US technological statecraft towards China

• Date: 19 April 2024
• Pages: 85-100
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/JITLP-10-2023-0059
• Published date: 19 April 2024
• Subject Matter: Strategy,International business,International business law,Economics,International economics,International trade
• Author: Halil Deligöz

US technological statecraft

towards China

Halil Deligöz

Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, Turkey

Abstract

Purpose –This study aims to def‌ine a “technological statecraft”concept to distinguish tech-based

measures/sanctionsfrom an array of economic measures ranging from restrictionsof rare earth elements and

natural gas supplies to asset freezes under the wider portfolio of economic statecraft. This concept is

practically intended to reveal the USA’s“logic of choice”in its employment of technology as an eff‌icient

instrumentto deal with China in the context of the great power rivalry.

Design/methodology/approach –This study follows David A. Baldwin’s statecraft def‌inition and

conceptualizationmethodology, which relies on “means”rather than “ends.”Inaddition to Baldwin and as an

incremental contribution to his economic statecraft analysis, this study also combines national political

economy with statecraftanalysis with a particular focus on the utilization of technologicalmeasures against

China duringthe Trump administration.

Findings –The US rationale for choosingtechnology, namely, emerging and foundational technologies,in

its rivalry against China is caused at least by two factors: the nature of the external challenge and the

characteristicsof the US innovation model based largely on radicalinnovations. To deal with China, the USA

practically distinguishedthe role of advanced technology and followed a grammerof technological statecraft

as depicted in the promulgatedlegal texts during the Trump administration.

Originality/value –Despite a growing volume of literature on economic statecraft and technological

competition, studies focusing on countries’“logic of choice”with regard to why and under what conditions

they choose f‌inancial, technological or commodity-based sanctions/measures/controls are lacking. Inspired

from Baldwin’s account on the “logic of choice”fromamong alternative statecrafts (i.e. diplomacy, military,

economic statecraft, and propaganda). This study will contribute to the literature with a clear lens to

demonstrate the “logicof choice”from among a variety of economic statecraft measures in the case of the US

technologicalstatecraft toward China.

Keywords Technological statecraft, Technological power base, Export and investment controls,

Varieties of capitalism, Statecraft analysis

Paper type Conceptual paper

Introduction

Technology has been a distinct lever of states utilized purposefully for foreign policy aims.

Based on this observation, this article aims to introduce a concept of “technological

statecraft”by examining US tech policies toward China, with a particular focus on the

Trump administration period(2017–2020). What is technological statecraft, and how does it

function for foreign policy purposes? Following David Allen Baldwin’s methodology for

statecraft conceptualization, this article def‌ines a variety under economic statecraft,

ref‌lecting the salient practice in international politics today. Conceptualizing a

“technological statecraft”is necessary due to the “novel means”used in foreign policy and

This article is based on the conceptual part of the author’s PhD dissertation, and he would like to

thank his PhD supervisor Dr Christian Wilhelm Lekon and two anonymous reviewers for their

precious comments.

US

technological

statecraft

Received30 October 2023

Revised12 February 2024

Accepted8 March 2024

Journalof International Trade

Lawand Policy

© Emerald Publishing Limited

1477-0024

DOI 10.1108/JITLP-10-2023-0059

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:

https://www.emerald.com/insight/1477-0024.htm

the “changed conditions”in geopolitics (Baldwin, 2020, p. 28, quoted from Lasswell, 1958,

pp. 7–8). To put it more clearly, the emphasis on technological means in a time of

technological rivalryallows def‌ining this concept.

Exactly as security institutions (primarily the NATO) was complemented by economic

statecraft mechanisms (primarily the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export

Controls or the CoCom) right from the beginning of the Cold War, the unipolar era was

complemented by free trade and its institutions, altogether making the rule-based

international order. However, once again the tide is turning in international politics toward

the great power rivalry, and economic statecraft has gained a renewed application in this

context. The Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton gave two speeches in 2011 and 2012

specif‌ically on the potentials of “economic statecraft”(Clinton,2011, 2012) and suggested

“turning to economic solutions for strategic challenges”(Clinton, 2012). China was a major

concern in this adjustment. However, it was Trump, who unleashed the potentials of

economic statecraft in a confrontational style. From a variety of economic tools, he

particularly tapped on technological ones. During the Trump administration, the US legal

framework was reformed to use the country’s technological preeminence as an inf‌luential

power base –as in the cases of export and foreign investment controls –in international

politics. In this context, Trump administration listed Chinese companies on the Entity List

and the Communist Chinese Military Companies List to curb their access to critical and

emerging US technologies. This article argues that “restriction”or “promotion”of

technology (Mastanduno, 1992, p. 29) relies on a technological power base/power resource,

and the US technological measures depict a phenomenon with new materials for analysis

and conceptualization.

The remaining sections will proceed as follows. The second section illustrates the

instrumental role of high technology in today’s foreign policy practices. After explaining

why technology should be regarded as a distinct variety of economicstatecraft, this section

develops with two subsections: the f‌irst subsection explains the logic behind the USA’s

choice of technology as a primary tool in the contestation with China, and second one puts

forth the main types of technological tools used in this context. The third section

complements the second section by focusingon the functions and eff‌iciencyof technological

measures in internationalpolitics. In two subsections, this part comments on,f‌irst, what the

US goals might be, and second how eff‌icientlyeconomic statecraft was instrumentalized by

the USA toward China. The fourth section examines China’s countermeasures. Finally, the

f‌ifth section concludes.

Technology as a variety of economic statecraft

Economic statecraft has become a catch-all concept describing a wide range of measures,

including grain embargos (as imposed on Russia after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979)

(Paarlberg, 1980); oil embargoes, such as on Japan in 1941 (Herzog, 1966), in the context of

the Six-Day War in 1967 (Daoudi and Dajani, 1984), and on Iranian oil after the 1979

revolution (Psaledakis, 2022); f‌inancial measures such as asset freezes exploiting the

“exorbitant privilege”of the US dollar (Eichengreen, 2011, p. 118); restrictions on rare earth

elements (Smith, 2012, p. v); and technological controls (Lee et al., 2022), among others.

Considering this rich portfolio of measures, three distinct varieties of economic statecraft

can be identif‌ied based on three bases of economic power: currency/f‌inance [1], commodity

and technology. This articleaims to elaborate on the last one.

Instrumentalizing technologyinvolves its utilization positively (through “promotion”)or

negatively (through “restriction”)(

Mastanduno, 1992, p. 29). In his book, The Lever of

Riches, Joel Mokyr emphasizes the instrumental role of technology in creating wealth.

JITLP