Why were the UK and USA unprepared for the COVID-19 pandemic? The systemic weaknesses of neoliberalism: a comparison between the UK, USA, Germany, and South Korea

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.13169/jglobfaul.7.1.0009
• Pages: 9-45
• Published date: 01 June 2020
• Date: 01 June 2020
• Author: Timothy I. Mellish,Natalie J. Luzmore,Ahmed Ashfaque Shahbaz
• Subject Matter: COVID-19,healthcare,preparedness,neoliberalism,politics,governance

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Journal of Global Faultlines, 2020

Vol. 7, No. 1, 9-45.

Why were the UK and USA unprepared for the COVID-19

pandemic? The systemic weaknesses of neoliberalism:

a comparison between the UK, USA, Germany,

and South Korea

Timothy I. Mellish1, Natalie J. Luzmore2, and Ahmed Ashfaque Shahbaz3

“Gentlemen, it is the microbes who will have the last word.”

(Louis Pasteur)

Abstract

Pandemics historically have killed as many people as the wars that have beset this world,

yet the resources committed to pandemic prevention and response are a fraction of the

resources we commit to security. This paper examines the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 by

analysing the preparedness and responses of the UK, the USA, Germany, and South Korea.

We will evidence that the UK and USA lacked the levels of preparedness that global health

reports indicated, and that their responses were diametrically opposite of those of Germany

and South Korea. We argue that decades of deregulation and privatization due to neoliberal,

free-market economics by the UK and USA led to the Great Recession of 2008. This, in

turn, led to economic collapse and austerity (increased neoliberalism), which negatively

impacted investment in healthcare in the UK and USA. This resulted in very different levels

of preparedness and responses by the four countries under the microscope.

Keywords: COVID-19, healthcare, preparedness, neoliberalism, politics, governance

Introduction

Pandemics historically have killed as many people as the wars that have beset this world,

yet the resources committed to pandemic prevention and response are a fraction of the

resources we commit to security (GHRF Commission, 2016). Most natural disasters are

limited by geography, whereas the COVID-19 crisis, by contrast, has the whole planet in its

grip. Natural disasters usually only affect localised communities in vulnerable geographic

locations, however this crisis has victimised the world over. Like other pandemics, it will

go down in history as a once-in-a-lifetime experience for the majority of global citizens

alive today; albeit one or two remarkable exceptions – the Italian miracles of 101-year-old

‘Mr P’ and 104-year-old Ada Zanusso, who have both recovered from COVID-19 infections

and who have lived through many pandemics and global disasters (Ioannidis, 2020;

Porterfield, 2020; Winterburn, 2020). The International Monetary Fund calls it a “rare

disaster” and states “this is a crisis like no other” (Gopinath, 2020).

At the time of publication, much has already been written on COVID-19, the major-

ity being scientific or medical. In contrast, as fledgling political scientists, the authors

have combined their International Business, International Relations, History, Politics, and

International Law studies to write a paper that seeks to discuss the political, economic,

and social impact of COVID-19. We looked with horror at the lack of readiness of the UK,

which was in contrast to the responses of Germany and South Korea. It would be remiss of

Why were the UK and USA unprepared for the COVID-19 pandemic?

Mellish et al.

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us not to include the USA as our research uncovered relevant and meaningful discourse in

respect of the preparedness and response of the USA. We acknowledge and thank Professor

Bülent Gökay for his support and guidance, for without it, this paper would not have been

written.

A “Black Swan” event

Before moving to the main body of this paper, we believe it is essential to comment on

whether COVID-19 is a “Black Swan” event; something that is unexpected or could not be

predicted. Many commentators, scholars, writers, and political pundits are, at present,

questioning whether COVID-19 can be categorised as an event that simply could not have

been predicted.

In his seminal book, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Nassim

Nicholas Taleb (2008) defines a “Black Swan” event. Taleb writes:

Before the discovery of Australia, people in the old world were convinced that all

swans were white, an unassailable belief as it seemed completely confirmed by

empirical evidence. The sighting of the first black swan might have been an interesting

surprise for a few ethnologists, but that is not where the significance of the story lies.

