Are US antidumping cases being crowded out by other forms of protectionism?

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/JITLP-09-2019-0060
• Pages: 1-7
• Published date: 16 January 2020
• Date: 16 January 2020
• Author: Prashant Desai,Robert M. Feinberg
• Subject Matter: International business,International trade,Strategy,International economics

Are US antidumping cases being

crowded out by other forms

of protectionism?

Prashant Desai

Georgetown University, Washington, District of Columbia, USA, and

Robert M. Feinberg

Department of Economics, American University, Washington,

District of Columbia, USA

Abstract

Purpose –The issue of substitutability betweenvarious modes of import protection has been studied by

economists in various ways. Since President Donald Trump came into off‌ice and soon started imposing

tariffs, the need by US f‌irms to f‌ile antidumping (AD) cases wouldseem to have been reduced. This study

aims to examinewhether such a reduction in AD cases has occurred.

Design/methodology/approach –Quarterly US AD f‌ilings via a negativebinomial regression analysis

are explained. Patterns based on data from 1995 through 2016 are obtained f‌irst and then predict US AD

petitionsfor 2017 and 2018.

Findings –The authors reject a hypothesis of substitution away from AD in the Trump era of general

protectionism but do f‌ind some support for the notionthat protection moves downstream, with greater than

predictedAD f‌ilings in downstream metals sectors.

Originality/value –This is the f‌irst study to examine the possibilityof trade policy substitutability in the

Trump era.

Keywords Antidumping, Trade policy substitution, Trump tariffs

Paper type Research paper

Introduction

The issue of substitutability between various modes of import protection has been studied

by economists in various ways. One concern with much of the empiricalwork has been the

endogeneity between alternative modes of protection; however, we now have a natural

experiment for the USA. SinceJanuary 2017, when President Donald Trump came into off‌ice

and soon started imposing tariffs, the need by US f‌irms to f‌ile antidumping (AD) cases

would seem to have been reduced. Arguably, these Trump tariffs are exogenous with

respect to AD petitions. In what follows,we explain quarterly US AD f‌ilings, based on data

from 1995 through 2016, and then –from this –predict US AD petitions for 2017 and 2018.

We compare our estimate to the actual number of petitions in those years and interpret the

difference as the “Trump effect”.

Consider the timeline of President Trump’s tariff policy. He had campaigned against

existing and potential future trade agreements) but it was not anticipated by most

economists that he would act –unilaterally –to impose large tariffs on taking off‌ice.

Bloomberg News (2018) presents detailson trade actions under the Trump Administration,

JEL classif‌ication –F1

Forms of

protectionism

1

Received16 September 2019

Revised19 November 2019

Accepted19 November 2019

Journalof International Trade

Lawand Policy

Vol.19 No. 1, 2020

pp. 1-7

© Emerald Publishing Limited

1477-0024

DOI 10.1108/JITLP-09-2019-0060

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