Abe's Report Card An "A" for promises and vision. A "D-minus" for developing the strategy and tactics to bring about compelling change.

• Author: Katz, Richard

If any Japanese prime minister had the political dominance to deliver on promises of structural reform of the economy, it was Shinzo Abe. He held advantages unmatched by any predecessor for decades. Following his 2012 election triumph, he faced no opposition party with any realistic chance of winning an election for years to come. His Liberal Democratic Party and its small coalition ally won more than two-thirds of the seats in the Diet's powerful Lower House not only in 2012 but again in 2014 and 2017. Unlike his predecessors, he faced no powerful opposition factions within the LDP. Finally, he achieved what forerunners had unsuccessfully sought: leverage over the bureaucracy by wresting the power to appoint the top six hundred posts in the ministries.

Instead of spending this immense political capital on structural reform, however, Abe risked it on pushing through two unpopular moves on security issues. One was changing Article 9 of the Constitution in a way that many Japanese considered illegitimate. Instead of amending the Constitution, he simply had his Cabinet "reinterpret" it, so as to legalize participation in collective defense. The second was a state secrets law that critics said would allow the government to cover up its mistakes and infringe on civil rights. Both caused big demonstrations and temporary drops in poll ratings. Yet since there was no credible alternative, neither Abe nor the LDP paid any penalty in subsequent elections. This suggests that Abe had the power to get what he wanted on both security and the economy, but chose not to use it.

The upshot is a tale of missed opportunities. Abe's accomplishments never came close to his promises or his potential.

Abe promised that "Abenomics" would generate 2 percent annual GDP growth, more than double the sluggish 0.9 percent pace prevailing in the "lost decades" since 1991. His tenure began with a spurt of growth, but only because Japan's economy was recovering from a six-year slump caused by the 2008 global financial meltdown. Then Abe hiked the consumption tax in April 2014 and again in October 2019. Both hikes triggered mild downturns. Had Japan been fundamentally healthy, those would have been minor interruptions. However, Abenomics had done nothing to elevate Japan's potential growth rate on any long-term basis. Consequently, during Abe's whole tenure prior to Covid-19, GDP grew just 0.8 percent a year, and from the 2014 tax hike onward, just 0.5 percent.

The whole purpose of growth is to raise living standards, but those fell further under Abe. Despite the prime minister's pleading with companies to raise wages 2 percent each year, real...