It illustrates a severe limitation to our learning from observations or experience and

the fragility of our knowledge. One single observation can invalidate a general

statement derived from millennia of confirmatory sightings of white swans. All you

need is one single (and, I am told, quite ugly) black bird.

(Taleb, 2008, Prologue)

Taleb denes a “Black Swan” event as “an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expec-

tations because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries

an extreme impact (unlike the bird). Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes

us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predict-

able” (Taleb, 2008, Prologue). This triplet of rarity, extreme impact and retrospective pre-

dictability can explain almost everything in our world, spanning ideas, religions, cults, and

politics, to elements of our personal lives. If an event has low predictability, yet conversely has

an extreme impact, then we can explain away the extreme impact and reduce our response to

the event as a reaction rather than a planned process. As noted above, some writers or com-

mentators argue or suggest that COVID-19 is dierent from other political and economic cri-

ses in that it is a “Black Swan” event, one that is unexpected and unpredicted and, therefore,

is not possible to plan for a response.

Our position is that COVID-19 was only unpredictable in terms of the unexpected

timing of the pandemic; in this respect, COVID-19 is like any other previous pandemic.

However, we argue that COVID-19 is not a “Black Swan” event in that influenza pandemics

are the subject of much discourse, with extensive and comprehensive planning amongst

state and non-state actors, academics, health, medical, and scientific planners of national

governments. Furthermore, as we will evidence, there have been many influenza pandemics

or derivatives of them over the last century, with the most recent being in 2009. We argue

that the timing of COVID-19 should be separated from the event itself; the timing and the

event itself are not mutually inclusive but rather mutually exclusive.

However, as a precursor to a more detailed analysis of governmental planning and

published documentation, an example goes back 12 years to 2008 with the UK Cabinet

Office publishing the annual UK National Risk Assessment. This document sets out the

government’s “assessment of the likelihood and potential impact of a range of different

risks that may directly affect the UK, as promised in the National Security Strategy”. The

National Risk Assessment “assesses the impact and likelihood of the major risks, both

Journal of Global Faultlines, 2020

Vol. 7, No. 1, 9-45.

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hazards and threats, that the country could face over five years, enabling prioritization of

the UK’s planning for emergencies” (UK Cabinet Office, 2008). Page five of this publication

has a diagram of a risk that would have the highest impact on the UK, that being an influ-

enza pandemic (see Figure 1). Many other multiple high-level UK Government documents

between 2004 and 2017 articulate the potential risk of an influenza pandemic and have put

in place detailed plans, strategies, and tactics to deal with such an emerging pandemic.

From a global perspective, the Commission on Global Health Risk Framework for

the Future (GHRF Commission) states in their 2016 report titled The Neglected Dimension of

Global Security: A Framework to Counter Infectious Disease Crises that “we have not done

nearly enough to prevent or prepare for such potential pandemics. While there are certainly

gaps in our scientific defences, the bigger problem is that leaders at all levels have not been

giving these threats anything close to the priority they demand” (National Academy of

Medicine, 2016). We will reference this report in more detail later in this paper, as it is ency-

clopaedic yet admonishing and instructive for pandemic planners. The GHRF consider pan-

demic planning a neglected dimension of security, which places the onus of responsibility

on the shoulders of all governments. Supporting the GHRF, the 2019 Global Health Security

Index Report (the first of its kind) notes that “Countries are not prepared for a globally cata-

strophic biological event, including those that could be caused by the international spread

of a new or emerging pathogen or by the deliberate or accidental release of a dangerous or

engineered agent or organism” (Global Health Security Index, 2019, p. 9).

At the time of publication, the justification for our research can be seen in the

infection, death, and recovery statistics between the four countries under discussion, as

seen in Figure 2. The USA has the highest infection rate in the world, with the figures

placing the UK fourth behind Brazil and Russia. The USA also has the highest number of

deaths, followed by the UK, which, when compared to Germany and South Korea, makes

for dire reading.

Figure 1 An illustration of the high consequence risks facing the United Kingdom.

Source: UK Cabinet Office, 2008.