Audit Fees and IAS/IFRS Adoption: Evidence from the Banking Industry

Date01 July 2014
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12019
AuthorPietro Perotti,Mara Cameran
Published date01 July 2014
Audit Fees and IAS/IFRS Adoption: Evidence from the Banking Industry
Mara Cameran1and Pietro Perotti2
1Università Bocconi,Milan, Italy
2University of Graz,Austria
The adoption of International Accounting Standards/International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) has
two opposite effects on audit fees: on the one hand, greater effort is required from auditors, which is likely to be
reflected by higher fees; on the other hand, if IAS/IFRS improve the quality of financial reporting, expected
liability costs could decrease and lower fees may be demanded. We consider a large sample of Italian banks and
we examine the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on audit fees. The results show that higher fees (19.29 per cent in real
terms) are paid after the switch to the new standards. Using a standard earnings management model, we do not
find support for the idea that financial reporting quality is affected by the adoption of IAS/IFRS. The observed
increase in fees is positively associated with the presence of financial derivatives held for hedging purposes. This
paper extends the findings of prior research on the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on audit fees; contrary to prior
contributions, our analysis concentrates on the banking industry. Furthermore, unlike prior works, we consider
both listed and non-listed firms.
Key words: Audit fees, banking industry, IAS/IFRS adoption, IFRS transition, financial derivatives, hedge
accounting
1. INTRODUCTION
Auditing activity is a critical aspect of the switch to new
accounting standards, and audit fees represent a part
of the related implementation costs. In this paper we
investigate how the introduction of the international
accounting standards (IAS/IFRS) influences auditors’fee
determination in the Italian banking industry. We argue
that IAS/IFRS adoption has two opposite effects on fees.
On the one hand, the use of IAS/IFRS – which are
principle-based and fair value oriented standards, as
opposed to previous Italian regulation – implies greater
effort for auditors; this is likely to be reflected by higher
fees. On the other hand, if IAS/IFRS improve the quality
of financial reporting, the expected liability costs for
auditors decrease, which may, therefore, lead to lower
fees.
The effect of the adoption of IAS/IFRS on fees paid to
auditors is at the centre of a debate among practitioners.
The professional press reports an increase in audit fees
paid in Europe in 2005 due to the adoption of IAS/IFRS
(Accountancy Magazine, 2005). Some anecdotal evidence
based on UK FTSE 100 audit fees confirms this view
(Accountancy Magazine, 2005, 2006), while an ICAEW
(Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales)survey conducted among investors, preparers and
auditors across 23 EU countries shows that ‘the costs of
auditing IFRS implementation were significant, ranking
as the second highest cost for companies with turnover
below 500m and the third highest for larger companies’
(ICAEW, 2007, p. 61). According to the same source, 67
per cent of the auditors said that ‘their audit fee for the
first set of IFRS financial statementswas higher as a direct
consequence of IFRS’ (ICAEW, 2007, p. 72). It has also
been argued that the demand for auditing work is
expected to increase with the adoption of IFRS in the US
(Accountancy Age, 2008).
Only a few academic works are concerned with the
change in audit fees after IAS/IFRS adoption. Griffin,
Lont and Sun (2009) find an audit fee increase associated
with the adoption of IAS/IFRS and the concurrent
introduction of new corporate governance rules in New
Zealand. Vieru and Schadewitz (2010) investigate fee
determination in the transition year to the IAS/IFRS for
small and medium-sized Finnish companies. Kim, Liu
and Zheng (2012) develop an analytical audit model to
examine the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on fees through
audit complexity and financialreporting quality; they test
the predictions of the model using datafrom 14 European
countries and excluding the financial industry. The
aforementioned studies generally find an increase in fees
after IAS/IFRS adoption. The sample of all the analyses is
limited to listed firms.
We extend the findings of prior research on IAS/IFRS
adoption and audit fees as we concentrateon the banking
industry. Furthermore, unlike previous works, we
consider both listed and non-listed firms.
The relationship between auditors and banks is a
critical regulatory issue. The recent credit derivatives
market turmoil highlighted the importance of internal
and external control mechanisms in the banking industry.
As argued by previous empirical studies on the
divergence of opinions among market participants and
analysts (Morgan, 2002; Flannery, Kwan & Nimalendran,
2004), banks’ financial statements are more opaque than
those of non-financial firms. The bottom line is that
intermediation risk and, specifically, loans and financial
assets are hard to monitor from the outside; as a
consequence, in such an opaque environment, auditing
activity plays a particularly important role in mitigating
information asymmetries.
Our analysis focuses on the Italian banking industry.
One benefit of using datafrom a single industry is that our
analysis does not suffer from the industry effect problem
(Carson, 2009; Reichelt & Wang, 2010; Francis, 2011).1
Weargue that Italy is a suitable setting for our study for at
least three reasons. Firstly, according to Italian regulation
(see Section 2), all Italian banks are obliged to use
IAS/IFRS in their annual accounts. This allows us to
Correspondence to: Mara Cameran, Università Bocconi, Dipartimento
Accounting, via Röntgen, 1, 20136 Milano, Italy. Email: mara
.cameran@unibocconi.it
International Journal of Auditing doi:10.1111/ijau.12019
Int. J. Audit. 18: 155–169 (2014)
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd ISSN 1090-6738

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