X v the United Kingdom
| Date | 18 October 1982 |
| Court | European Court of Human Rights |
(Chamber composed of: Wiarda, President; Thór Vilhjálmsson, Bind-schedler-Robert, Liesch, Matscher and Pinheiro Farinha, Judges; Sir Robert Jennings, Judge ad hoc)
State responsibility — Damages (Measure of damages) — Award of damages in general — Grounds for awarding damages — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 50 — Just satisfaction in respect of established breach — Reform of domestic law — Financial compensation — Legal costs
Disputes — Other international courts — European Court of Human Rights — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 50 — Proceedings for just satisfaction in respect of established breach — Financial compensation — Whether necessary — Domestic legal costs — Whether actually incurred by applicant
The individual in international law — In general — Human rights and freedoms — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Article 50 — Just satisfaction — Death of applicant — Whether claim survives for benefit of estate — Reform of domestic law through draft legislation — Financial compensation — Whether necessary — Domestic legal costs — Costs referable to proceedings before Convention institutions — Agreement between parties — Whether equitable
Summary: The facts1:—The case originated in an application against the United Kingdom by X, a United Kingdom citizen, who died in 1979. In its judgment of 5 November 1981 the European Court of Human Rights held that there had been a breach of Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights due to the absence of any procedure for independent review of the detention of X in a mental hospital. The Court reserved the question of the application of Article 502 and invited the Commission to submit its observations on the question, including any friendly settlement at which the Government and the applicant's estate may have arrived.
No friendly settlement was reached. The applicant's estate asked for just satisfaction in the shape of (i) reform in the law, (ii) financial compensation for damage caused and (iii) reimbursement of costs necessarily incurred for proceedings before domestic courts and before the European Commission and the European Court (Strasbourg costs). With regard to the domestic law, the Government claimed that the various amendments inserted into draft legislation would remedy the deficiency. It rejected the claim for financial compensation as based on insufficient evidence and contended that no domestic costs were actually incurred by X. An agreement was reached between the Government and the estate with respect to the Strasbourg costs, to which the Commission had no objection.
Held:—(1) In principle a claim for just satisfaction vested in a deceased person could survive for the benefit of his estate, at least in respect of material damage and costs.
(2) Having regard to the limits of its own functions, the Court confined itself to taking note of the draft legislation in question.
(3) There was no causal link between the breach of Article 5(4) and the deprivation of liberty. Consequently, no compensation was recoverable for damage caused in so far as it related to the applicant's compulsory readmission to hospital. Just satisfaction could be afforded for the distress which the applicant would not have sustained had there been available to him an adequate remedy to review the lawfulness of his continued detention. However, due to the applicant's death and the personal nature of the injury alleged, it was not necessary to award financial compensation to the applicant's estate.
(4) The Government was ordered to pay the applicant's estate the domestic costs.
(5) The Court took formal note of the agreement between the Government and the applicant's estate concerning the Strasbourg costs.
Per Judge Thór Vilhjálmsson (dissenting): In so far as X, if still alive, would have been entitled to financial compensation under Article 50, such compensation should have been paid to his estate. The estate was entitled to satisfaction for non-material damage caused to X as a consequence of the breach of Article 5(4).
The following is the text of the judgment of the Court:
1. The case of X v. the United Kingdom was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights (‘the Commission’) in October 1980. The case originated in an application against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Commission on 14 July 1974 by a United Kingdom citizen, referred to as X in this judgment in view of the wish expressed by his next of kin following his death in 1979.
2. The applicant had alleged violation of paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Article 5 of the Convention in relation to his compulsory confinement in a psychiatric hospital. By judgment of 5 November 1981, the Court held that there had been a breach of paragraph 4, but not of paragraph 1, of Article 5 and that it was not necessary also to examine the case under paragraph 2 (Series A no. 46, points 1, 2 and 3 of the operative provisions and paragraphs 36–66 of the reasons, pp. 29 and 17–28).[3]
The only outstanding matter to be settled in the present case is the question of the application of Article 50. Accordingly, as regards the facts, the Court will confine itself here to giving the pertinent details; for further particulars, reference should be made to paragraphs 8 to 30 of the above-mentioned judgment (ibid., pp. 6–14).[4]
3. At the public hearings held on 22 June 1981, counsel on behalf of the applicant had stated that, should the Court find a violation, they would be submitting a claim for just satisfaction under Article 50 to obtain both compensation for damage suffered and reform of the law. The Government of the United Kingdom (‘the Government’), for their part, had not taken a stand on the matter.
In its judgment of 5 November 1981, the Court reserved the whole of this question. The Commission was invited to submit to the Court, within the coming two months, written observations thereon and, in particular, to notify the Court of any friendly settlement at which the Government and the applicant's next of kin might have arrived (see point 4 of the operative provisions and paragraph 67 of the reasons, ibid., pp. 29 and 28).[5]
4. The President of the Chamber extended the above-mentioned time-limit twice, on the last occasion until 5 May 1982.
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