Alien Tort Stat ute
| Pages | 50-51 |
50 Volume 17, July–September 2011 international law update
© 2012 Transnational Law Associates, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
D C C
A T S
T V
P A
Defendant, Exxon Mobile Corporation entered
into a contract with the Indonesian government to
employ members of its military to serve as security
for Exxon’s natural gas facility in Aceh. e military
had committed human rights abuses in the past.
Despite Exxon’s knowledge of this, it employed
the military, though performance of the security
contract would lead to human rights violations
by Indonesian soldiers against the residents of
Aceh. e abuses that occurred included genocide,
extrajudicial killing, torture, crimes against
humanity, sexual violence and kidnapping.
e Plaintis are fteen Indonesian villagers
from the Aceh territory. Some of the Plaintis
led claims under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)
and the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”).
e Plaintis claim that decisions made by Exxon
in the United States and at its Aceh plant caused
grave violations of the law of nations. ough the
acts were actually committed by the Indonesian
military, their actions could be attributed to Exxon
because they were committed by a unit dedicated
only to Exxon’s Aceh facility.
In 2001, Exxon moved to dismiss the
complaint. After receiving advisement from the
Oce of the Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, the district court dismissed the Plaintis
statutory claims under the ATS and TVPA.
Plaintis now appeal.
e United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reverses in part and
arms in part. First, the Court addresses the
Plaintis claims under the ATS. e Plaintis assert
a claim of aiding and abetting under the ATS. e
Court notes that it has been well established in case
law that the ATS allows for an aiding and abetting
claim. “Ample authority supports the conclusion
that the First Congress considered aiding and
abetting itself to be a violation of the law of nations.
All three branches of government had addressed the
subject and were in accord.” 654 F.3d 29. “ese
authorities and sources conrm that aiding and
abetting liability is clearly established in the law of
nations and consequently such liability is available
under the ATS.” 654 F.3d 32.
Moreover, the Court addresses the issue of
extraterritoriality, which has not yet been decided
by a circuit court of appeals. However, the Court
notes that the actual issue is whether common law
causes of action that federal court recognize in ATS
lawsuits may extend to harm to aliens occurring in
foreign countries.
Dissenters state that they “would dismiss
plaintis’ ATS claims because the ATS does not
apply to claims against corporations. In cases such as
this where no U.S. treaty is involved, claims under
the ATS are dened and limited by customary
international law, and customary international law
does not extend liability to corporations.” 654 F.3d
81.
By analyzing the history of the Act, the Court
nds that “two modern developments convince us
that it is entirely appropriate to permit appellants
to proceed with their aiding and abetting claims
even though much of the conduct relating to
the international law violations alleged in their
complaint occurred in Indonesia. First, modern
ATS litigation has primarily focused on atrocities
committed in foreign countries, and Congress in
enacting the TVPA expressly endorsed federal
courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over such lawsuits. . .
. Second, although the United States argued in [Sosa
v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)] that the
ATS in no way applies to alleged torts, such as the
one at issue in Sosa—arbitrary detention, that occur
outside of the United States, no Justice indicated
agreement with the United States’ position” 654
F.3d 26 (internal citations omitted).
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