U.S. Policy on Human Trafficking: A Partial Solution for a Perplexing Global Human Rights Problem
Author | Madeleine Bailey |
Position | SMU Dedman School of Law |
Pages | 607-643 |
e Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law
ISSN: 2338-7602; E-ISSN: 2338-770X
http://www.ijil.org
© 2018 e Institute for Migrant Rights Press
I thank Professor Anthony Colangelo for reading multiple versions of this dra, as
well as Professors Natalie Nanasi, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, and Vanessa Bouche for
providing invaluable feedback during the writing process.
U.s. PoliCy on HUMan traffiCkinG
A PArtiAl Solution for A PerPlexing globAl
HumAn rigHtS Problem
Madeleine Bailey
SMU Dedman School of Law
E-mail: mebailey@smu.edu
e development of international law combatting human tracking has been inu-
enced—indeed, propelled—by the U.S. Department of State’s Tracking in Persons (TIP)
report. e TIP Report ranks countries of the world into three main tiered categories
based on compliance with international human tracking law. e U.S. imposes sanc-
tions on countries failing to comply with certain dened “minimum standards.” is ar-
ticle argues that the U.S. Tracking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and corresponding
Tracking in Persons (TIP) Report provide valuable tools for measuring and responding
to the global human tracking problem despite criticism for alleged asymmetry with
the international denition of human tracking. is article provides a novel empirical
analysis of data collected for the U.S. TIP Report compliance rankings, and investigates
its application of anti-tracking policy for consistency with international policy. E xist-
ing literature analyzing U.S. and global anti-tracking policy for consistency focuses
primarily on how international policy and U.S. policy dene various tracking oenses.
is article argues that the denitions are consistent, and then adds a new facet to this
analysis by examining not just denitional consistency, but consistency in application
of anti-tracking laws in the U.S. TIP Report. Ultimately, it concludes that the U.S. an-
ti-tracking legislation and sanctions regime is in accordance with international prin-
ciples, and provides a valuable hard law contribution to a rights regime. Additionally,
this article provides normative sug gestions for improving the international compliance
system administered by the United Nations Oce of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Such
enhancements would provide the legitimacy of global consensus, and a framework upon
which to build a multilateral sanctioning system to bring noncompliant States into con-
formity with global anti-tracking law.
Keywords: International Law, Legal C ompliance, Human Rights, International Law
Making.
V Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law 607-43 (October 2018)
608
Bailey
INTRODUCTION
Human tracking is among the fastest growing and most protable
forms of transnational organized crime.1 Even though only approxi-
mately 4% of the world’s 30.2 million tracking victims at the end of
2010 were tracked for sex, those individuals generated approximately
40% of the 96.8 billion in prots generated by human tracking during
2010.2 Data released by the International Labor Organization (ILO) es-
timates that forced labor in the private economy, including for sexual
exploitation, generates 150 billion dollars per year in illegal proceeds.3
Prots in human tracking are high because trackers can keep their
costs low by withholding food, wages, adequate shelter, and health care.
And unlike migrant smuggling, fees for movement of the “product”
(the human) can be extracted from the prolonged servitude of the vic-
tim.4
Current global trends in online payment and fast, online information
transmission increase the likelihood that human tracking will
only become increasingly protable in the coming years.5 Some have
suggested that the most eective approach to attacking the industry
will be to erect a system that renders it a low prot, high risk business
venture.6 is will involve a coordinated global eort to elevate
economic penalties in the law.7 However, global standards to achieve
1. L S, H T: A G P 3 (2010).
2. Siddharth Kara, Designing More Eective Laws Against Human Tracking, 9
NW J. I’ H. R 126 (2011); O. S’ C- E-
, L A-M L R C T-
H B (2014) (hereinaer L A-M
L R).
3. ILO Says Forced Labour Generates Annual Prots of USD 150 Billion, I’
L O. (May 20, 2014), http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/news-
room/news/WCMS_243201/lang--en/index.htm.
4. Kelly E. Hyland, e Impact of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish
Tracking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 8 H. R B 38
(2001).
5. L A-M L R, supra note 2.
6. Kara, supra note 2, at 128.
7. Id.
609
U.S. Policy on Human Tracking: A Partial Solution for a Perpelxing Global Human Rghts Problems
Bailey
this end are dicult to eectuate for many reasons such as push-back by
state-sovereignty advocates over a “new” human rights regime, and the
frequent complicity of state ocials in perpetuating tracking crimes
within their borders. Recent attempts by the United States to combat
tracking on an international scale through its Tracking Victims
Protection Act (TVPA) have generated public outcry and resistance to
hegemonic inuence in a global human rights regimes.8
In this paper, I argue that the impact of U.S. anti-tracking
legislation has been largely positive because (a) its operative language
has been craed in accordance with international principles, (b) its
practical application reects the fact that countries with U.S.-based
domestic anti-tracking policies are not treated more favorably, and
(c) it provides the hard law that can eectuate so law on human
tracking by minimizing the economic benet of participating in the
illicit industry.
I. BACKGROUND ON ANTI-
TRAFFICKING INTERNATIONAL LAW
As with many human rights regimes, the anti-human tracking regime
sits at the center of complex denitional and moral issues, contributing
to considerable international debate on the most eective ways to de-
ne the issue and combat it appropriately. “Because so many dierent
agencies, organizations, and lobby groups seek to address such radical-
ly dierent concerns and agendas through a focus on tracking, it has
proved remarkably dicult to obtain consensus on a precise and work-
able legal denition of the term.”9 Appropriate, consensus-based global
responses to the problem of human tracking have been elusive for
a few reasons: rst, the scope of the problem is virtually unknowable;
second, remediation for the problem of human tracking sits at the in-
tersection of controversial moral issues; and third, solution building is
at the intersection of two regimes—law enforcement and human rights.
8. Janie Chuang, e United States as Global Sheri: Using Unilateral Sanctions to
Combat Human Tracking, 27 M. J. I’ L. 437 (2005).
9. Bridget Anderson & Julia O’Connell Davidson, Tracking: A Demand-led
Problem? A Multi-Country Pilot Study, S C (2002).
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