World hegemony in question: the complexities & contradictions of China's ?passive revolution' in its global context

• Author: Jonathan Pass
• Position: Profesor Asociado de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Pablo de Olavide
• Pages: 330-363

www.reei.org

REEI, núm. 38, diciembre 2019

DOI: 10.17103/reei.38.10

WORLD HEGEMONY IN QUESTION:

THE COMPLEXITIES & CONTRADICTIONS OF

CHINA’S ‘PASSIVE REVOLUTION’

IN ITS GLOBAL CONTEXT

LA HEGEMONÍA MUNDIAL EN ENTREDICHO:

LAS COMPLEJIDADES Y CONTRACCIONES DE LA

‘REVOLUCIÓN PASIVA’ DE CHINA

EN SU CONTEXTO GLOBAL

JONATHAN PASS

Summary: I. INTRODUCTION. II. ‘PASSIVE REVOLUTION’: A BRIEF OVERVIEW.

III. CHINA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITION. IV. SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS IN

CONTEMPORARY CHINA. V. ‘TRASFORMISMO’ STRATEGIES: FROM DENG TO HU.

VI. XI’S ‘CAESARISM’ & NASCENT HEGEMONIC PROJECT’. VII. CONCLUSION:

WORLD HEGEMONY IN QUESTION.

ABSTRACT: China’s unprecedented meteoric rise has dramatically altered the structure and functioning of

the global order sparking debate about whether it may become a ‘world hegemon’. The Neo neo-Gramscian

perspective adopted here understands hegemony as a power relationship between state-society complexes,

each determined by the social forces emergent from its particular class configuration. To enjoy world

hegemony a state-society complex must, amongst oth er things, enjoy politico-cultural hegemony over its

subordinate counterparts, manifested in intellectual and moral leadership, enabling it to remaking the world

in its ‘own image’. In order to assess China’s ‘hegemonic credentials’ (and the kind of world order it would

be) according to th is criterion, this study examines the evolving and contradictory nature of the country’s

ongoing top-down social restructu ring – a passive revolution – within the context of a changing global

capitalist system. Contemporary China stands at a crossroads, its growth model “un stable, unbalanced and

uncoordinated” and its society far from “harmonious”. Against the backdrop of authoritarian Caesarism,

we argue, a nascent hegemonic project has em erged under Xi Jinping, which seeks not just to carry out

profound domestic social reform, but to extend Chinese hegemony internationally, as witnessed over the

last few years. We conclude th at for th e foreseeable future Chinese world hegemony appears unlikely,

amongst other reasons because its present societal model fails to inspire emulation abroad, a key

requirement for intellectual and moral leadership.

Fecha de recepción del trabajo: 26 de junio de 2019. Fecha de aceptación de la versión final: 4 de noviembre

de 2019.

 Profesor Asociado de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Pablo de

Olavide. Email: jonapass@upo.es. Es autor del libro recién publicado American Hegemony in the 21st

Century: A Neo Neo-Gramscian Perspective, New York, Routledge, 2019.

[38] REVISTA ELECTRÓNICA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (2019)

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DOI: 10.17103/reei.38.10

RESUMEN: El auge meteórico sin precedentes de China ha cambiado de forma espectacular la estructura y

funcionamiento del orden global, provocando un debate sobre si se convertirá en el ‘hegemon mundial’.

La perspectiva Neo neogramsciana aquí presentada comprende la hegemonía como una relación de poder

entre complejos estado-sociedad, cada uno determinado por las fuerzas sociales emergentes de la

configuración particular de sus clases sociales. Para poder disfrutar de la hegemonía mundial un complejo

estado-sociedad, entre otras cosas, tiene que ejercer la hegemonía político -cultural sobre sus homólogos

subordinados, manifestada en el liderazgo intelectual y moral, lo que le permite rehacer el mundo ‘en su

propia imagen’. Con el fin de evaluar las ‘credenciales hegemónicas’ de China (y la clase de orden mundial

resultante) según este criterio, este estudio examina el carácter cambiante y contradictorio de la

reestructuración social ‘de arriba abajo’ – una revolución pasiva – que el país lleva experimentando desde

hace tiempo en el contexto de un sistema capitalista global variable. La China contemporánea se encuentra

en una encrucijada, su modelo de crecimiento “inestable, desequilibrado y descoordinado” y su sociedad

lejos de ser “armoniosa”. Con el Cesarismo autoritario como telón de fondo, sostenemos que ha emergido

un proyecto hegemónico naciente bajo el mandato de Xi Jinping, que pretende no solamente llevar a cabo

una reforma social doméstica profunda, sino extender la hegemonía china internacionalment e, tal y como

hemos presenciado durante los últimos años. Concluimos que por ahora la hegemonía mundial china

parece poco probable, entre otras razones porque su modelo social actual no inspira la imitació n en el

exterior, un requisito clave para el liderazgo intelectual y moral.

