Burundi: what sanctions meant on the ground.

AuthorCravero-Kristofferson, Kathleen

In reaction to the coup d'etat led by Pierre Buyoya on 25 July 1996, seven countries - Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, Ethiopia and Cameroon - imposed an economic embargo on Burundi. The sanctions had clearly stated objectives: to end the illegality of the regime by exerting pressure to restore the constitution and National Assembly; lift the ban on political parties; and bring about unconditional negotiations between the warring factions.

The sanctions, however, ended up staying in place for nearly two and a half years. During this time, Mr. Buyoya gradually complied with the stipulated conditions, although the role of the embargo in bringing about this change remains controversial. Apart from launching an internal debate and participating in external negotiations, he initiated a series of political reforms that culminated in the establishment of an internal partnership in June 1998 and the expansion of the National Assembly to include representatives from all political parties and civil society.

On 23 January 1999, regional Heads of State finally acknowledged the headway made in the peace process and suspended the sanctions, albeit insisting that they could be reinstated if progress faltered.

There has been much debate about the political, economic and humanitarian impact - and thereby overall usefulness - of the sanctions. It is widely acknowledged that the sanctions did not achieve their desired short-term political effect. Much has also been said about their rather inconsistent and inefficient implementation. As time passed, neighbouring countries' borders became increasingly porous as businessmen from throughout the region found ways to circumvent the restrictions, resulting in large-scale profiteering that benefited a small group of entrepreneurs. This inevitably led to the creation of a parallel economy which undermined and largely replaced legal market activity. The fact that neighbouring countries themselves were often guilty of violating the sanctions, coupled with increasing reports of dissension among the "imposers" themselves, i.e. the neighbouring Heads of State, further undermined their credibility.

It has, in fact, proven difficult to discern between the specific effects of the embargo and the general effects of over five years of civil strife, insecurity, population displacement and restricted access. The lack of an effective monitoring system and reliable indicators has further hindered the...

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