ministry of Defense.

"Contrary of Iraq's claims of having only a peaceful nuclear programme, the team found documents showing that Iraq had been working on the revision of a nuclear-weapons design and one linking the IAEC to work on a surface-to-surface missile project--presumably the intended delivery system for ther nuclear weapons", the report stated. Most of the important documents were obtained, photographed or seen during visits to two establishments in Baghdad--the Nuclear Design Centre and the Petrochemical Three headquarters--on 23 and 24 September, respectively.

The documents described nuclear-weapons development experiments involving neutron initiators, enriched-uranium cores, reflectors, high-explosive lenses and electronic firing setts.

The nuclear-weapons design work, the team s tated, was conducted at Al Atheer--a facility which Iraq claimed had no nuclear connection but which, according to an Iraqi to secret report, had the objective of designing and producing a nuclear device. Previous inspection teams had concluded that the facility was most probably to be used for nuclear-weapons component production, high-explosive experiments and device assembly.

Iraqi position

On 30 September, Iraq informed (S/23102) the Secretary-General that the inspection team's "contrived and biased mode of behaviour" was being used to "give currency to allegations against the Iraqi nuclear programme dedicated to peaceful purposes within the framework of the concerted campaign of animosity against Iraq".

Iraq said it would not acknowledge any document or visual material with respect to which no joint record had been drawn up by the two sides. If an accusation should present itself involving documents or visual materials that had not been entered in the joint record, that would indicate that there was "a deliberate intention to do a disservice to Iraq."

On 2 October, in a communique (S/23110) to the Secretary-General, Iraq charged that Chief Inspector Kay was reporting "important information relating to Iraqi documents" to the United States Government before it was received by the UN, even though the team was "answerable only to the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the Special Commission itself."

On 23 and 24 September, the team had inspected buildings and "confiscated documents", Iraq said, "before the employees concerned arrived, without their knowledge and without tem seeing." That was unacceptable, Iraq stated. The Chief Inspector and those of the team members who had "private links with foreign intelligence circles" had sought to "insinuate spurious documents that had nothing to do with us" in order to provide a rationale for "false accussations".

Iraq also accused the team of behavious "incompatible with prevailing customs and values in Iraqi society", including forcing and breaking open doors and locks; beginning visits to facilities before the official start of the workday; and tampering with private property, such as staff members' handbags and briefcases, and opening envelopes containing private letters.

Iraqi officials accompanying the team and the staff at the visited sites "exercised the greatest degree of self-control and behaved judiciously despite such provocative modes of behaviour', Iraq reported.

Detention drama

The sixth inspection team arrived in Baghdad on 22 September and undertook its first inspection the next day at the Nuclear Design Centre in the capital city, arriving at 5:59 a.m. local time. Shortly after 10 a.m., the team found four boxes of classified documents in the basement.

When the team attempted to leave the facility at 3:45 p.m., they were prevented from doing so. At 4:30 p.m., Iraqi authorities began to review the documents obtained by the...