When do investors value board gender diversity?

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-01-2018-0012
Pages60-79
Published date17 September 2018
Date17 September 2018
AuthorChristopher Groening
Subject MatterCorporate governance,Strategy
When do investors value board
gender diversity?
Christopher Groening
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to use the passage of the Italian Gender Diversity Law to help isolate the
effects of board gender diversity on firm value by investigating conditions under which such diversity
providesgreater role-enhancing resourcesto the board.
Design/methodology/approach This paper used a one-day event study to measure when gender
diversity matters to investors. Abnormal returns from Italian firms were used to study investors’
anticipatedoutcomes of the effect of gender diversityon firm value.
Findings Board genderdiversity is financiallybeneficial especiallyfor firms with a male dual CEO and
board chair and with few or no women on board committees and firms that operate in industries with
greater levels of competition. Addition of these moderators more than doubles the variance explained.
Moreover,the effect of genderis isolated in this study,which examinedinvestor reactionto the expectation
of increasesin the numberof female boardmembers, ratherthan to specificfemale appointees.
Social implications Determining the conditions when a gender diverse matters to firm value is
important for shareholders, policymakers and advocates for gender equality. The findings illustrate
precise conditions for stakeholders to make the case for board gender diversity as achieving financial
reward,in addition to societal benefit.
Originality/value The value of a gender diverseboard is contingent on the company’s need for diverse
resources (e.g. more competition, lack of gender diversity on committees or CEO duality). This paper
provides insight as to why prior research linking board gender diversity to firm value finds seemingly
contradictory results. Thus, this paper provides useful insights for researchers, boards and legislative
bodies.
Keywords Gender, Board of directors, Event study
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The persistent challenge of achieving gender diversity in business is of greatconcern when
examining corporate boards. Growth in the percentage of women on corporate boards has
been slow. Female representation on corporate boards in countries such as Norway and
France averages near 40 per cent; in others, such as the USA and Canada, it averages
close to 20 per cent, whereas in Brazil, India and Portugal, the average is around 10 per
cent (Eastman et al.,2016). Yet, even if boards achieve gender diversity, there is a lack of
consensus as to whether investors believe gender diversity will create a board that is more
able to execute its duties and increasefirm value (Post and Byron, 2015;Kang et al.,2010).
Several papers have discussed the multi-faceted role of women on boards: monitoring and
directing managers, monitoring regulatory compliance, providing insight, advice and
counsel to managers and creating legitimacy for firms (van der Walt and Ingley, 2003;
Adams et al.,2010;Adams and Ferreira, 2009;Kim and Starks, 2016). Some findings
suggest that the presence of female board members has a positive impact on firm value
(Joy et al.,2007;Carter et al.,2003), whereas other studies are less sanguine about their
impact (Miller and Triana, 2009;Matsaand Miller, 2013).
Christopher Groening is
based at the Department of
Marketing and
Entrepreneurship, Kent
State University College of
Business Administration,
Kent, Ohio, USA.
Received 28 August 2017
Revised 8 January 2018
6 May 2018
Accepted 28 June 2018
PAGE 60 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 19 NO. 1 2019, pp. 60-79, ©EmeraldPublishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 DOI 10.1108/CG-01-2018-0012
My paper advances this literature stream by suggesting that the capability of gender
diversity to affect firm value varies depending on the firm’s need for diverse resources; in
other words, is the relationship between board diversity and firm value contingent on
characteristics of the firm and its environment? To look for an answer to this question, an
examination of theoretical explanations for the link between boardgender diversity and firm
value is necessary. Academics posit that no single theory can explain the link between
board diversity and firm value (Dalton et al., 1999;Carter et al.,2010;Hillman and Dalziel,
2003). Therefore, this paper uses a multi-theoretical framework to examine the relationship
between board diversity and firm value: agency theory addresses monitoring of managers
and regulatory compliance (Bathala and Rao, 1995); resource dependence focuses on
advice and counsel to managers (Hillmanet al.,2000); and institutional theory applies to the
legitimacy of the board (Hillman et al.,2007). The potential moderators for the gender
diversityfirm value relationship are derived from whether the agency-reducing, resource-
and legitimacy-improving functions of diversity are valuable in all scenarios (Terjesen et al.,
2008).
First, the need for a diverse board may be contingent on the level of competition. That is,
more competitors may require more resources from the board to provide insight, advice
and counsel to managers regarding the threats that competitors present. Second, board
committees monitor managers and regulatory compliance. A board with the resources of
diverse committees will reap more financial benefits due to its improved monitoring
capability. In addition, diverse board committees can create greater levels of legitimacy
with stakeholders. Third, a concentration of power is created when the same individual
occupies the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board. This situation, known as CEO
duality, creates an agency issue that may require greater level of monitoring by the board,
and thus, greater levels of diversity.Finally, other forces may ameliorate the need for a high
level of monitoring by the board. For example, regulated industries have a high level of
governmental regulation, reducing agency issues, and thus may make the presence of a
diverse board less necessary and therefore less valuable to a firm.
The nature of the data used to examine the role of gender diversity in creating firm value is
another possible challenge when trying to reconcile divergent research findings. Prior
studies examineboards where the identities, and thus qualifications and characteristics (e.g.
name, gender, age and credentials) of each board member are known to investors. In other
words, previous studies may not have been accuratelymeasuring the impact of the concept
of board gender diversity, but rather the reaction to the appointment or presenceof specific
women. This paper attempts to address this question by investigating a scenario where the
specific characteristics of the womenon the board are not available to investors.
This paper examines the effect of reducing gender inequality on firm value by examining
investors’ immediate reaction when presented with news that a firm’s board of director’s
gender make-up will have to change. Specifically, this paper uses a one-day stock market
reaction to the passage of a law mandating that all Italian publicly traded companies’
boards comprise a minimum of 20 per cent female members to investigate whether the
effect of women’s board appointmentson firm value is contingent on firm characteristics.
Financial outcomes regarding diversity
There is a lack of consensusregarding the effect of mandated gender diversity on firm value
(van der Walt and Ingley, 2003;Terjesen et al.,2009). Evidence suggests that managers
perceive a positive correlation between diversity and firm performance (Allen et al.,2008).
Several studies also found evidence of a positive financial effect from a diverse board. For
instance, gender diversity in boards of directors has a positive effect on Tobin’s q, the ratio
of the market value of a company’s assets to the replacement cost of its assets, in both
Spanish (Campbell and Mı
´nguez-Vera, 2007) and US firms (Erhardt et al.,2003). In fact,
many US firms deliberately have sought to increase the ratio of female to male board
VOL. 19 NO. 1 2019 jCORPORATEGOVERNANCE jPAGE 61

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