Audit Quality, Earnings Management, and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from India

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12087
AuthorMuhammad Nurul Houqe,Kamran Ahmed,Tony Zijl
Published date01 July 2017
Date01 July 2017
Audit Quality, Earnings Management, and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence
from India
Muhammad Nurul Houqe,
1
Kamran Ahmed
2
and Tony van Zijl
1
1
Victoria Business School,Victoria University of Wellington
2
La Trobe Business School,La Trobe University
This study examinesthe effect of audit quality on earnings management and cost of equity capitalof listed companies
in India. Our results show that companies employing a high-quality auditor have a lower degree of earnings
managementand lower cost of equity capital.The results also show that companiesbelonging to business groupshave
a lower degree of earningsmanagement and lower cost of equity capitalthan do stand-alone companies but that they
benefit less from employing a high-quality auditor. Our results are based on a large sample of 7,303 firm-year
observationson listed companies in India and arerobust to alternative measuresfor our main variables audit quality,
earnings management, and cost of capital and to tests for endogeneity and the impact of the global financial crisis
(GFC). Giventhe distinctive and unique institutional featuresof the Indian market such as the dominant role of family
business groups in the national economy, large market share of domestic audit firms, less litigious environment, and
less effective professional accounting bodies in checking audit failure, our findings make a significant contribution to
the literature on the role of audit qualityas a corporate governance monitoring mechanism as reflected in the impact
on earnings management and cost of equity capital.
Key words: Audit quality, earningsmanagement, cost of equity capital, Indian stock market,Emerging economy, Big 4
auditor
1. INTRODUCTION
The Indian economy,which used to be state-controlled, has
undergone major restructuring and reforms, including the
liberalization of the corporate sector in the early 1990s.
The restructuring of the economy sparked the growth of a
strong investment culture, reduced the dependence on
state-owned enterprises, and generated a proliferation of
groups of enterprises led by entrepreneurial families. India
is the second largest economy in Asia after China and in
recent years real GDP has grown by around 7.0 per cent.
While there are over 6,000 public listed companies, many
are affiliated with business groups owned by family
entrepreneurs. Chakrabarti, Megginson and Yadav (2008)
estimate that business groups account for 60 per cent of
the largest 500 companies in India and 65 per cent of the
total market capitalization of these companies. Business
groups are a common feature of developing economies
but the degreeof their dominance in India is unique.
In this study, we examine the effects of external audit
quality on earnings management and the cost of equity
capital for listed companies in India. We also examine
whether these effects differ between companies affiliated
to a business group (hereafter group companies)and
other companies (hereafter stand-alone companies). We
thus address the aggregate and differential effects of audit
quality on both financialreporting earnings management
and the capital market cost of equity capital. We
measure audit quality by the employmentof an audit firm
affiliated witha Big 4 auditor, earnings quality by absolute
discretionary accruals, and cost of capital by the modified
PEG method. We use a large sample of 7,303 firm-year
observations on listed companies over the period 1998
2009. Our results show that, subject to certain company-
specific controls, audit quality is inversely associated with
both earnings management and the cost of equity capital.
However, while group companies have a lower degree of
earnings management and lower cost of equity capital
compared with stand-alone companies, group companies
benefit less from employing a high-quality auditor than
do stand-alone companies. The main result confirms the
findings from studies on the effects of audit quality, but
the result of differential effects across the two types of
companies is novel. The latter finding is facilitated by the
unique institutional setting of India. Our results are robust
to the use of alternative measures for our main variables
audit quality, earnings management and cost of equity
capital and to testsfor impact of the global financial crisis
(GFC) and for endogeneity.
Although a number of studies have examined the effect
of audit qualityon financial reporting credibility in a range
of countries (Teoh & Wong, 1993; Becker et al.,1998;
Khurana & Raman, 2004; Weber, Willenborg & Zhang,
2008; Chen et al., 2011; Cameran et al.,2015),theresults
cannot be generalized to a country such as India, which
has a distinctive and unique securities market and
institutional setting. For example, studies of the US audit
market assume thatthe effects of audit quality on financial
reporting credibility are uniform across companies (Chen
et al., 2011). In an emerging market context, Chen et al.
(2011) examined the effect of audit quality on earnings
management and cost of capital of state-owned (SOE)
and non-state-owned companies in China (NSOE) and
found that the effect of higher audit quality was greater in
reducing earnings management and cost of equity capital
for NSOEs than for SOEs. However, Chinas institutional
setting is significantly different from that of India. In
India, business groups play a major role in the economy
where the promoters(together with their relatives and
friends) are the dominant shareholders, while in China
state enterprises are the significant players.
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) define a business group as a
set of firms which, though legally independent, are bound
together by a constellation of formal and informal ties
Correspondence to: Kamran Ahmed, Professor of Accounting, La Trobe
Business School, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Vic 3086, Australia.
Email: k.ahmed@latrobe.edu.au
International Journal of Auditing doi: 10.1111/ijau.12087
Int. J. Audit. 21:177189 (2017)
©2017 John Wiley& Sons Ltd ISSN 1090-6738

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