Two Readings of Bentham's Theory of Meaning as Applied to Moral and Political Discourse

• Published date: 01 December 2021
• Author: Simon Palmer
• Date: 01 December 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12333

© 2021 The Authors. Ratio Juris, published by University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Ratio Juris. Vol. 34 No. 4 December 2021 (386–414)

Two Readings of Bentham’s Theory

of Meaning as Applied to Moral

and Political Discourse

SIMON PALMER*

Abstract. In this paper, I sketch out and assess two readings of Bentham’s theory of meaning,

one reductive (Section 2), the other quasi- pragmatist (Section 3)— both implicating Bentham’s

ontological and epistemological views. I focus on the way these readings would understand

Bentham’s analyses of claims in moral and political discourse that rely on putatively normative

notions such as obligations and rights, good and bad, and what ought to be the case. I conclude

the paper by suggesting tentatively that the independent merits of both readings could signal

an irreconcilable tension at the heart of Bentham’s thought (Section 4).

1. Introduction

Two instincts lie are at the roots of Bentham’s thought— one naturalistic, the other

pragmatist. The first pulls Bentham toward a view of mind and world admitting the

existence only of natural substances and the impressions and other derivative mental

states their presence leaves upon us. The second takes human flourishing as not just

one amongst other values, but the only value of ultimate and irreducibly normative

significance. A site wherein these twin instincts exert their greatest influence is in

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* An ancestor of this paper benefited greatly from Gerald Postema’s generous and corrective

feedback given at a panel dedicated to his Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Postema

2019a) and Utility, Publicity, and Law (Postema 2019b), held at the Karlsruhe Institute of

Technology International Society for Utilitarian Studies conference in July 2018. Xiaobo Zhai

deserves special mention for organising the panel, and thanks should also be extended to the

panel’s participants for the day’s insightful discussions (they include Francesco Ferraro, Michael

Lobban, Michihiro Kaino, Gerald Postema, Dan Priel, and Xiaobo Zhai). Thanks too are owed to

Philip Schofield in particular, and to Kristi Gourlay, Michael Quinn, Michael Schefczyk, William

Twining, and Xiaobo Zhai— conversations with all of whom were helpful in stimulating some

of the ideas in the paper. Alex Green, Alexandra Hearne, and Oisin Suttle provided valuable

encouragement and instructive comments late in the paper’s development. I’m grateful, too, for

useful suggestions from an anonymous referee for the journal, and to the journal’s copyeditor,

Filippo Valente. A final thanks to Douglas Long and Philip Schofield for making available to me

their early transcriptions of Bentham’s Preparatory Principles and Logic and Language manu-

scripts, respectively. Any remaining errors are mine. A final note: Throughout this article, words

and phrases referred to as such will be enclosed within single quotation marks, while all quoted

matter will be enclosed within double quotation marks. Open access funding enabled and orga-

nized by ProjektDEAL.

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Ratio Juris, Vol. 34, No. 4 © 2021 The Authors. Ratio Juris, published by University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Two Readings of Bentham ’ s Theory

Bentham’s theory of meaning.1 In this paper, I sketch out and assess two readings of

that theory that correspond respectively to these two instincts— one reductive, the

other quasi- pragmatist. My focus will be on the way each reading understands

Bentham’s conceptions of normative notions used in moral and political discourse

(MPD).

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I sketch out the reductive reading of

Bentham’s theory of meaning (RR), implicating as it does his ontological and epistemo-

logical views. I show how the RR understands the substance of Bentham’s conceptions

of MPD involving important putatively normative notions such as that of obligation

and right, good and bad, right and wrong, and what ought to be the case. I conclude

the section by adducing worries I believe the RR saddles Bentham’s theory of meaning

with— worries that by Bentham’s own lights he would want to avoid. In Section 3,

I present an alternative “quasi- pragmatist” reading of Bentham’s theory of meaning

(QPR), drawing heavily on Gerald Postema’s own QPR (Postema 2019b, 3– 25). I show

how the QPR alters the underlying character of Bentham’s conceptions of the same

normative notions canvassed in Section 2, before concluding by discussing difficulties

I see in the way the QPR relates normative notions to the extramental entities Bentham

thinks provide them with crucial explanatory support. The QPR, if right, requires a

radical reorientation in the way Bentham’s ontology and epistemology are tradition-

ally thought of. In Section 4, I conclude by suggesting tentatively that the independent

merits of the RR and the QPR speak to the possibility of an irreconcilable tension at the

heart of Bentham’s thinking between his naturalistic and pragmatist instincts.

2. Reductive

On the RR, MPD is analysable without loss into non- normative discourse. The ration-

ale for attributing this thesis to Bentham is borne from a popular way of interpreting

Bentham’s ontological and epistemological views, views which the RR takes as the

primary backdrop to Bentham’s theory of meaning.2 According to Bentham, the nor-

mative notions invoked in MPD are “fictitious” entities. Thought and talk of ficti-

tious entities is intelligible only when connected to thought and talk of what Bentham

calls “real” entities. On the RR, this connection is essentially analytical. Thought and

talk about fictitious entities is meaningful because, properly understood, it is thought

and talk about real entities. Before I can present how the RR understands Bentham’s

conceptions of normative notions, we need to have some handle on his ontology and

epistemology as the RR understands them.

Entities, for Bentham, are either real or unreal. On a standard interpretation of

Bentham’s ontological and epistemological views, real entities are either ordinary nat-

ural substances (“physical” or “material” entities like rocks, trees, and lions) or mental

1 Sustained treatments of Bentham’s theory of meaning can be found in Bronzo 2014; Dinwiddy

1989, 38– 53; Goldworth 1972; Harrison 1983, 47– 105; Jackson 1998; Ogden 1932; Postema 2019b,

1– 25; Quinn 2012b; Rosen 2005, 46– 56; Schofield 2009b, 1– 27; Tarantino 2018, 21– 58; Tyler 2004.

2 The RR’s bases as I construct them are partly inspired by the important accounts given of

Bentham’s ontology and epistemology in Quinn 2012b; 2013b; Schofield 2009a, 50– 3; 2009b,

1– 27; 2010. I think, however, that Philip Schofield and Michael Quinn would contest, amongst

other things, the overall analytical gloss I give to the RR (notwithstanding, of course, the

important differences between their accounts). I thank them for numerous illuminating conver-

sations on Bentham’s views here.