KEYWORDS: China, hegemony, state-society complex, passive revolution, hegemonic project, Xi Jinping

PALABRAS CLAVES: China, hegemonía, complejo estado-sociedad, revolución pasiva, proyecto hegemónico,

Xi Jinping

I. INTRODUCTION

The economic development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is unparalleled: “the

fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”;

1

recording a real gross

domestic product (GDP) average growth rate of 9.5% for almost 40 years (1979–2017).

2

China’s GDP, measured in purchasing power parity, went from being amongst the poorest

countries to the world’s richest, to overtaking the United States (US) in 2014.

3

In 2010 it

also ended the US’s 125-year reign as the world’s largest manufacturer, not to mention

its biggest exporter.

4

The need to guarantee a constant supply of resources and customers has forced the PRC

embed itself ever-deeply into global trade networks. Backed by Beijing, and more acutely

after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) hit, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE)

have ‘gone global’, signing hundreds of so-called Angola Mode deals with governments

throughout Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, securing access to oil, gas,

1

THE WORLD BANK, “The World Bank in China”, 18th April 2019,

https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview (accessed 01/05/19).

2

Albeit one that has being slowing down of late with 6.3% expected for 2019. INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY FUND, “IMF World Economic Outlook”, April 2019

https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/CHN (accessed 28/05/19).

3

BBC NEWS, “Is China’s Economy really the largest the world?” Ben Carter, 16th December 2014,

https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30483762, (accessed 18/12/14).

4

THE ECONOMIST, “Global Manufacturing: Made in China”, 12 th March 2015.

World hegemony in question: the complexities & contradictions of Chin a’s ‘passive revolution’ in its

global context

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DOI: 10.17103/reei.38.10

minerals etc. in return for building crucial infrastructure, technology transfers, arms and

cash. Similarly, China has become the first or second biggest trading partner the world’s

most powerful economies (e.g. the US, European Union, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil,

South Korea, Australia), many of which have found themselves pulled ever closer into

PRC’s economic orbit.

The PRC is a keen defender of the liberal international economic order, actively

participating in the Bretton Woods ‘trio’

5

. The fact that Beijing can portray itself as one

of the global guardians of free trade in the face of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ and

heightened protectionism remains the ultimate irony. Nevertheless, given what it sees as

the pro-Western bias prevalent within the orthodox institutional framework, China has

started to set up its own international organisations in ‘the shadows’, as it were (e.g. Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Developmental Bank). These offer

alternative Sino-centric development aid; one which is increasingly reliant on the yuán

(instead of the dollar) and enjoys independence from what is considers as the unstable

and predatory nature of Anglo-Saxon finance.

China’s interest in international institution-building, one could suggest, finds its historical

parallels in the establishment of US hegemony in the 1940s. Beijing’s launching of its

multi-billion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, for example, bears more than

a passing resemblance to the 1949 Marshall Plan: a world power seeking to garner support

amongst international elites by underwriting a new ‘hegemon-centred’ accumulation

regime. Certainly, Washington is concerned about the BRI’s geopolitical importance,

urging its allies not to participate in it, while accusing Beijing of building up its military

and engaging in aggressive power projection throughout Asia-Pacific.

Given the supposed relative decline of the US and China’s growing economic, political,

military and technological strength – the heart of the present Huawei/5G clash – it is

inevitable to raise the question as to whether we are now seeing the emergence of a new

‘world hegemon’.

6

In mainstream international relations theory, be it realist, neorealist or American

international political economy, hegemony in defined in inter-state terms: the

‘supremacy’ or ‘dominance’ of one country over another (or others), especially in military

and economic terms.

7

The modified (or Neo) neo-Gramscian approach adopted in this

paper, however, understands hegemony as a relationship between state-society

complexes, whose particular nature is determined by the underlying configuration of

5

The World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

6

See for example JACQUES, M., When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World an d the

Birth of a New Global Order, New York: The Penguin Press, 2009.

7

See for example MORGENTHAU, H. J., Politics Among Nations: The S truggle for Power and Peace,

New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948; WALTZ, K., Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw

Hill, 1979; MEARSHEIMER, J. J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition) New York,

W.W. Norton & Company, 2001; KEOHANE, R., After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World

Political Economy, Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984 ; GILPIN, R., Global Political

Economy. Understanding the International Economic Order, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University

Press, 2001.